

household to change over the next 12 months? It will . . . (get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse, don't know).”

As noted, these discrete evaluations (whose pairwise correlations here ranged from .20 to .54) have typically been found to exert varying influence on intolerant and populist sentiment, and were thus left as separate variables in our model.

MODELS AND METHODS

We employed logistic regression to analyze each of our dichotomous measures of populist voting as a function of the authoritarian dynamic—the interaction of authoritarian predisposition with our overall measure of normative threat.

Note that each of these models also originally included as controls the four discrete items reflecting economic evaluations, as well as the interactions of those evaluations with authoritarianism. With sample size trimmed by the elimination of non-whites and non-voters, it was important not to overload the models, particularly in view of their estimation via logistic regression. Thus, if any of these evaluations or their interactions proved statistically insignificant, they were removed from the model in question. The full models and raw results (logit coefficients) from which the findings presented here in the text are derived are reported in Appendix F, Table 1, at www.KarenSennner.com under “Repository.”

tory” (including results for the economic control variables). The conditional coefficients (marginal effects) calculated from those raw results are also reported there in Appendix F, Table 2.

Here in the text itself, we present succinctly in Table 1 (below) only our core findings regarding the impact of the authoritarian dynamic, as conveyed via changes in the predicted probability of voting for populist candidates and causes, given different predispositions to authoritarianism, and varying conditions of normative threat.

TABLE 1. PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR POPULIST CANDIDATES AND CAUSES: Trump, Brexit and Le Pen (2016–2017)

Effects of independent variables (X):	Under interaction conditions:	Increasing X changes P(Y) from:		
		P(Voting for Trump)	P(Voting for Brexit)	P(Voting for Le Pen)
<i>Authoritarianism</i>	<i>if high normative threat</i>	.07 → .87*	.30 → .93*	.11 → .84*
	<i>if mid normative threat</i>	.21 → .63*	.38 → .68*	.07 → .31*
	<i>if low normative threat</i>	.48 → .31	.47 → .27	.05 → .04
<i>Normative Threat</i>	<i>if authoritarian predisposition</i>	.31 → .87*	.27 → .93*	.04 → .84*
	<i>if balanced predisposition</i>	.39 → .41	.36 → .70*	.04 → .44*
	<i>if non-authoritarian predisposition</i>	.48 → .07*	.47 → .30	.05 → .11

Note: Predictions derived from logistic regression analyses in Appendix F, Table 1 at www.KarenSennner.com under “Repository.” * significant at $p < .05$.

Before turning our focus to the authoritarian dynamic, we note first that authoritarianism did indeed prove to be the main “background” determinant of populist voting across all three countries in our investigation. That is to say, there was no socio-demographic variable whose impact on populist voting exceeded that of our basic “child-rearing values” measure of authoritarianism: not education, income, religion, gender, age, or urban/rural residence. We found that the impact of authoritarianism was substantial even under ordinary conditions—among those not feeling particularly threatened (or reassured)—increasing the probability of a populist vote by about .42, .30, and .24 in the US, UK, and France, respectively (see Appendix F; Table 2, upper panel).

Put more simply, even given middling perceptions of normative threat in their polity, Americans ranged from about a .21 to a .63 probability of voting for Trump as authoritarianism went from its lowest to its highest levels (see Table 1, page 197). Similarly, highly authoritarian Britons had about a 68 percent likelihood, and their non-authoritarian peers about a 38 percent chance, of voting to leave the European Union when perceptions of normative threat were unremarkable. And under those same conditions, about 31 percent of highly authoritarian French voters would likely opt for Le Pen, compared to only about 7 percent of their non-authoritarian comparitors.

A NOTE ON INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

Note that all the statements directly above simply represent alternative ways of describing the results presented in the

upper panel of Table 1 (page 197), across the row labeled “if mid normative threat.” This seems the appropriate place to pause and ensure we have clarity first on some important issues of methodology and terminology. For us, the “impact” of any independent variable (e.g., authoritarianism) is the difference in expected outcomes (e.g., in the likelihood of voting for Trump) between those scoring at the extremes (highly authoritarian versus non-authoritarian) of that explanatory variable. Technically, it is the change predicted in the dependent variable for a one-unit increase in the independent variable, e.g., the change in the probability of populist voting in response to a one-unit increase in authoritarianism. Recall we scored all our variables such that a “one-unit increase” always entails moving across the full range (from lower to upper bound) of the explanatory variable, e.g., it is the difference between the very non-authoritarian and the highly authoritarian. The change that such an increase induces in the likelihood of populist voting is, in our terminology, the “impact” of that explanatory variable.

