

Cultural Backlash

Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism

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


FIGURE 2.1. The theoretical framework

The cultural backlash theory weaves together old and new claims, as Figure 2.1 illustrates. The electoral marketplace combines three interactive components.¹ Demand-side factors involve societal forces shaping the public's values, attitudes, and beliefs, creating reservoirs of potential support in the electorate that parties attempt to attract. Supply-side factors involve the appeals that parties and leaders use when seeking to mobilize support and the institutional context, especially electoral systems regulating party competition, shaping how popular votes translate into seats and ministerial office. Finally, governance concerns the consequences where parties and leaders gain votes and elected office.

DEMAND-SIDE: THE SILENT REVOLUTION CATALYZES THE CULTURAL BACKLASH

The first premise in our argument concerns the silent revolution in cultural values that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, transforming the cultures of post-industrial societies. More than 40 years ago, *The Silent Revolution* argued that the postwar era's unprecedentedly high levels of existential security led to an intergenerational value shift among Western publics.² This shift eroded materialist values emphasizing economic and physical security above all, bringing a gradual rise of post-materialist values prioritizing individual free choice and self-expression.

The rise of post-materialist values is the earliest-studied and most thoroughly documented example of changing human values and motivations. Survey data from 1970 to the present demonstrate an

intergenerational shift from materialist to post-materialist values in relatively secure high-income societies, but not in less developed ones.³ The rise of post-materialist values is part of a much broader cultural shift that has brought greater emphasis on environmental protection, peace movements, sexual liberalization, democracy and human rights, gender equality, cosmopolitanism, and respect for the rights of homosexuals, immigrants, handicapped people, and ethnic/racial minorities. These shifts are also associated with the erosion of conventional political participation, such as voting, membership of political parties, trade unions, and voluntary associations, which have given way to protests, demonstrations, and digital activism among the younger generation. Materialist/post-materialist values are only one indicator of this broad cultural shift – but a very good indicator, as Table 2.1 demonstrates. In the 1970s and 1980s, these values and norms were often referred to as 'counter-cultural' – a term that grew outmoded as they gradually became predominant in high-income societies. These values are so closely linked that Inglehart developed an index of survival versus self-expression values based on them.⁴ In this book, building on these theories, we refer to this cluster as socially liberal or socially conservative values.

Today, this long-term evolution has transformed the balance of public opinion in post-industrial societies. Traditional moral beliefs, social norms, and behaviors that were conventional and mainstream during the

Eritrea, or Nigeria. The overall total of migrants includes a number who are at greatest risk – the refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons, 6.2 million of whom live in Europe.²⁴

Period Effects Interact with Structural Change

Generational replacement, rising educational levels, growing ethnic diversity, gender equality, and urban growth all contribute to value change. But cultures are also influenced by period-effects, especially those associated with economic insecurity, such as job losses due to the decline of manufacturing industries, as well as rapid changes associated with migrant flows and the perceived risks of terrorism. Social conservatives endorsing social conformity, order, and stability are especially likely to feel threatened by the growing diversity of Western societies. In 2015, in 17 advanced industrial societies of North America and Western Europe, the percent of the population that was foreign born was twice as high as it had been in 1970.²⁵

The recession, the refugee crisis in Europe, and major acts of terrorism gave rise to period-effects, which conditioned the impact of social structural change.²⁶ Public perceptions of these events were stimulated by direct experience, such as the impact of austerity cutbacks on the pocketbook economy among Greek and Spanish households dependent upon unemployment and welfare benefits. Such perceptions are expected to be influenced indirectly by communications through the legacy and digital media, by party campaign rallies, and by leadership discourse, especially messages exploiting popular fears and reinforcing anxieties. Period-effects can accelerate or retard the long-term processes of generational value change, with threats inhibiting the rise of socially liberal attitudes. Moreover, the historical heritage of past cultural values leaves an enduring imprint upon contemporary societies, as has the legacy of Protestantism or Catholicism, or living for decades under democratic governments or under communist rule, even when these experiences gradually fade in importance. Consequently, although the silent revolution has swept over many high-income societies, the pace of change varies considerably.

SUPPLY-SIDE INSTITUTIONS: FROM VALUES TO VOTES

But under what conditions do secular changes in societies and the evolution of cultural values translate into votes – and then seats in parliament and government offices? In particular, how can structural theories of

cultural change explain rising support for authoritarian-populist forces? This is a complex process, where the impact of value change is hypothesized to be mediated by several factors. On the demand-side, one major factor is an authoritarian reaction among social conservatives who perceive that some of their most cherished core values are being eroded. Moreover, a tipping point can occur in the balance between those holding socially liberal and socially conservative values, producing a backlash among the once-dominant group. On the supply-side of the market, leadership appeals and media cues can activate latent authoritarian attitudes among social conservatives in the electorate. Finally, the way that value cleavages in the electorate are translated into votes is conditioned by different rates of electoral turnout – such as the fact that the younger cohorts, whose attitudes are more socially liberal, are less likely to participate than older socially conservative generations. The electoral rules that translate popular votes into elected offices, and the patterns of party competition also matter.²⁷ Let us unpack these claims.

The Silent Revolution Reinforces Support for Progressive Forces

Massive but glacially moving shifts in Western cultures have been extensively documented in previous research. But their consequences for voting behavior and party politics have not been fully explained. These value changes motivate the rise of libertarian populists, when the rising tide of social liberalism among the younger, college-educated population is combined with deep disillusionment with the performance of mainstream political parties and leaders. Libertarian populists combine support for socially liberal policies with a sweeping critique of the failure of mainstream parties to address corporate greed, economic inequalities, global capitalism, and social injustice. Campaigning as outsiders, this appeal is likely to mobilize Labour Party members favoring Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders supporters in Democratic primaries, voters for Jean-Luc Mélenchon's La France Insoumise, the Five Star Movement in Rome, and community activists engaged in Pablo Iglesias' Podemos in Spain.²⁸ Political parties usually attract older voters, but by adopting digital tools, some like the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, have succeeded in attracting a relatively young membership.²⁹

At the same time, levels of youthful enthusiasm are rarely translated into equivalent levels of voting turnout at the ballot box.³⁰ The Millennial generation in the US and Europe are more likely than their elders to participate in direct protest politics, community volunteering, new social

movements, and online activism, but they are usually far less engaged through conventional electoral channels such as voting.³¹ Libertarian-Populist parties seeking the support of younger, college-educated voters therefore face stiff competition from social movements championing the progressive agenda on issues such as environmental protection and climate change, LGBTQ rights, gender equality, Black Lives Matter, the 'Me-too' movement against sexual harassment, gun control, immigration rights, human rights and democracy, international development, and social justice. Populists advocating a socially liberal agenda also face competition at the ballot box from mainstream center-left parties and from Green parties, which have become established throughout Western Europe, such as Groen! and Ecolo in Belgium, Les Verts in France, The Greens in Germany, and D66 and GroenLinks in the Netherlands.

