

intuition. As mentioned earlier, I suggest that this occurs during the movement from System 1 (intuitions) to System 2 (beliefs). The difficulty arises in that there are a number of different psychological drivers that affect the formation of political beliefs. Consider long-standing intractable conflict where leaders have long histories of disappointment and perhaps perceived unethical behavior. In such instances, individuals may come to face-to-face interactions with a pre-formed set of beliefs about the intentions of the other. Over the course of interaction they may gain an intuition that stands in contrast to their prior-held beliefs, but *changing* that belief likely requires more than a single intuition. The neuroscientific and psychological studies referenced above are normally conducted with complete strangers, individuals without the type of experience and history with others that is quite common in international politics, particularly in intractable conflicts. As Wheeler has noted, bad-faith models, for example, may serve to point individuals toward particular beliefs because the past is influencing the present.

These System 2 psychological drivers can be very hard to overcome. Belief perseverance, while a powerful psychological principle, does not imply that individuals simply reinforce their beliefs upon meeting face-to-face, however. Rather, because of the privileged access doctrine discussed above, where individuals feel more certainty in their intuitions since they are experiencing them for themselves, simulating the intuition in their own physical body, individuals are more likely to privilege the intuition they generate in ST face-to-face than TT intention approximation. Put another way, the empirical cases that follow often demonstrate instances of individuals arriving to an interaction with a pre-formed belief about the intention of the other, generated from afar through approximation, and either confirming or revising that belief based on the intuition that follows from the face-to-face interaction. Prior-held beliefs might predispose individuals to feel a particular way regarding the other's intentions, but they do not preclude face-to-face interaction from providing an entirely different understanding since the mechanisms of ST and TT are entirely different.

In addition to the problems of individual differences and psychological drivers, there are a number of counter-arguments that need to be addressed. Rather than deal with all of them in a single place, I will address them individually as they often appear as counter-explanations of the empirical cases to follow. Three common counter-arguments that will be found in each of the cases that follow are folk psychology/TT approximation of intentions, costly signaling, and trust. The theory presented in this book suggests that ST represents the method by which diplomats and leaders come to understand the intentions of others in

face-to-face diplomacy and that this explains their ultimate decisions. If, instead, they privilege intention approximation from afar, or learn little from their face-to-face encounters with respect to intentions, then this would be a problem for the theory and a strong counter-argument to what I am proposing. Similarly costly signaling has been identified as an effective way for states to convey their intentions. If costly signals explain the intention understanding engendered, rather than face-to-face diplomacy, this too would be problematic for the theory. Finally, trust is a particularly thorny problem since the development of intention understanding and the development of trust often go hand-in-hand. If it is indeed trust, or perceptions of trustworthiness of one's counterpart, that explain the decisions made in diplomacy, rather than the face-to-face intention understanding, then this would be problematic. In each of the cases that follow, as well as the concluding chapter in the case of trust, I deal explicitly with these counter-arguments.

Case Selection and Measurement

Empirically investigating these propositions in diplomacy is challenging for a number of reasons. First, it requires an independent measure of intentions. If "intention" is defined as a diplomat's reading of intentions, the key question becomes how to measure that reading's accuracy. For a compelling empirical case, the intentions of the interlocutor need to be available as well as what intentions the diplomat is reading from the interlocutor. For example, it is important to demonstrate that diplomats not only believe that face-to-face interaction makes a difference from an intention understanding perspective, but to provide evidence that it actually does. This is difficult since the ideal evidence, an independent measure of the mental state of an actor, is not attainable. Nevertheless, what we can do is reconstruct, through triangulation of sources and evidence, with a relatively high level of precision what the diplomat believed the other's intentions to be and what the interlocutors intentions were at the time. Because leaders may not be able to articulate precisely what face-to-face diplomacy is doing for them, they often cannot express precisely what it was that caused them to infer a particular intention. As such, much of what we are looking for is reference to claims of "having a sense," or "feeling," which speaks to intuition. Clearly this is subject to error, and at root the process of knowledge-creation is based on approximation. In any case, such a standard of evidence creates arguably a high bar for empirical research.

Investigating these propositions faces another hurdle: the analysis of face-to-face interactions themselves. Researchers may be able to

empirically demonstrate the sincere intentions of the interlocutor as well as the diplomat's reading of those intentions, but it is far more difficult to prove that it was the face-to-face interaction that led to that assessment. One interaction as a source of information cannot be isolated easily from other sources of information. If, for instance, a diplomat has an interaction with another diplomat and uses that meeting as a data point together with data points from classified documents, military intelligence, and so forth, how can the researcher determine that the face-to-face meeting was the decisive factor? Scholars face serious empirical problems in distinguishing the source of intention understanding when there are many potential sources that need to be disaggregated.

On the other hand, if we take what diplomats have to say about their interactions seriously, and we can check up on what they say through triangulation and consilience, then we can gain insight into what was occurring in their minds at the time. Records of conversations with others, meeting minutes, contemporaneous memoirs, and so forth, all provide ways to buttress, or falsify, the claims that leaders and diplomats make. Further, recent evidence suggests that the distance between public statements and private beliefs may not necessarily be that great.²⁴³ Put another way, we need not naively take the words of diplomats at face value in order to reconstruct what was occurring at the time of interaction – other sources of evidence allow for corroboration and gain an assessment of what they were likely thinking, and importantly feeling, at the time.²⁴⁴ This does not absolve us of the problems of post-hoc rationalization or the value-laden nature of interpreting the past, but it does allow us to combine different types of evidence to revise, or update, our understanding of the past.