Crucially, we expect that this impact will vary under different conditions, e.g., given conditions of normative threat or reassurance. This varying impact is reflected by the varying magnitude and direction of the conditional coefficients we report in Appendix F; Table 2, and likewise by the steepness and direction of the slopes in the associated Figures 2 and 3 (below). The reader can refer to Appendix F; Table 1 for the full results from which these conditional coefficients and slopes were derived.

RESULTS

IMPACT OF AUTHORITARIANISM ON POPULISM,
GIVEN VARYING NORMATIVE THREAT

Figure 2 (opposite) depicts the impact upon voting for populist candidates and causes of moving across the full range of the authoritarianism measure (from very non-authoritarian up to highly authoritarian) as the variable with which it interacts—normative threat—is held, in turn, at very high and low levels. These different slopes graphically reflect what we have called the authoritarian dynamic: they represent the varying effects of authoritarianism under conditions of normative threat and reassurance.

The three constituent panels of Figure 2 reflect the probability of voting for Trump, Brexit, and Le Pen, respectively. All these *authoritarianism x normative threat* interactions proved to be very substantial and highly significant (see Appendix F; Table 1). As anticipated, the impact of authoritarianism was greatly magnified (steepened) under conditions of normative threat. For example (see Figure 2, upper panel), we found that authoritarianism increased the probability of voting for Trump by about .80 under conditions of high normative threat, with the likelihood of a Trump vote ranging from only about 7 percent (for non-authoritarians) to about 87 percent (for authoritarians) among disillusioned respondents who saw their government as controlled by rich elites and their country headed in the “wrong direction.” Note that the steepness of these slopes and their end points (both specified above) align, respectively, with the marginal effects reported in Appendix F,




FIGURE 2: Impact of authoritarianism on voting for populist candidates and causes, for those who perceive low versus high normative threat.

Table 2, and with the marginal probabilities presented here in Table 1 (page 197).

Much the same pattern was evident for the UK (see Figure 2, middle panel), where we found that authoritarianism increased the probability of voting to leave the European Union by about .64 given conditions of high normative threat, with the likelihood of favoring Brexit ranging from about 30 percent (for non-authoritarians) to about 93 percent (for authoritarians) when leaders, governments, and democracy itself were all found sorely wanting (see Table 1, page 197). Likewise regarding the electoral appeal of the National Front in France (see Figure 2, lower panel). Here we found that authoritarianism increased the probability of voting for Le Pen by about .75 given high normative threat, with the likelihood of a vote for the National Front ranging from about 11 percent (among non-authoritarians) to about 84 percent (among authoritarians) given wholesale loss of confidence in democratic government and leadership (see Table 1, page 197).

Notice that throughout Figure 2, this impressive impact of authoritarianism is effectively flattened to virtually nothing under conditions of great normative reassurance, i.e., when people are sure their country is headed in the right direction and feel confident in the workings of democracy, positive about the government, and unconcerned about elite machinations. Although the marginal effects are not statistically significant in the case of reassurance, we see at least a hint in these pictures that under these reassuring societal conditions, authoritarians might even be repelled by popu-

list movements, seemingly lending more of their support to mainstream parties and leaders when the normative order seems intact and functional, and worthy of their allegiance.

Keep in mind it is *not* that people become less authoritarian under these conditions, only that their authoritarianism produces less manifest intolerance. Their inherent predispositions remain intact but latent, awaiting only the sounding of the next societal alarm—about immigrant hordes, moral decay, political disarray—to kick back into action and haul out the defensive arsenal.

IMPACT OF NORMATIVE THREAT ON POPULISM, GIVEN VARYING AUTHORITARIANISM

Some of this becomes clearer still when viewed from a different angle. Figure 3 (page 204) simply takes that same *authoritarianism x normative threat* interaction and depicts it from the other side, this time showing how the impact upon populism of normative threat (of moving from the lower bound of the scale, reflecting great reassurance, up to the upper bound, indicating extreme threat) depends on the predispositions of the perceiver: whether authoritarian or non-authoritarian.