The Counter-Reaction Generates Support for Authoritarian Populism

If socially liberal values have gradually become predominant, shouldn't the silent revolution benefit the electoral fortunes of the standard-bearers for liberal social values, such as the Greens and mainstream social democratic parties advocating progressive policies, as well as social movements among feminists, environmentalists, minority rights, and democratic activists? How do we explain growing voting support for Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders?

Newton's third law of motion holds that 'For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.' And from the start, the spread of post-materialist and other socially progressive policies stimulated a reaction on the part of social conservatives. These changes eventually reached a tipping point in the balance between social conservatives and social liberals in the electorate. This tipping point reflects a threshold effect in public opinion where cultural evolution is not linear. Changes in the relative size of majority and minority groups can spark a decisive shift in collective attitudes and behaviors, catalyzing a reaction when a previously dominant group perceives that their core norms and beliefs are being overwhelmed by social tides and they are losing their hegemonic status. This provides an opportunity for political elites to respond to their cultural grievances.

The 'tipping point' notion suggests that cultural interactions are influenced by the relative proportions of groups within a society. This concept has been explored by previous authors, providing insights into the dynamics of race and gender. In 1969 and 1971, Thomas Schelling published widely cited articles describing a general theory of tipping points to

account for racial dynamics.³² Similarly, Mark Granovetter discussed the idea of racial thresholds, where the size of minority groups living within a local community was seen as triggering 'white flight.'³³ And Malcolm Gladwell popularized notions of tipping points drawn from epidemiology, reflecting the moment when a virus reaches a critical mass and sharply accelerates diffusion in the general population.³⁴ Thresholds also exist in formal constitutional rules, such as the minimum percentage of votes required before popular support is translated into parliamentary seats.³⁵

In the field of gender studies and women's political representation, the concept of a 'critical mass' argues that the effects of women's presence in organizations partly depends on the relative size of the group. Rosebeth Moss Kanter advanced the notion that when only a few token women were included in corporate boardrooms, men, and women behaved similarly. Even if minorities have different interests or behaviors, they are under pressure to conform with established organizational cultures. But once women reached a certain threshold in an organization – constituting perhaps one-third of the board's members – then women could be empowered to express themselves more freely, challenging conventional behavioral norms and cultural attitudes.³⁶ The notion of a critical mass in organizations also influenced arguments about the design of gender quotas seeking to strengthen women's representation in public affairs. In particular, Drude Dahlerup hypothesized that women's interests are unlikely to have a major impact on political decision-making and the established policy agenda unless women constitute a 'large minority' of elected representatives.³⁷ This work inspired a substantial debate about the effects of a critical mass on women's access and power in parliaments, a process conditioned by the rules for decision-making within elected bodies.³⁸

These diverse accounts share the notion that social change is not necessarily linear; instead, the relative size of groups is important for generating potential threshold shifts.

We argue that the slow process of value change arising from generational, educational, gender, and urban transformations have deepened cultural cleavages in many Western societies and changed the relative balance between liberalism and conservatism. Older social conservatives have gradually lost their hegemonic status, although remaining a large minority of society – and a bare majority of the voting public. In addition, traditional social conservatives are clustered disproportionately in declining rural communities based on manufacturing and agriculture, whereas the younger generations have moved away to cities in pursuit of college degrees and job opportunities, leaving behind aging, overwhelmingly

white, and less-educated populations. Thus, in hundreds of counties in America, more people are dying than being born.³⁹ Conversely, younger social liberals have expanded as a proportion of the overall population – and they are active through community volunteering, protests, and online activism – although they are substantially less likely to vote.⁴⁰

How do people react to the profound cultural changes in Western social values? Several alternative scenarios are possible.

On the one hand, as the proportion of social conservatives erodes in society, their beliefs and behaviors could gradually fade away. In 1974, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann developed the influential theory that people are more likely to remain silent when they feel that their views are in the minority.⁴¹ The ‘spiral of silence’ theory posits that people fear social penalties, such as isolation, disapproval, or the loss of status and position, if they are seen to be holding controversial minority views that are not socially desirable, for example by expressing transgressive racial slurs, xenophobia, or misogynistic views in liberal societies. When they feel that their own views are at odds with the majority, people are more likely to self-censor themselves.⁴² They tend to feel more comfortable in communicating socially acceptable views that reflect mainstream norms. Hence, social psychologists have found that the public expression of prejudice is strongly related to perceptions of prevailing social norms.⁴³ People may continue to be prejudiced – such attitudes do not change readily – but they may hesitate to express their views. Such self-censorship seems to underlie resentment against ‘political correctness.’ If this argument is correct, a snowball or band-wagon effect should be observable in the public square as socially liberal values are seen to gain acceptance in society, such as support for non-traditional families, gay marriage, affirmative action for women and minorities, legalizing recreational drugs, animal rights movements, environmental protection, and transgender rights.