Lastly, if face-to-face diplomacy aids in intention understanding, which represents a core problem under anarchy, then it is precisely moments where much is at stake in the international system that the problem of intentions is particularly relevant. This means that a theory of intentions necessarily must grapple with some of the bigger moments in diplomatic history. At the same time, focusing on the “big moments” of international politics may give the false impression that face-to-face diplomacy only matters when there is a lot on the line or an unexpected

outcome obtains.²⁴⁵ This is both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is in providing a potentially new understanding of salient moments in world history. The challenge is that most, if not all, of these moments are likely causally overdetermined.

These methodological obstacles require a specific strategy. Following the advice from John Gerring, who has perhaps done the most to provide a detailed analysis of the usefulness of the case study method and articulated a precise strategy for choosing cases, when it comes to studying decision-behavior, “case study research may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting,” even if they are inherently unobservable. Importantly, in order to do this we need to identify the causal implications of the theory and find corroborating evidence, through process tracing, for the causal argument.²⁴⁶ As Gerring suggests, process tracing is “akin to detective work,” where “multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference – bits and pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis.”²⁴⁷ Or as Mahoney puts it, “The search for decisive clues and the use of other diagnostic evidence makes process tracing somewhat like the method of discovery employed by detectives, the reasoning carried out by juries, and the guidelines used by physicians when diagnosing illnesses.”²⁴⁸ The aim is to solve a puzzle;²⁴⁹ this requires a number of steps.

First, in order to deal with problems of selection bias and endogeneity, I am interested in cases where the likelihood of agreement or overall success was low but policymakers nevertheless chose to pursue face-to-face diplomacy, while noting that the theory does not just apply to surprising or unusual outcomes. For example, Jimmy Carter faced tremendous skepticism from some in his administration with respect to the idea of bringing Israeli and Egyptian leadership together in order to craft an unprecedented peace agreement. Given the level of hostility and deep suspicion each side shared for the other, the likelihood of success was low. Indeed in this case, the dogs were not barking until Carter engaged in a series of face-to-face interactions that allowed him to understand the potential for cooperation. The aim of each case study is to answer a relatively simple question: would the outcome of intention understanding (or misunderstanding) be the same were it not for face-to-face interaction? Each case is structured around this counterfactual

²⁴³ See, for example, Renshon 2009; Schafer 2000.

²⁴⁴ One of the more intriguing strategies for assessing mental states in historical cases come from piecing together emotional states experienced by the individuals and communities involved. While difficult to pinpoint what individuals were thinking at any given time, uncovering emotion through letters, deeds, chronicles, and so forth help to uncover the patterns of emotions and “feeling rules” tell individuals how to feel and express feelings. See Hochschild 1979 and Rosenwein 2005.

²⁴⁵ See, for example, Pouliot's (2016, 8) critique of the “widespread bias toward extraordinary individuals or outcomes” in many existing studies of diplomacy.

²⁴⁶ Gerring 2007, 45. ²⁴⁷ Gerring 2007, 173. ²⁴⁸ Mahoney 2015.

²⁴⁹ On the virtues of puzzle-based research, see Shapiro 2002; Bleiker 2009, 178–80.

in order to provide as much evidence as possible that it was the face-to-face interaction itself that led to a particular outcome. I follow Levy, who argues that counterfactuals are useful additions to case studies in identifying causal processes. As Levy notes, the "statement that x is a cause of y implies that if the value of x were different, the outcome y would be different."²⁵⁰ Counterfactuals are always theory-driven, since we can never be certain about the thought-process outcome, but they can provide more analytical leverage than case studies alone. In short, "the more explicit the counterfactual implications of a theory, the better the theory."²⁵¹

Second, dealing with epiphenomenality requires demonstrating that face-to-face diplomacy itself made a difference. In order to deal with this we need cases where the type of interaction varied but other structural considerations, such as power and economics, remained relatively static. Within case variation, where differences in interaction modality occur in a relatively short period of time, such as in the case of the German unification process at the end of the Cold War, is particularly useful. This allows for controlling, to the extent possible in a case study, the structural material environment.

As my theory is one that posits a causal relationship between two variables, specifying and measuring the variables is paramount. In terms of measurement, we should expect variation in interaction modality, i.e. whether the interaction occurs face-to-face or not (the independent variable), to have an effect on intention understanding (dependent variable). The outcome of a diplomat or leaders attempting to understand an interlocutor's intentions that are communicated in a letter, cable wire, or through costly signaling should be different from a diplomat attempting to understand intentions through a face-to-face interaction. We therefore need cases where significant variation of the interaction modality exists in order to measure difference in intention understanding. Ideally, the information provided in both interaction modalities should be the same. For instance, an interlocutor sends the diplomat a cable wire with a proposal at time t_1 . The interlocutor then meets the diplomat in a face-to-face interaction and presents the same proposal at time t_2 . We would then look for independent measures of the intentions of both the interlocutor and diplomat at t_1 and t_2 to measure any change in the dependent variable that resulted from the change in interaction modality. There are many confounding variables that need to be accounted for in such cases, such as preference change between t_1 and t_2 , the presence of actions that may be construed as costly signals, or intention dynamism within an

²⁵⁰ Levy 2008, 629.