When considered from this alternative perspective, the potential political power of the authoritarian dynamic is readily apparent. In the lower panel of Table 1 (page 197), we see that increasing feelings of normative threat intensified attraction to populism even among those of “balanced” disposition (at least outside the US), who were driven a considerable way toward voting for Brexit and nearly halfway




FIGURE 3. Impact of normative threat on voting for populist candidates and causes, for those who are low versus high in authoritarianism.

to accepting the National Front as feelings of normative threat soared. But this impact of normative threat on populist voting was basically *doubled* for those of authoritarian disposition. As anticipated, it was authoritarians—heavily invested in the normative order that fills their world with oneness and sameness—who were by far the most reactive to normative threat (see Figure 3). For example, we calculated that rising normative threat increased authoritarians' probability of voting for Trump by about .58 (see Appendix F, Table 2), boosting their likelihood of a Trump vote from about 31 percent, among those feeling reassured about the polity, up to about 87 percent, for those convinced their world was coming apart (see Table 1, page 197).

We detected the same forces at work in the UK sample (see Figure 3, middle panel), where we found that mounting threats to the normative order drove authoritarians toward leaving the European Union, boosting their likelihood of favoring Brexit from about 27 percent, when feeling roundly reassured, up to about 93 percent, once highly threatened (see Table 1, page 197). An even starker picture was painted for France (see Figure 3, lower panel). Here we saw the accumulation of normative threat increase authoritarians' probability of voting for the National Front by about .80, lifting their prospects of tapping Le Pen for the presidency from as little as 4 percent, given constant reassurance, to as much as 84 percent, in the face of intense normative threat (see Table 1, page 197).

Finally, our evaluation of the evidence is not complete until we consider how normative threat affects those at the

lower bound of the authoritarian spectrum. Across two decades of empirical research, we cannot think of a significant exception to the finding that normative threat tends either to leave non-authoritarians utterly unmoved by the things that catalyze authoritarians or to propel them toward being (what one might conceive as) their “best selves.” In previous investigations, this has seen non-authoritarians move toward positions of greater tolerance and respect for diversity under the very conditions that seem to propel authoritarians toward increasing intolerance. In a nutshell, authoritarians act more like authoritarians, and non-authoritarians more like their antithesis, under these conditions. As authoritarians move to shore up their defense of oneness and sameness, non-authoritarians may redouble their own efforts on behalf of the “open society.” Based now on this latest evidence, it seems that non-authoritarians’ “activation”—in defense of freedom and diversity over obedience and conformity—includes rejection of populist candidates and causes that fail to share this vision of the good life.

Certainly this appears to hold at least for non-authoritarians in the contemporary United States: see Figure 3, upper panel, for a stark depiction of this “classic” polarization under conditions of normative threat. It is so being indeed to ponder the self-fueling properties of this dynamic—where perceptions of normative threat produce increasing polarization that in turn further exacerbates normative threat—which is surely implicated in our debilitating contemporary “culture wars” (see also Hetherington and Weiler, 2009).

ECONOMIC FACTORS WEAK AND INCONSISTENT

The one empirical task that remains is to compare the impact of the authoritarian dynamic on support for populist candidates and causes with that of economic “distress,” variously conceived. As noted at the outset, the notion that populist attitudes and behaviors are driven, in some way, by economic distress is one of the most common accounts offered for the current “wave” of populism in the wake of the GFC, the decline of manufacturing, and the inevitable dislocations of globalism. It is a highly “rational” account of the populist phenomenon, with economics and materialism at its core, and analysts offering these kinds of accounts sometimes go to considerable lengths even to reframe manifestly nonmaterial explanations in materialistic terms. For example, there is the argument that anti-immigrant sentiment is not really (or only) about immigration, but instead (or additionally) a means of expressing economic fears and displacing them onto the immigrants (refugees, minorities, guest workers, terrorists-in-the-making) who are purportedly stealing the natives’ jobs and draining communal resources that ought to be reserved for the locals.

Our own investigation finds the evidence in support of the notion that populism is mostly fueled by economic distress to be weak and inconsistent, however that distress is conceptualized. Preliminary analyses confirmed that the four economic evaluations available in the EuroPulse data (retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy and household finances) represented distinct sentiments, and ought to be entered separately in our model.