This reaction depends on whether people are aware of changing social norms – which may not happen – for example where distinctive subcultures persist within isolated communities, or if the cues about what is socially acceptable come from media bubbles or dominant opinion leaders, or during periods of rapid transition and intense polarized debate where it may be unclear what social norms should guide acceptable ideas and behavior.⁴⁴ Moreover, conservatives who perceive that orthodox moral beliefs are slipping to marginal status within their societies are likely to feel threatened by the loss of respect for their values. If so, even if overt dissent is suppressed, this could trigger anger and resentment on the losing side. The more rapid the shifts in the balance of public opinion, the

greater the threat. As later chapters demonstrate, there are strong links between social conservatism (in expressing moral approval on issues such as divorce and abortion) and authoritarian values (as measured by the personal importance of security, conformity, and tradition).⁴⁵

One obvious cultural threat to social conservatives comes from foreigners with different cultural values. But conservatives may view any challenge to conventional norms as threatening, whether linked to race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, gender identity, lifestyles, or beliefs. Latent feelings of resentment and intolerance may be galvanized into political expression by non-conformity with group morals and values. Conservative reactions can manifest themselves as a violent, nativist force directed against the other, fueled by resentment against globalization, migrants, the closure of factories and plants, the blurring of genders, and the intrusion of different languages. Traditionalists may also reject ‘politically correct’ views on the benefits of global markets, feminism, diverse lifestyles, and multiculturalism favored by the urban, cosmopolitan liberal elite dominating the media, intellectual life, and parliamentary representatives.

Substantial cultural change has been occurring throughout advanced industrial society. These developments can seem immoral and decadent to those endorsing traditional values, social conformity, tradition, and order. Moreover, large immigration flows, especially from low-income countries, have changed the ethnic makeup of advanced industrial societies. The newcomers speak different languages and have different religions and lifestyles from the existing population – reinforcing the impression that one no longer lives in the society in which one was born. Studies have documented the substantial rise of hate crimes among militant White supremacist and neo-Nazi groups emboldened by the election of Trump in the United States, exemplified by the fatal clashes over the Confederate legacy in Charlottesville, VA.⁴⁶ The broader phenomena of Islamophobia has also been rising in Continental Europe, triggering attacks against recently arrived migrants, discrimination in employment and housing, and new laws passed since 2011 in Belgium, France, Austria, and the Netherlands banning the niqab or burqa in public.⁴⁷ White nationalist groups typically scapegoat ethnic minorities but they can also be seen to represent a broader reaction against rapid cultural changes that seems to be eroding the basic values and customs of Western societies.

Traditional identities concerning faith, family, ethnicity, and nation, common in the mid-twentieth century, are no longer predominant in Western societies, especially among cultural elites. A tipping point has emerged where social conservatives have become increasingly resentful at finding

themselves becoming minorities stranded on the losing side of history. They may also feel that they reflect the 'real' majority in America – especially if they live in isolated communities where friends, family, and neighbors share similar values, if they get much of their political information from conservative media bubbles like Fox TV and like-minded Facebook groups, and if opinion-leaders willing to champion and articulate socially transgressive opinions.⁴⁸ Politicians thereby have opportunities to mobilize social conservatives by blaming the erosion of traditional moral values on liberal elites, corrupt politicians, and the mainstream media, as well as denigrating rising out-groups who benefit from socially liberal attitudes and policies, such as women, racial minorities, and immigrants.⁴⁹

Our study is not the first to link the rise of Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders with the politics of resentment and alienation. In the US, for example, anthropological studies have depicted social trends as the end of white Christian America.⁵⁰ Declining rural communities in the American Mid-West and South have been described as inhabited by people who feel that they have become 'strangers in their own land.'⁵¹ The shutting of factories and coal plants has produced declining numbers of secure, unionized jobs, triggering major social problems in which drugs, alcohol, and suicide have led to declining longevity. These social and economic developments may have fueled the politics of resentment, with older whites in rural America blaming global trade, racial minorities, and immigrants for eroding their economic security.⁵² In Europe, as well, studies have depicted the white working class as the new minority in politics.⁵³ Several survey-based studies in particular European countries have demonstrated that populist attitudes, such as mistrust of elites and belief in popular sovereignty, are associated with voting for populist parties.⁵⁴ Numerous studies have also linked anti-immigrant and racist attitudes with support for radical right parties in Europe.⁵⁵

But showing that cultural attitudes and values predict support for Authoritarian-Populist parties, by itself, does not account for why these parties have seen rising electoral fortunes in recent years. The impact of long-term cultural shifts, generating a tipping point among social conservatives, has been under-estimated.

Subsequent chapters provide new evidence demonstrating how long-term inter-generational, educational, and urbanization change have gradually shifted the balance between social liberals and social conservatives in Western societies, and how this, in turn, has triggered a cultural backlash among social conservatives with intolerant attitudes.

But much remains to be understood about tipping points in the balance of majority and minority views in public opinion, including the timing, nature, and consequences of these changes in given societies and communities, the way that these developments may serve to mobilize or demobilize citizens to participate at the ballot box, the role of electoral rules for translating voting thresholds into seats, and the broader consequences for party competition, the policy agenda, and liberal democracy.

Mobilizing Voting Turnout

We hypothesize that the tipping point in public opinion can catalyze social conservatives into voting for authoritarian-populist leaders.⁵⁶ But turnout depends on the context. Majorities among the population do not translate directly into representation in liberal democracies for many reasons, including the relative propensity of young and old to vote. In certain contexts, social conservatives may not bother to vote, especially if they are already disenchanted with politics and if the policy programs of mainstream parties fail to reflect the issues they care most about. In this context, those disillusioned with the political classes and disaffected electoral choices, might logically decide to stay home on polling day. On the other hand, where populist parties and leaders who champion their values are on the ballot, this provides a channel for political expression, mobilizing discontented sectors. The Interwar generation (with more traditional values) is also usually far more likely to vote than the millennial generation.⁵⁷ As a result, older groups can be disproportionately influential, constituting a majority of those who actually vote, even when they have become a smaller segment of the population.

Cleavages in Party Competition

The success of parties and leaders in using authoritarian-populist appeals to gain votes, seats, and public office is conditioned by electoral systems and institutional rules, patterns of party competition over the key issues, and the role of campaigns. In elections, political demagoguery and media frames can reinforce latent authoritarian values, whipping up fear of 'others,' especially when established authorities have failed to respond to public anxieties. Indeed, mainstream elites, who usually share broadly socially liberal and cosmopolitan values, are regarded by populists as part of the problem of moral corruption – not part of the solution.




FIGURE 4.6. Ideological left-right self-identification by generation, Europe, 1970-2007

Note: Ideological position on the extreme right (7-10) are compared by ideological self-placement on a 10 point left-right scale.
Source: Eurobarometer 1970-2007.