²⁵¹ Levy 2008, 631.

interaction itself. Systematic discourse analysis of the meetings, contemporaneous writings, memoirs, and so forth will aid in identifying signals and preference changes as a result of new information. Lastly we will want some indication of the theory's limits through an analysis of scope conditions. This of course is the ideal research design. History presents more ambiguity, making the identification of actual intentions at any given time difficult. But it also presents more dynamism and nuance that can be investigated.

Finally, a note about sources is worthwhile. Given the emphasis in this book on individuals, I take what the individuals involved in the cases say about the interactions seriously. The drawback with doing so is that one can never be sure that what is said reflects the truth as it is understood by the individual. There are multiple challenges here. Memoirs, diaries, and so forth are always written for an audience (even if the audience is the author) and as such need to be understood in that context. Additionally, there may be a propensity to funnel historical insights into what Tilly calls a "standard story," a simplified linear representation of a causal sequence of events that, in all likelihood, was nonlinear and complex when it played out. However, the upside of utilizing the words of actual leaders is that we can gain insight into what they were thinking, and saying, as the events unfolded, allowing for process tracing that is impossible to reconstruct without an understanding of what was going through the minds of the individuals involved at the time. In order to deal with the drawbacks associated with taking the words of leaders at face value, I adopt a strategy of triangulation and consilience, the notion that a theory "gains in credibility to the extent that the several pieces of evidence in its favor are unrelated," whenever possible.²⁵² Put simply, evidence from independent or unrelated sources can often converge on particular conclusions. Comparison of personal accounts with official declassified documents provides further opportunities to deduce the perspectives of the individuals involved at the time. The problems associated with memoirs still remain, but triangulation and consilience severely undercut the issue.

Each of these steps, from careful linking of laboratory findings to real world politics in theory-building and proposition-construction, to triangulation of evidence, appropriation of a consilience strategy, and counterfactual analysis in the cases, contributes to a research design that seeks to make the case for the importance of face-to-face interaction

²⁵² O'Mahoney 2015, 248. On the use of consilience as a strategy for assessing unobservable variables in actors, such as motives and reasons for actions, see O'Mahoney 2015, especially 248–49.

while avoiding the logical fallacy of inference to the best explanation. Precisely because the mirroring system is difficult to observe in real world politics, the focus here is on demonstrating, through a rigorous empirical strategy, that which is observable in the lab also occurs in the real world.

The Value of Face-to-Face: An Old Idea, Refreshed

In the end the value of face-to-face diplomacy is an old idea brought into the twenty-first century by new insights from psychology and neuroscience. Social theorists in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s were right to point out that face-to-face is saliently different from other types of communication modalities. We are now in a better position, with the benefit of new technologies and experimental designs, to understand potentially why. In the following four chapters, I assess these new insights, and the propositions that I have derived from them, in four of the most salient cases of diplomatic history in the twentieth century: Cold War reassurance, the unification of Germany, the Camp David Accords of 1978, and “Munich.”

3 Reassurance at the End of the Cold War Gorbachev and Reagan Face-to-Face

Face-to-Face with the End of the Cold War

Why and how did the Cold War end? Most importantly, why did it end peacefully? These questions continue to be debated and the ramifications of the ending of the Cold War continue to affect current geopolitics. It has become commonplace to hear commentators and scholars, both in the United States and Russia, suggest that the particulars of the Cold War, including unification of Germany¹ in NATO and subsequent NATO expansion Eastward through Poland and other Eastern European states, represent some of the most important causal factors in modern international politics. The relationship of mistrust between the United States and Russia that characterizes much of the first part of the twenty-first century, for example, is often argued to be rooted in the particular circumstances of Mikhail Gorbachev’s final negotiations with the United States at the end of the twentieth. Put simply, many believe that Russia was duped by the United States. Others contest this interpretation of the history, noting that a promise regarding NATO expansion was never made. This has created a competition of narratives that may be fueling current conflict, such as the escalation of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine in 2014.²

¹ There are a number of different framings used to refer to the reestablishment of a unified German state. The process by which this occurred is the subject of the next chapter, but as it will be referenced in this chapter it is worth addressing the various formulations used, including “unification,” “reunification,” and “Germany unification,” “German unification.” While these are used interchangeably they often are used to imply different meanings or connotations. Spohr (2000) notes that “reunification” implies the pre-WWII German state being brought back together. The issue with this formulation is that in 1990 this was not the aim, as eastern territories (including Silesia and East/West Prussia) would remain part of Poland. The German government chose to use the term “re-establishing Germany’s unity” or “German unification” in order to refer to the post-Cold War Germany initiative. Following this convention I have attempted to use “German unification” throughout this book. For further discussion of the history of this issue, see Spohr 2000, 869.