In terms of both the magnitude and direction of their effects, these four variables exerted widely varying influence on populism (in contrast to the various components of normative threat), as a review of the economic results in Appendix F will confirm. This persisted even without controlling for authoritarianism and normative threat, and regardless of whether the model included interactions between authoritarianism and the various economic components.

We found that the effects of these economic evaluations were either weak and inconsistent or, sometimes, large and counterintuitive. Evaluations of household finances seemed mostly inconsequential as predictors of populist voting (which accords with the generally modest effects discerned for income). Perceptions of (past) national economic decline had some mixed effects (including, in the case of France, in interaction with authoritarianism), but certainly seemed to propel some voters toward Trump. Yet even that finding sits side by side with a seemingly counterintuitive result, with positive evaluations of the economic *future* apparently associated with support for both Trump and Brexit (see Appendix F). Of course, the direction of causality remains unclear. Given that these hopeful sentiments were measured *after* the vote in each case, it is quite possible that having voted for Trump/Brexit, these voters consequently felt more optimistic about the future. It is plausible that a vote for Trump may have reflected in some part dissatisfaction with past economic progress *together with* hope for a future economic turnaround. If so, this would make America's choice of a billionaire businessman for president an expression not just of

unleavened economic fear and disappointment but also at least a touch of economic hope and optimism for the future.

In any case, what we found is that there is no real pattern to be discerned in regard to economic influences across either the different economic components or the different politics. This would accord with the inconsistent findings typically reported by others, and with the general state of uncertainty regarding whether we are truly confronting a “wave” of populism (and whether it is surging or has stopped), and also with the continuing disagreement over the direction of causality between anti-immigrant sentiment and professions of economic distress. We refer here to the dispute over whether our “populists” are typically starting with (real or imagined) perceptions of financial/economic threat and projecting that onto easy targets like immigrants, or whether they are starting with their opposition to immigration and—due to the constraints of political correctness—merely expressing that as economic distress (viz., “the immigrants are stealing our jobs”). We think the totality of evidence tends to favor the latter, a theme we will return to below.

DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

DEMOCRACY DOES NOT BREED DEMOCRATS

Trump ascended to the American presidency, Britain exited Europe, and the French flirted with the National Front because Western liberal democracies have now exceeded many people's capacity to tolerate them—to live with them, and in them. This is hard to accept until one comes to terms

with two critical realities. First, people are not empty vessels waiting to be filled with appreciation and enthusiasm for democratic processes. It is perhaps ironic that tolerance of difference is now threatened by liberal democrats' refusal to recognize that many of their fellow citizens are . . . different. We all come into the world with distinct personalities, which is to say, predisposed to want, need, and fear different things, including particular social arrangements. Presumably, societies with a diverse mix of complementary characters tended to survive and adapt to changing environments in human evolution. Notwithstanding some ancient migration bottlenecks, these different personalities—authoritarian and libertarian, open and closed, risk-seeking and risk-averse, to name but a few—have over time distributed themselves all around the world. This means there are plenty of would-be liberal democrats languishing in autocracies, and many authoritarians struggling along under “vibrant” liberal democracies.

Second, there is remarkably little evidence that living in a liberal democracy generally makes people more democratic and tolerant. This means that most societies—including those “blessed” with democracies—will *persistently* harbor a certain proportion of residents (by our calculations, roughly a third) who will always find diversity difficult to tolerate. That predisposition, and those limitations, may be largely immutable. And this is the most important implication: if we are right about normative threat serving as a critical catalyst for these characters, then the things that multiculturalists believe will help people appreciate and thrive in democracy—

experiencing difference, talking about difference, displaying and applauding difference—are the very conditions that encourage authoritarianism not to the heights of tolerance, but to their intolerant extremes. Democracy in general, and tolerance in particular, might actually be better served by an abundance of common and unifying rituals, institutions, and processes.

IS ANYBODY LISTENING?

Democratic enthusiasts and multiculturalists sometimes make the mistake of thinking we are at an enlightened point in human history (Fukuyama 1992) when all these different personalities—daily experiencing the joys of increasing liberty and democracy—are evolving in a fairly predictable and linear fashion into more perfect democratic citizens. This is why the populist “wave” strikes many observers as a momentary madness that “comes out of the blue,” and why the sentiments that seem to fuel these movements are often considered merely the products of frustration, hatred, and manipulation by irresponsible populist leaders—certainly not serious, legitimate preferences that a democracy must attend to.