Authoritarian Values

Our theory argues that social conservatives are a shrinking share of the overall population, and they tend to have authoritarian predispositions, making them intolerant of non-conformity with established social norms. Consequently, social liberals accepting new norms concerning gender identities, secular ethics, sex before marriage, and racial equality are not merely seen as different, but are condemned by conservatives as morally corrupt. Normative threats, such as feelings of moral decay, national decline, and social disorder, dramatically magnify the impact of authoritarianism by exacerbating racial, political, and moral intolerance, strengthening the use of stereotyping and discrimination against minorities.³⁹

Analysis of the World Values Survey data covering seven high-income societies, presented in Figure 4-7, demonstrates the strong association between endorsement of authoritarian values (the Schwartz using items measuring the personal importance of security, conformity, and tradition), and a battery of items monitoring socially conservative or liberal attitudes (using 10-point scales concerning the justifiability of homosexuality,




FIGURE 4.7. Socially liberal values are negatively correlated with authoritarian values

Note: The social liberalism 100-point standardized scale includes how far the following are seen as justifiable: homosexuality, abortion, sex before marriage, and divorce. The authoritarian values index is based on combining five items using the Schwartz scale to measure the personal values of security, conformity, and tradition. Data are from the WVS-6 (2010-2014) in the following seven societies: Australia, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and United States.
Source: World Values Survey 2010-2014, Wave 6. N. 10576.

abortion, pre-marital sex, and divorce). As the graph shows, those with authoritarian values are by far the most socially conservative toward these moral issues, with the relationship showing a steady linear pattern.

Many other previous studies have observed the links between generations and social liberalism that we have also documented here. But to what extent have Western societies reached a tipping point in the balance between authoritarians and libertarians in the electorate? To answer this question, we draw on the pooled European Social Survey, waves 1-7. To measure authoritarianism, the study selected five items from a battery originally developed by Schwartz for cross-national comparisons of personal values, as listed in Table 4.3. The preamble asks: 'Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.' Respondents are presented with a wide range of statements designed to reflect diverse values. Five of the items listed in Table 4.3 were selected to monitor adherence

TABLE 4.3. Measuring citizen's authoritarian and libertarian values (Schwartz scales)

Variables	Description	Authoritarian values	Libertarian values
ipbhprp	It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	.728	
impSAFE	It is important to her/him to live in secure surroundings. She/he avoids anything that might endanger her/his safety.	.711	
ipstrgv	It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	.704	
imprad	Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family.	.652	
iptrule	She/he believes that people should do what they're told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.	.652	
impdiff	She/he likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She/he thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.		.783
ipadvnt	She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life.		.710
ipctviv	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her/him. She/he likes to do things in her/his own original way.		.700
impfree	It is important to her/him to make her/his own decisions about what she/he does. She/he likes to be free and not depend on others.		.601
ipudrst	It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with them, she/he still wants to understand them.		

Note: The Schwartz value scales in the European Social Survey (ESS) use the following question: 'Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer.' Response categories to the above questions in 6-point scales range from 1 'Not very much like me' to 6 'Very much like me.' The coefficients in the table are generated by principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization. The scales have a high level of reliability.

Source: The European Social Survey, Cumulative File Rounds 1-7.

to authoritarian values, including the core concepts of conformity (the importance of behaving properly and following traditions), security (the importance of living in secure surroundings and that of a strong government to protect against threats), and deference (the importance of following rules and doing what one's told). To measure libertarian values, five other items were selected, reflecting the values of non-conformity, independence, and personal autonomy (the importance of being free and not dependent on others). Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed the dimensionality of the selected items listed in Table 4.3 and the expected division between Authoritarian and Libertarian values. The scales displayed a high level of reliability when compared with equivalent measures.⁴⁰ The value scales were each summed from these items and then standardized around the mean (Z-scores) for ease of comparison.

It should be emphasized that these items refer to individual predispositions and personal value preferences.⁴¹ In this regard, they are similar to the older items used to measure authoritarianism in terms of the importance of teaching children about the values of manners, obedience, and conformity. The selected items are designed to tap personal values across multiple societies. They do not seek to gauge public attitudes toward specific public policy issues, such as the rights of minorities, equal opportunities for women, or strengthening police powers, which might be influenced by support for given candidates or parties, and thus be open to the risk of endogeneity.

Figure 4.8 shows the tipping point in the proportion of the elector-ate endorsing authoritarian and libertarian values (as measured by the Schwartz scales) across Europe. The overall results show strikingly divergent patterns between birth cohorts, and a tipping point in these values among European publics, as predicted by our theory. Thus, across Europe, the Interwar generation displays the highest levels of authoritarian values, while support for these values steadily declines among the younger generation and Millennials. By contrast, the reverse pattern is evident for the libertarian values scale, which shows growing support as we move from older to younger birth cohorts, with the strongest endorsement among the Millennials. As a result, the trend lines cross, showing the hypothesized tipping point in the balance of rising levels of libertarian versus authoritarian values by cohorts. Thus, among the Interwar generation, in the pooled European data, authoritarian values clearly outweigh libertarian values. The reverse situation can be observed among Millennials.

The patterns also reflect the distinctive experiences of different countries; Figure 4.8 shows how the tipping point varies by birth cohort across countries in different European regions. Thus, the cross-over between




FIGURE 4.8. *The tipping point in authoritarian and libertarian values by generation, Europe*
 Note: The trend lines illustrate the mean standardized (z-scores) for the Schwartz authoritarian and libertarian value scales. For their construction, see Table 4.3.
 Source: The European Social Survey, Cumulative File Rounds 1-7.

authoritarian and libertarian values, reverses earliest among the Baby Boom generation in Norway, Denmark, and Finland, all affluent post-industrial societies and long-established liberal democracies, with strong egalitarian cultural traditions and comprehensive cradle-to-grave welfare states. Several Northern European societies show a similar profile, such as France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – all affluent knowledge economies. By contrast, the tipping point is reached later (among Generation X, born in the mid-1970s), in Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy. The gap barely reverses itself in post-communist Europe, such as in Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and in Turkey (where no reversal occurs), reflecting the sluggish economic growth and the later (and unstable) democratic development of several states in this region.