² See, for example, Mearnsheimer 2014.

A few months after National Security Directive 23 is drafted, uprisings in Eastern Europe soon gave way to the Berlin Wall falling. The new Bush administration was still trying to get a handle of Gorbachev's intentions regarding security concerns, but a new host of distributive issues would soon take precedence. It is those issues, and the face-to-face interactions that resolved them, that serve as the topic of the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the process of reassurance at the end of the Cold War, overcoming the security dilemma that many argue the US and Soviet Union found themselves in, was aided in very specific ways by face-to-face diplomacy. Over the course of several interactions, Reagan and Gorbachev were able to clarify and convey their sincere specific intentions to each other. This intention understanding ultimately helped to ensure that the Cold War ended with a handshake rather than war. As I have illustrated, the evidence suggests that Reagan was serious about intending SDI as a defensive system. At the same time, the evidence also suggests that Gorbachev intended to kill the SDI program, not because he necessarily questioned Reagan's sincerity, but because of crucial domestic pressures at home and his beliefs regarding the destabilizing nature of the program. Reagan picked up on this in their interactions and ultimately used it to his advantage. By walking out of the room in Reykjavik, Reagan did, as Gorbachev once told Henry Kissinger, the one thing the Soviets had not anticipated. "We had thought of everything except that Reagan might leave the room."²⁰¹ Reagan was intent on not using SDI as a bargaining chip and by realizing Gorbachev's aims to kill it, he knew he could not give in. Finally, precisely because Gorbachev knew that Reagan was serious about SDI's defensive orientation he felt comfortable in "untying the package" that connected SDI to other arms reduction agreements and was confident that Reagan would not exploit the move. Reagan read Gorbachev's sincerity and Gorbachev read the same from Reagan.

In reflecting back on this period, Shultz makes an important observation regarding the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev: "One reason they respected each other was that they both could see that the other guy was saying what he thought. Maybe you did not agree with him and maybe you did. But there it was. It wasn't maneuvering and manipulating and trying to make some obscure point. It was right there.

²⁰¹ Kissinger 1994, 783.

It was real. What you saw was what you got."²⁰² This statement captures succinctly what this chapter, and indeed the book, is about: *seeing what the other is thinking*, in a very real and tangible way, through diplomacy.

As will become a recurring theme in this book, those that did *not* have the same face-to-face access to Reagan and Gorbachev routinely misperceived and misinterpreted the intentions of these two leaders. On the American side, for instance, William Clark and Caspar Weinberger routinely suggested that Gorbachev was a wolf in sheep's clothing, interpreting his discourse and concessions as mere cheap talk, at best, and cunning ploys at worst. These amount to theories regarding Gorbachev's aims. Those in the administration that had regular access to Soviet policymakers, and Gorbachev in particular, such as Jack Matlock and eventually George Shultz, come to an entirely different understanding of Gorbachev. Most importantly, Reagan himself undergoes a significant revision of his beliefs regarding Gorbachev. Not only is the Soviet Union interpreted as an evil empire, Gorbachev himself is interpreted as just another Soviet leader. These beliefs only change once Reagan is able to intuit Gorbachev's specific intentions and reflect upon that new information. And ultimately the "pause" in relations between the US and Soviet Union is based, at least in part, on George H.W. Bush's lack of confidence in Gorbachev's sincerity with respect to his intentions. Not having the same opportunity to read Gorbachev as his predecessor did, Bush enters office with uncertainty and beliefs regarding Gorbachev that were more costly aligned with Gates than Reagan.

Thus in the end, what we see in the ending of the Cold War, from a reassurance perspective, is a series of face-to-face interactions providing leadership at the highest levels, specifically Reagan and Gorbachev, with the ability to intuit the intentions of the other and eventually revise their beliefs about the intentions of the other. And, it should be mentioned, particularly with Reagan's beliefs about Gorbachev, they were deeply ingrained. In this case it is very difficult to see how intention understanding could have engendered to the degree it did without the face-to-face interactions in which the two engaged.

One of the remarkable aspects of the summits that Reagan and Gorbachev engaged in was that there was relatively little deception occurring between the two protagonists. Recalling the discussion in the previous chapter, realists in particular worry about diplomacy as an intention understanding mechanism because of incentives to dissemble. Yet in this case an analysis of the face-to-face interactions demonstrates a remarkable amount of sincerity.

²⁰² Quoted in Wohlforth 1996, 105.