When authoritarians raise concerns about, say, the rates or sources of immigration, they are not actually saying, “I’m scared I might lose my job,” but in fact, “This is making me very uncomfortable and I don’t like where our country is headed.” Moreover, “Nobody will let me say so, and only [this Trump-like figure] is listening to me.” Our sense is that if Trump had not come along, a Trump-like figure would have materialized eventually. It may be the case that many Republicans would have voted for anyone marketed under

the Republican brand. And Hillary Clinton may well have won if FBI director James Comey had not made his ill-timed announcement. And it seems likely that Russian interference tilted the outcome. But one must still explain why a Trump-like figure was even within reach of the presidency, and why Trump-like figures are popping up all over, and why the outrageous statements that critics thought would surely destroy their candidacies seem to be the very things that most thrill their supporters and solidify their bases.

Trump publicly inviting Russia to hack into Clinton's private emails was shocking to many from a number of perspectives, but perhaps the most prominent was the lack of horror expressed by many of his supporters at what might conceivably be characterized as treason. When being interviewed about his foreign policy, Trump assured us that he himself would happily "take out the families" of suspected ISIS terrorists: essentially, making a public declaration of his willingness to commit war crimes. Far from provoking horror, Trump's many astonishing statements—all indelibly infused with classic authoritarian sentiments and stances—were greeted with a kind of exhilaration by his supporters. It became clear that a large portion of the American people felt the nation's political leaders had not just failed them but actually did not represent them. Here "represent" goes well beyond mere political representation to something more primitive, like "belonging." In essence: "You are not us." In this state of mind, it no longer seemed beyond the pale to publicly invite a dangerous and long-

standing adversary to spy on the country's leaders, or extol the effectiveness of war crimes for nipping terrorism in the bud. The gleeful reactions of Trump's supporters to his "strongman" posturing attested to their anger and bitterness regarding the "political correctness" of the "liberal elite," and the pleasure they seemed to derive from watching someone who sounds like "us" finally sticking it to "them."

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE

Clearly, immigration policy is the flashpoint for populism and offers a critical starting point for any new efforts at civil peace. If citizens say they're concerned about the rate of immigration, we ought to at least consider the possibility that they're concerned about the rate of immigration, and not merely masking a hateful racism or displacing their economic woes onto easy scapegoats. Common sense and historical experience tell us that there is some rate of newcomers into any community that is too high to be sustainable—that can overwhelm or even damage the host and make things worse for both old and new members. It is also common sense that some newcomers are more difficult to integrate than others—especially when there are clashing values and lifestyles. Some might, accordingly, need to be more carefully selected, or more heavily supported and resourced to encourage and aid their assimilation. All these things must be considered when formulating a successful immigration policy (Haidt 2016). Ignoring these issues is not helpful to either the hosts or the

newcomers. It is implausible to maintain that the host community can successfully integrate any kind of newcomer at any rate whatsoever, and it is unreasonable to assert that any other suggestion is racist.

As noted, we already have some idea of what the requirements for social cohesion are in many other contexts. There are surely types and degrees of affinity between host and newcomers, rates of entry, and methods of supporting their assimilation and inclusion that facilitate successful integration into the community. Frank consideration of these matters is the key to broad acceptance of immigration policy and vital to the continued health of our liberal democracies. For all the reasons we have canvassed, these things are not currently known, but are knowable. It is essential for free societies to discuss these issues openly, and a matter of great urgency that we empirically investigate these parameters and settle the matter with hard evidence. Most obviously, if we were able to discuss these kinds of questions openly, they could simply be incorporated into mainstream political debates and effectively managed by normal political processes, cutting much of the fuel for intolerant social movements. Another important benefit of better immigration policies is that the resulting improvements in social inclusion and cohesion are likely to reduce the prospects of radicalization and terrorism, since these phenomena may be driven, in large part, by the dis-integration of perpetrators from their families and communities.