ANALYZING AGE-COHORT-PERIOD EFFECTS

What are the underlying drivers of authoritarian values, socially conservative attitudes, and populist orientations? And how can we disentangle




FIGURE 4.9. *The tipping point in authoritarian and libertarian values by generation and European country*
 Note: The trend lines illustrate the mean standardized (z-scores) for the Schwartz authoritarian and libertarian personal value scales. For their construction, see Table 4.3.
 Source: The European Social Survey, Cumulative File Rounds 1-7.

birth cohorts (generations) from the effects of life cycles (as people age) and periods (defined as events like the financial crash happening during particular years)? The classic identification problem is that each of these may possibly be influencing cultural values and two of these effects are always confounding. If socially liberal values are increasing this could be attributed to generational differences in attitudes among Interwar and Millennial cohorts, or it could be because events mean that all people have changed their values over time.

To disentangle these effects we use both panel and cross-sectional datasets. Following Tilley, age is measured indirectly using the underlying indicators of social ageing, in particular marriage and children.⁴² This allows us to model the significance of the birth cohort (generation), the years of the survey, from 2002 to 2014 (period), and marriage and children as the proxy indicators of the life cycle (age).

A series of models entering these variables in blocks using OLS regression was used for the analysis. In each table, Model 1 tests the effects of generation (birth cohort). Model 2 adds controls for the year of the European Social Survey, to see whether there are any significant period-effects, which can be interpreted as associated with the occurrence of specific events, such as the 2007 financial crash or the migrant crisis. Model 3 adds controls for compositional effects arising from education, sex, social class (using the Goldthorpe scheme), religiosity, and urbanization, since older and younger generations vary systematically in these characteristics. The aim is to establish the effects of generation, independently of the fact that Millennials are better educated, more urbanized, and less religious than the Interwar generation. Finally, Model 4 also controls for life-cycle effects associated with ageing, in particular marriage and children.

Subsequent chapters will expand this framework by analyzing additional economic factors (including socio-tropic indicators such as household income, subjective feelings of financial security, and the experience of long-term unemployment, and ego-tropic indicators, such as satisfaction with the performance of the national economy), as well as the effects of ethnicity (such as race, type of religious faith, citizenship, immigration status, and nationality).

Authoritarian Values

Table 4.4 predicts support for authoritarian values, as measured by the Schwartz scale. The results in the successive models confirm that birth cohort is an important predictor of support for authoritarian values. As expected, in Model 1, the Interwar generation proved significantly more likely to endorse authoritarian values than successive generational cohorts, with Millennials being the most libertarian. Authoritarianism fades steadily in the pooled European sample as we move from older to younger birth cohorts, supporting the cultural change thesis, which emphasizes the process of generational population replacement.

Model 2 adds the year of the ESS survey to the analysis, serving as a proxy for period-effects from 2002 to 2014. In particular, two events

TABLE 4.4. Predicting authoritarian values

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	d. Error	Sig.	B	d. Error	Sig.	B	d. Error	Sig.	B	d. Error	Sig.
Interwar (1900-1945)	0.00											
Generation X (1965-1979)	-4.48	0.07	***	-6.51	0.07	***	-4.46	0.07	***	-0.10	0.07	***
Boomers (1946-1964)	-4.48	0.07	***	-6.51	0.07	***	-4.46	0.07	***	-0.10	0.07	***
Millennial (1980-1996)	-8.15	0.08	***	-8.48	0.08	***	-6.66	0.08	***	-6.33	0.08	***
Y2004	0.88	0.10	***	0.88	0.10	***	0.80	0.10	***	0.81	0.10	***
Y2006	2.33	0.10	***	2.33	0.10	***	2.38	0.09	***	4.23	0.12	***
Y2008	2.52	0.10	***	2.52	0.10	***	2.74	0.09	***	4.59	0.12	***
Y2010	2.52	0.10	***	2.52	0.10	***	2.19	0.10	***	3.96	0.13	***
Y2012	1.45	0.10	***	1.45	0.10	***	1.48	0.11	***	3.25	0.13	***
Y2014	-1.93	0.10	***	-1.93	0.10	***	-1.93	0.10	***	-2.08	0.10	***
Manager	-1.15	0.08	***	-1.15	0.08	***	-1.15	0.08	***	-1.27	0.08	***
Routine non-manual	-1.00	0.09	***	-1.00	0.09	***	-1.00	0.09	***	-1.19	0.08	***
Petty bourgeoisie	0.43	0.10	***	0.43	0.10	***	0.43	0.10	***	0.27	0.10	***
Skilled manual	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
Manual (Ref)	-0.62	0.02	***	-0.62	0.02	***	-0.62	0.02	***	-0.63	0.02	***
Education (5-point scale low to high)												

(continued)

during this period can be expected to have catalyzed latent authoritarian feelings. The first was the 2007–2013 financial crisis in OECD countries, especially the effects on unemployment and austerity cuts in social welfare in Mediterranean Europe, which heightened feelings of economic insecurity. The migrant crisis is another landmark event, which brought refugees and asylum seekers flooding into Europe in leaky boats that had crossed the Mediterranean and arduous overland journeys through Southern Europe. Migrants came from diverse regions and cultures, but the majority were Muslims, often seeking to escape conflict in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as from poorer countries like Eritrea in North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East. Eurostat estimates show the number of refugees seeking asylum in the European Union rose slowly from 2006 to 2012, increasing in 2012–2014, then accelerating sharply following Angela Merkel's open door policy for Syrian refugees into Germany, announced in the summer of 2015, before stabilizing in 2016 at the higher level, then falling again in 2017.⁴³

It is not possible to disentangle the impact of such events cleanly at aggregate levels. But the initial results in Model 2 show a pattern of trendless fluctuations in authoritarian values from 2002 to 2006, but a significant jump observed for 2008–2012. This suggests that the shock of these events may have reinforced these values – an issue explored in depth later in this book.

Model 3 shows that even after controlling for the social background characteristics of younger and older cohorts, the generation gap in authoritarian values remains significant and large. In other words, contrasts in libertarian and authoritarian attitudes among Interwar and Millennial generational cohorts are not attributable only to the different social characteristics of these groups.