Perhaps because of this lack of overt deception on either side, it is tempting to read this case as a story of interpersonal trust, as others have done.²⁰³ While there is much in the interactions to support such a reading, after all Gorbachev's move in 1987 to "untie the package," seemingly requires trust that Reagan will not take advantage of that move and exploit Gorbachev for domestic political gain, there are also significant moments in time that suggest Reagan and Gorbachev are reading each other correctly but interpersonal trust has not developed. For example, in Reykjavik the ultimate agreement for arms reduction was on the table. As Deborah Larson argues, the fact that an agreement did not occur represents a "stunning missed opportunity."²⁰⁴ Ultimately the reason why they could not find the will to finalize an agreement at Reykjavik relates to their inability, at that time, to fully trust the other. In their first meeting on October 11, Reagan makes this clear: "There is a Russian saying: *doveriyai no proveryai*, trust but verify. How will we know that you'll get rid of your missiles as you say you will?" Reagan is explicitly stating that he cannot trust Gorbachev on this point without verification – a point that Gorbachev understands and accepts, suggesting on-site inspections of weapon facilities. Later that day Reagan tells Gorbachev that SDI technology would be shared with the Soviet Union, at which point Gorbachev demurs that "If you will not share oil-drilling equipment or even milk-processing factories I do not believe that you will share SDI." Both Reagan and Gorbachev are explicitly *rejecting* interpersonal trust in this crucial interaction.²⁰⁵

Yet, they are able to read the intentions of one another. The crucial next step to trusting, however, has not yet occurred. According to Gates, Reagan felt like he had been trapped at Reykjavik and left angry both because of the lack of agreement *and* because Gorbachev had laid a trap with the flurry of concessions leading into the summits. Palazhchenko's argument that Gorbachev had been planning a public

²⁰³ Wheeler 2018 is the exemplar here.

²⁰⁴ Larson 2000, 212.

²⁰⁵ A somewhat related difficulty for the interpersonal trust argument is the series of issues on which there seemed to be a lack of trust between Reagan and Gorbachev. For example, in October 1987 Reagan, in a speech at West Point, states that he still believes the USSR is an expansionist power, which belies what Gorbachev had told him of his intentions in Geneva and Reykjavik. "If is in regional conflicts where Soviet performance has been most disturbing. Anyone searching for evidence that the Soviets remain expansionist – indeed, imperialist – need look no farther than Nicaragua or Afghanistan." This may be a speech intended for a particular domestic audience, so it is easy to read too much into it, but it does suggest that on issues other than weapons, interpersonal trust might not be a significant causal factor. Finally, Matlock outlines a number of important areas of controversy, from Libya to the Daniloff arrest, where Reagan seemed to be personally outraged at the behavior of the Soviet Union. See Matlock 2004 182–83; 199.

campaign of accusing the US of acting in bad faith further ill the point that, at least at Reykjavik trust was not in abundance, they may have been at later summits, such as Washington. Though, as Gates told me in a recent interview, ultimately when reflecting on those summits, "I would not go so far as to say trust occurred."²⁰⁶ the empirical record on trust between Reagan and Gorbachev is what mixed, with actors close to the negotiations putting their down on both sides of the debate. I do not doubt that trust ever developed between the two; for my purposes however, the key is trust is not doing *all* of the work in transforming enemies into partners at the end of the Cold War. More important, in my view, is the intention understanding that developed between the two sides as a result of interpersonal face-to-face interactions. Ultimately, the question of intention understanding and trust development are linked is an important issue that I will further develop in the concluding chapter of the book.

I now turn to the other side of the Cold War coin: the distributional realignment problem that manifests once the Berlin Wall falls, specifically the decisions that had to be made with respect to what to do about an unstable, and divided, Germany.

²⁰⁶ Interview with Robert Gates, May 14, 2015.

so it would be difficult to argue that trust was created between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta. Further, there is evidence that Gorbachev did not trust Bush at Malta, reflected in his discussion with Mitterrand where he reveals that he believes Bush is hiding his true intentions. This reading was of course correct, as it had been the intention of the US delegation to include a unified Germany in NATO.

Rather, as I have suggested, the key to Malta was Bush's reading of Gorbachev's intentions, a reading that gave him confidence that Gorbachev did intend the unification of Germany (even if he felt that he had been pushed to it by circumstances surrounding him) and therefore could be significantly malleable on the issue. This confidence is then displayed in Bush's meeting with Kohl in Laeken, a meeting which reinforced for Kohl Bush's intentions of providing Kohl with the autonomy and agency to push for unification on his own terms. Thus a recurring theme of this chapter has been the development of intention beliefs without *necessarily* requiring trust to develop, though it often does.

Yet, intentions and trust are very closely linked, a point that I pick up in the concluding chapter of the book. It is important to note here, as in the previous chapter, empirically it is often difficult to separate the two. This is particularly true in instances where intention understanding precedes the creation of trust and the historical record may not be detailed enough in order to parse out the differences between the two. For this reason it is important to look at cases where we explicitly have intention understanding but an overt lack of trust, which will serve as the basis for the next chapter, the Camp David Accords of 1978.

Conclusion

While many have connected the events of 1989–1990, particularly the ambiguity regarding NATO and its expansion Eastward, with Russian views of betrayal and broken promises that potentially are affecting current politics, including the recent crisis in Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, and strained Obama–Putin relations, the peaceful transition of two states into one in many ways illustrates the importance, and value in world politics, of face-to-face diplomacy. This chapter has argued that intentions were conveyed in a way that would not have been possible through other means and has provided much support for the propositions outlined earlier. The evidence in this chapter suggests that face-to-face interactions were not only important to this intention understanding but also served as a causal factor in the crucial decisions of elites that managed this peaceful transition. Importantly, while US and Soviet leaders were integral to the process, many of the salient interactions occurred

between other European leaders, particularly German elites. At key moments of contingency German leaders were playing an active role in attempting to understand the intentions of both Soviet and US leaders.