DEMOCRACY'S CORE DILEMMA, AND A CRITICAL CROSSROADS

Although we have paid great attention here to the role played by normative threat in the populist phenomenon, one critical thing to note about authoritarians is that they are *not* especially inclined to perceive normative (or indeed, any other kind of) threat—they are just especially reactive when they do. If anything, authoritarians, by their very nature, want to believe in authorities and institutions; they want to feel they are part of a cohesive community. Accordingly, they seem (if anything) to be modestly inclined toward giving authorities and institutions the benefit of the doubt, and lending them their support until the moment these seem incapable of maintaining “normative order.” As our observation of the mechanics of the authoritarian dynamic made clear, authoritarians are highly reactive *and* highly malleable. Depending on their assessment of shifting environmental conditions, they can be moved from indifference, even positions of modest tolerance, to aggressive demands to “crack down” on immigrants, minorities, “deviants,” and dissidents, employing the full force of state authority. This is to say, the current state we find ourselves in can easily be made much worse, or much better, by how we come together and respond to this now in terms of attending to people’s needs for oneness and sameness; for identity, cohesion, and belonging; for pride and honor; and for institutions and leaders they can respect. This should take the place of demeaning and ridiculing authoritarians, ignoring their needs and preferences (which

is an undemocratic way for a democracy to treat a third of its citizens), and simply waiting for them to “come back to their senses.” It is condescending to say that no sane, reasonable person could want the things they want, therefore they must be unhinged or else are being manipulated.

But this is no momentary madness. It is a perpetual feature of human societies: a latent pool of need that lurks just beneath the surface and seems to be activated most certainly by things that constitute the very essence of liberal democracy—things such as

... the experience or perception of disobedience to group authorities or authorities unworthy of respect, nonconformity to group norms or norms proving questionable, lack of consensus in group values and beliefs, and, in general, diversity and freedom “run amok”... (Stenner 2005: 17).

Liberal democracy has now exceeded many people’s capacity to tolerate it. And absent proper understanding of the origins and dynamics of this populist moment, well-meaning citizens, political parties, and governments are likely to respond to these movements in ways that serve only to exacerbate their negative features and entirely miss their possibilities. The same warning goes out to all of Western Europe and the English-speaking world post-Brexit. Worst of all, we might miss the real opportunities for a thoughtful, other-regarding reconciliation of two critical parts of our human nature: the desire to liberate and

enable the individual, and the impetus to protect and serve the collective.

We have shown that the far-right populist wave that seemed to “come out of nowhere” did not in fact come out of nowhere. It is not a sudden madness, or virus, or tide, or even just a copycat phenomenon—the emboldening of bigots and despots by others’ electoral successes. Rather, it is something that sits just beneath the surface of any human society—including in the advanced liberal democracies at the heart of the Western world—and can be activated by core elements of liberal democracy itself.

Liberal democracy can become its own undoing because its core elements activate forces that undermine it and its best features constrain it from vigorously protecting itself. So it seems we are not at the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). The “last man” is not a perfected liberal democrat. Liberal democracy may not be the “final form of human government.” And intolerance is not a thing of the past; it is very much a thing of the present, and of the future.

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NOTES

1. This section draws on arguments and evidence first presented in Stenner (2005, 2009a, 2009b). The reader is referred to the originals for further details and discussion.
2. In terms of collection methodology, Dalia's platform approaches millions of potential respondents through a network of over 40,000 apps and websites, whose users are anonymously profiled across key demographic attributes and selected according to census statistics. Data are collected online via desktop, laptop, tablet, and smartphone, and then weighted according to population structures and census statistics to obtain a representative sample.
3. Ultimately, just 55 percent of eligible Americans actually voted in the 2016 presidential election (compared to the 68 percent of our US sample who reportedly turned out), with 46 percent of those voting for Trump (compared to 44 percent in our sample). In Britain, 72 percent of those registered turned out to vote in the referendum, which exactly matches our British sample's self-reported turnout. But as noted, our sample seems to underrepresent the "exit" vote, with 52 percent voting to leave the European Union in reality, compared to 43 percent in our sample. Our figures do closely align in the French case, where 78 percent of those who were eligible voted in the first round of the recent presidential election (compared to the 80 percent of our French sample who said they intended to vote). And 21 percent ultimately opted for Le Pen in that first round (compared to the 22 percent of our sample who said they intended to do so).
4. Note that this is simply an unobtrusive means of measuring values; it need not reflect either how respondents were raised or how they are raising their own children.
5. We stress that the people we classified as being of authoritarian predisposition did not always describe themselves as right of center. In fact, when required to "describe [their] political views on a left-right scale," 42 percent of these authoritarians chose one of the "left-wing" options, while 58 percent chose one of the right-wing options. Among those we classified as non-authoritarian, 55 percent placed themselves left of center and 45 percent placed themselves right of center.