In addition, education also proves significant and negative, confirming as expected that support for values that are more authoritarian is concentrated among the less-educated sectors of the population. This finding confirms decades of research, having been repeatedly observed ever since the earliest studies of this topic, including Gordon Allport's work on the nature of prejudice, Samuel Stouffer's study of support for communism, and Seymour Martin Lipset's thesis of working-class authoritarianism, all published in the mid-twentieth century.⁴⁴ Education is consistently associated with attitudes that are more tolerant toward out-groups, including ethnic, religious, and racial minorities.⁴⁵

TABLE 4.4 (continued)

OLS regression models predicting citizen's support for authoritarian values measured by the Schwartz scale. P < .001, * .01, * .05, N/S = Not significant. The Interwar generation and the unskilled manual class are the excluded reference categories.

Source: The European Social Survey Cumulative File Rounds 1–7. N = 33,031 respondents in 31 European countries.

Model	Men (Ref)	Women	Urbanization (1–5 scale urban to rural)	Religiosity	How religious are you? (10-pt scale)	Children	Marital status	Married	Separated or divorced	(Constant)	Adjusted R ²
Model 1	0.00	-0.03	0.28	1.11	1.09	0.00	1.23	3.00	1.71	77.31	0.04
			0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.05	
			0.02	0.23	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
			0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
			0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
Model 2	0.00	-0.83	0.28	1.11	1.09	0.00	1.23	3.00	1.71	77.31	0.04
		0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.05	
		-0.03	0.02	0.23	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
Model 3	0.00	-0.83	0.28	1.11	1.09	0.00	1.23	3.00	1.71	77.31	0.04
		0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.05	
		-0.03	0.02	0.23	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
Model 4	0.00	-0.74	0.30	1.09	1.09	0.00	1.23	3.00	1.71	69.27	0.11
		0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.15	
		-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	
		0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.02	

The precise reasons *why* the more educated are more socially liberal and tolerant are difficult to disentangle, however, since the association could be attributed to both cultural and material insecurities.

On the one hand, differences in socio-economic status may be important, since access to higher education is skewed toward those coming from relatively prosperous middle-class families. Moreover, formal educational qualifications help to determine subsequent life-chances, social mobility, and occupational careers (and thus future economic status and material security). Writers, academics, journalists, artists, and scientists may also have liberal views on race, sexuality, and diversity because they are more likely to thrive under conditions of openness, meritocracy, and social change than those with lower knowledge, skills, and abilities.⁴⁶

At the same time, however, studies seeking to determine the origins of socially liberal views have concluded that education is far more important than occupational class.⁴⁷ Moreover, the education correlation in Model 3 persists even with controls for social class. Instead of an economic thesis, several scholars suggest that the linkage mechanism connecting education with views that are more libertarian may well arise from socialization effects.⁴⁸ Hence, it has been argued that tolerance of diversity and difference is fostered through the cultural values, knowledge, and cognitive skills learned through formal schooling.⁴⁹ Multicultural educational programs may also serve to strengthen intergroup relations, with textbooks integrating awareness of diverse experiences and cultures, and citizenship or civics education.⁵⁰ Informal processes may also play a role, if the experience of attending schools and colleges promotes intergroup contact and expands interpersonal networks. Contact theory, developed in the 1950s by Gordon Allport, holds that under certain circumstances, connections between majority and minority group members can promote tolerance and acceptance, especially where groups have equal status and share common goals.⁵¹ Similarly, Putnam has argued that personal communications and associational networks among people from diverse backgrounds, with different ideologies, and characteristics, can build 'bridging' social capital, promote social trust, and facilitate social cooperation.⁵² And Russell Hardin emphasizes that knowledge builds social trust.⁵³ From this perspective, ignorance and dogmatic thinking are likely to be closely associated with practices of intolerance, prejudice, and stereotyping. Where people lack understanding about individuals, peoples, or places, then observable group characteristics are more likely to function as heuristic shortcuts to form blanket judgments. Politics may be seen by those with little schooling and few analytical skills in simplistic

black-and-white terms, attracting them to demagogic populist leaders, promising easy short-term fixes and offering slogans instead of policy programs to address complex social problems ('Build a Wall').

Among the other controls for compositional effects, occupational class was strong and significant. Compared with the unskilled manual workers, which serve as the default category, middle-class groups are less likely to endorse authoritarian values, with professional and managerial groups displaying the least support. In 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset observed that the working class were usually less progressive than the middle class, where liberalism was defined in non-economic terms such as by respect for individual liberty, equality for ethnic and racial minorities, tolerance for internationalist foreign policies, and support for liberal immigration laws. As Lipset characterized this orientation, the lower strata and less educated are less sophisticated and therefore predisposed to view politics in black-and-white terms, making them more likely to support extremist movements and leaders that promise quick and easy fixes rather than viewing problems of reform in complex gradualist terms.⁵⁴ Almost six decades later, the evidence suggests that this pattern can still be observed.

As reported in previous studies, a modest gender gap can be observed, with men being slightly more likely to endorse authoritarian values than women; the exact reasons for the gender gap are difficult to establish.⁵⁵ One factor could be that men may generally feel a stronger sense of cultural grievances from the impact of feminism, their loss of predominant bread-winner status, and changing attitudes toward gender equality in the home, workforce, and public sphere. These developments may be perceived by older generations as violating traditional social norms about the roles of women and men which prevailed during earlier decades, threatening patriarchal beliefs about status and power.

Urbanization was also negatively related, with support for authoritarian values strongest in rural and non-metropolitan areas, rather than in urban areas that have multicultural populations — an issue explored in more depth in Chapter 6.

The strength of religiosity, closely linked with conformity toward a wide range of traditional values, is also positively and strongly associated with authoritarian values. Religious attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are often closely linked with social conservatism, as well as being far more pervasive among the older generations in Europe.⁵⁶

In short, authoritarian values are generally strongest among the working class, men, the less-educated, residents living in rural areas, and among the most religious.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, even with these controls, the

impact of generation on authoritarian values remains significant and is the second strongest predictor (after religion) in model 3.