It is difficult to explain certain aspects of German unification, particularly the *process* and *timing* with which it occurred, without taking into account face-to-face interactions. I agree with Philip Zelikow's recent remark that "[t]he timing of unification is crucial." As Jack Matlock points out in retrospect, "there was nothing inevitable about the timing, the shape, or the form of the settlements that reunited Germany."¹⁴⁷ Akhromeyev, reflecting back on those crucial hours in Malta, laments that the timing and process of unification ultimately seemed to hinge on that one interaction sitting where Gorbachev sat face-to-face with Bush and failed to convey that unification was off the table, even if he knew that it was not. As Akhromeyev indicates, in that one meeting Bush gained what he needed to know from Gorbachev, that there would be no pushback on unification, and that he could go directly to Kohl, from Malta, to convey this understanding. And, as we now know, this is precisely what happened. While it would be unwise to claim that any single meeting affects the course of history, particularly in as complex an environment as the end of the Cold War, it is difficult to overstate the importance, shared by both sides, that the Malta interaction played in conveying intentions. If we reran the tape of history and removed the Malta face-to-face diplomacy with Gorbachev and the subsequent face-to-face meeting with Kohl, it is quite likely that both the timing and form of unification, particularly with Germany in NATO, would have looked vastly different. Indeed, not believing that Gorbachev intended unification would have likely led to one of the other reunifications models identified by Sarotte to be pursued, as it was Bush's meeting with Kohl, where Kohl's model was given support, that occurred precisely because of the understanding of Gorbachev engendered in Malta.

The previous chapter began with an oft-asked question: who won the Cold War? In that chapter I contend that both Reagan and Gorbachev share that honor as it was a series of face-to-face interactions in summity that allowed each side to better understand the other and ultimately resulted, in my view, with reassurance that neither side intended aggression toward the other. But the story of German unification suggests that the interactions between Bush and Gorbachev were no less important from a distributive perspective. In many ways Reagan and Gorbachev laid the foundation such that Bush and Gorbachev could happen. While it is true that Bush's "pause" slowed progress in ending the Cold War,

ultimately, in my view, it was the reassurance gained through the summits of the late 1980s that made possible the interactions that would solve the Germany problem. It is hard to imagine, for example, questions of distribution being solved without first solving the questions of reassurance. Most importantly, this chapter has also identified the importance of the European leaders, particularly Kohl, in structuring, and pushing for, particular models of German unification. The end of the Cold War story cannot be told without highlighting the protagonists found not only in the US and USSR, but Europe as well.

I now turn to a case that more explicitly deals with these issues of reassurance and distribution, as well as the issue of intention understanding despite a lack of trust. Or, in the case of Egyptian-Israeli relations in the 1970s, intention understanding embedded in long-held intractable conflict and emotional hatred, two characteristics that make it a particularly hard case for successful intention understanding to occur.

¹⁴⁷ Matlock 1996, 386-87.

the expense of Israel's relations with the United States did resur-
ge. Lastly, while the ultimate framework for peace side-stepped some
issues such as the West Bank and Jerusalem in large part, the resur-
gences themselves did not. These were both sources of friction from
beginning and arguably integral to the hostility that was felt by
Begin and Sadat.

Ultimately, the process by which the Camp David accords were
suggested suggests an important role for the individuals involved and the face-
to-face interactions they engaged in. Structural changes may have provided
an opportunity for peace, but it was an opportunity that needed to be
taken. Once taken, it was an opportunity that needed to be fleshed
out in great detail where questions regarding specific intentions loomed
large. Ultimately, this chapter has argued that face-to-face interactions
were critical to agreement at Camp David because they allowed Carter
to understand Sadat and Begin's intentions. It was this understanding
that made agreement possible and, I have argued, without it there would
likely not be a peace treaty. By being able to discern the intentions
of the main protagonists, Carter, as a mediator, was able to envision a
range of possible agreements and craft an agreement that others were un-
likely to see. Face-to-face diplomacy therefore helps make sense of both the
process and outcome of Camp David.

In the final case study to follow, I turn to an even more difficult case
for face-to-face diplomacy than intractable conflict: overt deception.

only do psychopaths often not have cognitive perspective-taking empathy deficits, they may have superior perspective-taking abilities.¹⁴⁷ Indeed new models suggest that cognitive-perspective taking is not impaired in psychopathy, though affective empathy may well be impaired. Arguably this ability to understand others, including their beliefs and desires, aided Hitler in his ultimate deception of Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden and subsequent Munich agreement. Empathy, and the ability to express it, in other words, is as much a part of successful egoistic manipulation required for deception as it is required for trust and cooperative outcomes.