Finally, Model 4 adds controls for marriage and children as proxy variables for life-cycle effects. Both factors are significant but their effects are weaker than those observed for birth cohorts.⁵⁸ Authoritarian values may be strengthened by life-cycle effects as people age, and seem to have been affected by period-effects linked with the 2007 financial crisis – although further scrutiny is given in the next chapter to examine this interpretation. But the largest differences observed in these values are between older and younger generational cohorts. Controls for all these variables do not weaken the significant generational gaps already observed in Europe and the United States, revealing large differences between the authoritarian cultural beliefs of the Interwar cohorts from subsequent generations, especially the Millennials, who widely reject these values.

Socially Liberal Attitudes

Are these results found only in the specific items we have used to gauge cultural values? As an additional robustness test, Table 4.5 uses a similar design to predict endorsement of social liberalism or conservatism. This is measured in a composite scale constructed from the items listed in Figure 4.5 concerning approval of women's role in the paid labor force, men's right to a job, homosexual freedoms, EU unification, religiosity, and immigration.

The results of successive models in Table 4.5, predicting socially liberal attitudes, display a similar profile to that already observed, confirming the importance of birth cohorts, as well as the role of education, social class, religiosity, and urbanization. This is hardly surprising given the close correlation between socially conservative attitudes and adherence to personal authoritarian values that was documented earlier (see Figure 4.8). Birth cohort is important, with the Millennial birth cohorts being much more socially liberal than the Interwar generation. The role of education is also strong and significant, as observed previously in Figure 4.5, confirming the link between formal schooling and liberal attitudes, such as tolerance toward gay rights, immigrants, and gender equality. In addition, women, middle-class households, the urban, and the secular were somewhat more socially liberal. And with the proxies for life-cycle effects, those with children and those who were married were slightly more conservative, but the generation gaps persisted even with these controls. The overall factors predicting greater social liberalism or

TABLE 4.5. Predicting socially liberal attitudes

Models	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.
Generation												
Interwar (1900-1945) (Ref)	2.73	0.10	0.00	2.65	0.10	0.00	1.61	0.10	0.00	1.70	0.10	0.06
Boomers (1946-1964)	3.10	0.10	0.00	3.00	0.10	0.00	1.50	0.10	0.05	1.52	0.12	0.05
Generation X (1965-1979)	3.33	0.11	0.00	3.10	0.11	0.00	2.53	0.11	0.08	2.20	0.12	0.07
Millennial (1980-1996)												
Year												
Y2002 (Ref)	-1.76	0.09	-0.06	0.09	0.00	0.00	-1.39	0.09	-0.05	-0.30	0.13	-0.01
Y2004	1.08	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.19	0.08	0.04	1.19	0.08	0.04
Y2008							2.73	0.13	0.07	2.81	0.13	0.08
Class.												
Manager							1.67	0.09	0.06	1.74	0.09	0.06
Routine												
non-manual												
Petty bourgeois							0.53	0.12	0.01	0.63	0.13	0.02
Skilled manual							0.27	0.13	0.01	0.34	0.13	0.01
Manual (Ref)	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
Education (5-point scale low to high)							1.04	0.03	0.11	1.03	0.03	0.11
Education												
Men (Ref)	0.00			0.00			0.00			0.00		
Women	-1.11	0.07	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.16	0.07	-0.04	-1.16	0.07	-0.04

(continued)

facilitate comparisons of the stability of these estimates. The analysis we present comparing party and voter positions assumes that the expert measurement in 2014 provides a proxy guide to party positions throughout the 2002–2014 waves of the European Social Survey.

The results of the principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation, presented in Table 7.1, confirm that the economic left–right, authoritarian–libertarian, and populist items form three dimensions of party competition, as hypothesized. The empirical results confirm our argument that parties adopting populist rhetoric are scattered across the map of ideological values. Populists do not necessarily endorse authoritarian cultural values; this is not surprising, given the vagueness and ubiquity of politicians claiming to stand ‘for the people’ and against elites. Similarly, populist language is not adopted by all traditional authoritarians on the extreme left or right, such as neo-Nazis, White Supremacist, and hate groups advocating anti-Semitism, racial separation, and ethnic purity. The items measuring each of these dimensions were added to generate separate ideological scales, measuring populism, authoritarianism, and left–right economic policy positions, and then standardized to 100-point scales for ease of comparison. These scales are normally distributed and display a high degree of internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha.⁵¹

The continuous standardized scales provide fine-grained comparisons across all European parties for analysis with the European Social Survey monitoring the values of the electorate. Nevertheless, categories can also be useful, especially for selecting typical cases which aid understanding of concrete examples. To develop categories, ‘authoritarian parties’ are defined as those with policy position scales that scored more than 80 points on the standardized 100-point authoritarian–libertarian index. Left-wing and right-wing parties are defined as those with policy position scales that fall above or below the mean score (50) on the 100-point left–right index. Similarly, populist parties are categorized as those located at extreme positions (over 80/100) on the populism scale. The more detailed classification and CHES scores of all European Authoritarian–Populist parties included in our study are listed in Appendix A. The ideological scales constructed from the CHES dataset allow the expert-rated locations of European political party policy positions to be compared across these dimensions.

It should be noted that attempts to move from continuous scales to categorize parties as distinct groups or even families requires drawing dividing lines where judgments are inevitably somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, contagion effects can arise if leaders from mainstream center-right or

TABLE 7.1. Dimensions of party competition in Europe

CHES Variable name	Description	Cultural cleavage	Populist rhetoric	Economic cleavage
AUTHORITARIAN VALUES				
Galton	Party positions toward democratic freedoms and rights; libertarian parties favor expanding personal freedoms; authoritarian parties value order, tradition, and stability.	.935		
Nationalism	Pro-nationalism	.923		
Civlib_laworder	Favors tough measures to fight crime rather than the protection of civil liberties	.921		
Multiculturalism	Against multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers	.911		
Sociallifestyle	Opposes liberal social lifestyles (e.g. homosexuality)	.904		
Immigrate_policy	Favors restrictive policy on immigration	.894		
Ethnic_minorities	Opposes rights for ethnic minorities	.876		
POPULIST RHECTORIC				
Anti-corrupt salience	Salience of anti-corruption		.712	
Anti-elite_salience	Salience of anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric		.932	
LEFT–RIGHT ECONOMIC VALUES				
Deregulation	Favors market regulation or deregulation			.965
Econ_interven	Favors or opposed to state intervention on the economy			.954
Redistribution	Favors or opposed to redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor			.928
Spendvtrax	Favor or opposes cutting taxes and public services			.911

Notes: CHES 2014 expert survey of political party positions in 31 countries, including all EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, Dec 2014–Feb 2015. Factor analysis with rotated varimax and Kaiser normalization.