Conclusion: The Tragedy of "Munich"

Thus the tragedy of "Munich" was set in motion well before any documents were signed in 1938. For the five years prior to the agreement British officials had warned, often in great detail, of the dangers of Hitler and the lies that he told. These warnings, cultivated from face-to-face diplomacy with the Chancellor himself, did not translate to policy for a number of reasons that included Britain's material concerns. But just as importantly Chamberlain's own "faith in the essential rationality of all human beings, his abhorrence of war, and his supreme confidence in his own judgment had prevented him from realizing sooner that the riddle of Hitler had in fact been solved three months after the Nazis assumed power." While counterfactuals are difficult in world politics, Ascher makes the compelling case that "Had the leading officials in Britain (including Chamberlain) heeded the advice of their ambassadors in Berlin in the first years of Hitler's rule, they would have reined in the Fuhrer while Germany was still militarily weak."¹⁴⁸

Chamberlain's complicated experience with Hitler outside of Munich is a difficult one for a theory of intention understanding through diplomacy, though it does provide support for many of the propositions regarding face-to-face diplomacy. First, Chamberlain's visit was a very calculated one that was aimed explicitly at attempting to derive concealed information about Hitler's intentions. Chamberlain believed that the best way to gain this understanding of Hitler's secrets was through face-to-face interaction. He also understood that keeping the trip concealed from the public and his own government was prudent, not just because it would increase the drama of the event (which it did), but also because it prevented debate and criticism within his own cabinet that could have stalled, or prevented, the initiative. Chamberlain was taking

¹⁴⁷ See Lockwood et al. 2013.

¹⁴⁸ Ascher 2012, 90-91.

a calculated risk with the trip. By going to Munich to read Hitler he was also giving Hitler the ability to read Chamberlain's intentions which, prior to implementation of Plan Z, had been left intentionally vague. Hitler received Chamberlain for similar reasons. Britain had purposefully tried to keep Hitler guessing. As McDonough argues, the British Foreign office realized that a "personal meeting would inevitably show that Britain did not want to fight a war on account of Czechoslovakia or for that matter on behalf of any small state in Eastern Europe."¹⁴⁹ The implication was clear: if Chamberlain traveled to meet Hitler it would provide Hitler with an opportunity to read Chamberlain's intentions. The plan to keep Hitler guessing worked. Hitler assumed that Chamberlain was coming with a strong message of deterrence, and agreed to the face-to-face interaction, in part, in order to confirm these intentions personally with his counterpart in order to reduce uncertainty.

While the evidence is spotty, there is an indication of the type of intuitional thinking and belief-formation occurring in Chamberlain's assessment of Hitler. First, Hitler did reveal his specific intentions to settle the Czech Crisis, even by force if necessary, which Chamberlain calls him on, forcing a retreat from Hitler. In this moment Chamberlain is reading Hitler correctly. Second, Chamberlain *did* pick up on concealed information that Hitler was providing, after the reversal, most notably a ruthless nature that Chamberlain was not sure he could trust. This intuition was quickly replaced with other beliefs, beliefs that would become much stronger over the following days when he would justify his trip in front of the public and proclaim that he was sure that Hitler was telling the truth with respect to Czechoslovakia. Thus while not privileging the quick System-1 intuitional information he received in the interpersonal interaction, there is evidence to suggest that Hitler's secret deception was not kept perfectly to the vest; clues to Hitler's concealed intentions were provided. However, Chamberlain's own personality characteristics, most notably narcissism, served as a driver of the ultimate belief that was formed upon reflection in System-2. It is striking to note that other individuals interacting with Hitler face-to-face who may not have shared the same narcissistic tendencies, reached different conclusions. As such, it is reasonable to deduce that were it not for the face-to-face encounters, British officials would have been unable to arrive at the same conclusions regarding Hitler's intentions.

Ultimately, however, Munich is remembered for what went wrong. Chamberlain traveled to Hitler and read him incorrectly, with disaster to follow. One underappreciated aspect of this story, however, is how many

¹⁴⁹ McDonough 2011, 194.

got it right. In particular the diplomats and ambassadors stationed in Berlin, who had the ability to meet with Hitler when they needed to in order to gauge his intentions, paint a portrait of a man who stands up to history and everything that we now know in retrospect. In this way face-to-face diplomacy *was* ultimately successful in conveying Hitler's intentions, remarkably successful given the strong incentives that Hitler had to keep his plans secret, and therefore should not necessarily be remembered so much as a failure of face-to-face but rather a failure to act on the information that face-to-face provided.

As with the other case studies, competing explanations exist. As noted above, one of the ubiquitous explanations for the Munich agreement was simply that Chamberlain put too much trust in Hitler. "The man who trusted Hitler," as the *New York Times* put it,¹⁵⁰ erred, according to this logic, by believing what Hitler said with respect to his intentions. There is much support for such a reading, most particularly Chamberlain's own words on the subject matter, both to his Cabinet as well as to his sister, as documented above. On the other hand, Chamberlain enters the interaction with Hitler having expressed, just months earlier, "how utterly untrustworthy and dishonest" the government in Berlin actually was.

Perhaps most importantly, it is difficult to see how Chamberlain could have engendered anything more than a modicum of interpersonal trust given the lack of interaction with Hitler from a temporal perspective. As Adler and Barnett point out, "Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a lifetime of common experiences and through sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations, trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of actions and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude not withstanding the uncertainty that accompanies social life."¹⁵¹ While an argument could be made that this is what occurred in the Reagan-Gorbachev interactions from Chapter 3, for example, it is difficult to see the same type of development of trust occurring in the Chamberlain-Hitler relationship, given the paucity of their meetings. How did Hitler make himself vulnerable to Chamberlain in their encounter? If anything, Hitler congratulated himself on his ability to control that "silly old man . . . with his umbrella."¹⁵² And, just as importantly, the interactions of Rumbold/Phipps/Eden with Hitler do not convey much trust in Hitler at all.

Power and signaling provide other mechanisms by which the British government, and policymakers in the Foreign Office, attempted to

approximate German intentions. Some scholars, such as James Morrow, have typically interpreted the events in the late 1930s as "a concrete example of signaling."¹⁵³ By occupying Czechoslovakia, Hitler's Germany was signaling that its aims were not simply to unify ethnic Germans into a single state, as they could have accomplished this without occupying the non-German parts of Czechoslovakia, but instead possessed aims that transcended a unified ethnic Germany.¹⁵⁴ Morrow argues that Hitler's behavior in the earlier part of the decade serves to signal "deliberately . . . [that] he sought limited revisions in the status quo to conceal his true long-term objectives."¹⁵⁵ And, according to the argument, this worked quite well as it prevented Britain and France from taking "a stronger stand against him at that time."¹⁵⁶ Crucially, however, when looking at the balance and power and moves that Hitler made in 1935-1937, a more complicated picture of signaling emerges.

Recalling the discussion above, Britain found itself in a bleak relative power situation for much of the 1930s. As Yathi-Milio chronicles, perceptions of an increasing German air force (the *Luftwaffe*), buildup in the German army, and changes in the European balance of power all contributed to significant concerns among British policymakers that the balance of power had changed toward Germany's favor by 1936.¹⁵⁷ This was true vis-à-vis Britain as well as Western Europe. "Germany will have an advantage in respect to prewar preparedness. Our naval forces will be greatly superior to those of the Germans . . . [but] the German army will be numerically superior to the combined British and French armies. Germany seems likely to possess a marked advantage over the allies in air striking power."¹⁵⁸ Further, the Germans sent a number of costly signals, indicating their offensive intentions, throughout the period, including the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, "which was the first time Germany used its military force outside the Reich." While Germany did send signals of reassurance, such as signing a Naval Agreement with Britain in 1935, Yathi-Milio concludes that "the majority of Germany's actions [during this period] were hostile, not reassuring." From a costly signaling perspective, combined with the buildup in air force and armaments, the intentions of Hitler's Germany should have been relatively clear. Yet, the intention approximation from London was continually hampered by debate and uncertainty, leading ultimately to Chamberlain's attempt to clarify Hitler's intentions by meeting with him face-to-face. Therefore Morrow is right to point out that Hitler sent a costly signal with the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939, and

¹⁵⁰ "The Man Who Trusted Hitler," *New York Times*, February 17, 1985.

¹⁵¹ Quoted in Booth and Wheeler 2008, 243-44.

¹⁵² Kirkpatrick 1959, 135.

¹⁵³ Morrow 1999, 86.

¹⁵⁴ Morrow 1999, 86-87.

¹⁵⁵ Morrow 1999, 87.

¹⁵⁶ Morrow 1999, 87.

¹⁵⁷ Yathi-Milio 2014, Chapter 2.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Yathi-Milio 2014, 57.

he did send some signals of reassurance in the years preceding this, but crucially the signals were mixed with the bulk existing on the offensive side of the scale. As such, the costly signaling method of interpreting and approximating intentions remains something of a mixed bag in this case. Policymakers in Britain did not quite know how to interpret the mixed signals they received.

Somewhat relatedly, it is also important to note that this case illustrates the importance of prior-held beliefs. As noted in Chapter 2, prior beliefs can be "sticky" in their resistance to updating and revision. In this case we see variation in the role that these beliefs play. For example, Rumbold and Phipps both enter their initial interactions with Hitler *already possessing* negative beliefs regarding Hitler's intentions. Indeed Rumbold had "written the book" on German aims before his interaction with Hitler. The face-to-face encounters only serve to reaffirm existing beliefs. Eden is a more complicated case. Eden enters his initial interaction with Hitler with more positive priors regarding Hitler's aims, and in his first encounter these priors are confirmed and strengthened. Yet, in the second encounter with Hitler the strengthened prior beliefs are eventually revised based on the intuitions engendered in the interaction. Henderson enters his interaction with Hitler with relatively positive priors, indeed even finding positives in the Nazi regime, but is ultimately disappointed by the face-to-face encounter and revises his beliefs. This variation in priors, and the subsequent strengthening or revision of them, as a result of the face-to-face interaction implies that it is not necessarily the priors that dictate what one gleans from a face-to-face encounter. Indeed in this case there are ample examples of face-to-face interactions providing intuitional information that leads to the abandonment of firmly held prior beliefs.

In the following chapter I conclude the book by returning to international relations theory and taking stock of what we can learn from these four case studies. In particular I argue that face-to-face diplomacy ultimately allows individuals to escape the security dilemma at the interpersonal level. I also attempt to create a framework that will be beneficial for others in conducting the type of neuroscience and psychology-oriented research in International Relations scholarship I have utilized in this book.