Source: Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. ‘2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.’ Version 2015.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (subsequently referenced as the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey or just abbreviated as CHES 2014).

center-left parties, in attempting to steal supporters, adopt some of the populist language or the xenophobic rhetoric and strict immigration policies espoused by authoritarians. For these reasons, in subsequent chapters the analysis of voting support is measured using the position of all parties on the authoritarian-libertarian and the populism indices, although categories are employed for selecting cases.

For a robustness check on the validity and reliability of the CHES measures, the results were compared with independent evidence. The Immerzeel, Lubbers, and Coffé expert judgment survey of European Political Parties, conducted in 2010, provides one source.⁵² This research used a similar expert survey methodology to estimate the scores of political parties in 38 European countries, focusing on populist issues such as nationalism and immigration. The two independent datasets proved to be highly correlated in the perceived position of parties on the ideological scales, lending further confidence to the CHES estimates.⁵³ In addition, for face-value validity, the list of parties ranked according to the CHES cultural values scale was found to be generally consistent with previous classifications of right-wing populist parties.⁵⁴

Parties are also ranked by their average share of the vote for the lower house in national legislative elections since 2000 and categorized into major parties (10 percent or more), minor parties (4.0-9.9%), and fringe parties, which often fail to win any parliamentary seats (less than 4.0%). Each of these categories are also inevitably somewhat arbitrary but the choice of a 4 percent cut off for fringe parties reflects the common minimum vote threshold used to qualify for parliamentary seats.

IV COMPARING EUROPEAN PARTY COMPETITION

Table 7.2 and 7.3 list political parties in Western and Eastern Europe which we classify as authoritarian populist from 2000 to 2015 while Table 7.4 lists the libertarian-populist category. To examine the comparisons visually, Figure 7.2 illustrates the patterns of European party competition.

Authoritarian-Populist Parties

As can be observed from the scatterplot, the Authoritarian-Populist parties are located in the top-right quadrant. This category includes several parties in Scandinavia such as Jimmie Kasson's Swedish Democrats, Jussi Halla-aho's Finns Party, Siv Jensen's Progress Party in Norway, and Kristian Thulesen Dahl's Danish People's Party (DF). Similar parties and leaders

TABLE 7.2. *Authoritarian-Populist parties in Western Europe, 2000-2015*

	Party Name (English)	Abr.	% Vote	N. elec	SD
MAJOR (7)					
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	SVP-UDC	27.9	4	1.5
Norway	Progress Party	Fr	19.0	4	4.1
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ	14.8	4	5.1
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF	14.5	5	3.5
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List	LPF	11.4	2	8.0
Finland	Finnish Party - True Finns	SP-P	10.6	4	9.0
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	PVV	10.5	3	4.8
MINOR (10)					
France	National Front	FN	9.7	3	4.9
Belgium	Flemish Block	VB	8.8	4	3.9
Luxembourg	Action Comm. Pensions I Alt. Demo Ref	AR/ADR	7.9	3	1.2
Greece	People's Association - Golden Dawn	XA	6.8	4	0.3
Greece	Independent Greeks	AE	6.6	4	3.1
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	5.7	4	5.1
Austria	Team Stronach	TS	5.7	1	
Italy	Northern League	LN	5.6	3	2.3
UK	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	4.9	4	5.2
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD	4.7	1	
FRINGE (9)					
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	2.9	6	1.7
Belgium	National Front	FN	2.0	2	0.0
Italy	Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right	FdI-CN	2.0	1	
United Kingdom	British National Party	BNP	1.9	1	
Netherlands	Political Reformed Party	SGP	1.7	5	0.2
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD	1.5	3	0.2
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland	EDU-UDF	1.3	3	0.0
France	Movement for France	MF	1.0	2	0.3
Switzerland	Ticino League	LdT	0.6	3	0.2

Note: The list includes 27 Authoritarian-Populist parties in Western Europe which contested elections for the lower house of the national parliament. The percentage vote is the mean share of the vote for each party (and the standard deviation) in parliamentary elections from 2000 to 2015. For the party classification, see Chapter 8.

Source: Vote share calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow, 2016. *Parliaments and governments database (PartGov)* 'Elections' dataset. www.partgov.org/.

TABLE 7.3. Authoritarian-Populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 2000-2015

Party	Abr.	% Vote	N. elec	SD
MAJOR (9)				
Hungary	Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union	41.1	1	
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	29.9	5	5.6
Poland	Law and Justice	27.2	5	10.6
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	24.2	5	5.8
Bulgaria	National Movement Simeon II	21.9	3	19.9
Hungary	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	18.4	2	2.5
Romania	People's Party - Dan Diaconescu	14.0	1	
Turkey	National Action Party	12.8	5	3.0
Lithuania	Order and Justice - Liberal Democratic	10.5	3	2.8
MINOR (13)				
Slovakia	Ordinary People and Independent	8.6	1	
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	8.5	4	0.3
Lithuania	The Way of Courage	8.0	1	
Croatia	Croatian Peasant Party	7.5	4	6.2
Bulgaria	Attack	7.3	4	2.1
Latvia	For Latvia from the Heart	6.9	1	
Latvia	Latvian Association of Regions	6.7	1	
Slovenia	New Slovenia - Christian People's Party	6.3	5	2.5
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	6.2	4	3.8
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Without Censorship	5.7	1	
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	5.5	2	2.5
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights	4.6	4	1.6
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	3.3	2	1.5

TABLE 7.4. Libertarian-Populist parties in Europe, 2000-2015

Party Name (English)	Abr.	% Vote	N. elec	SD
Italy	Five Star Movement	25.6	1	
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	18.3	7	14.6
Spain	Podemos - We Can	12.7	1	

Note: The list includes three Libertarian-Populist parties in Europe which contested elections for the lower house of the national parliament. The percentage vote is the mean share of the vote for each party (and the standard deviation) in parliamentary elections from 2000 to 2015. For the party classification, see Chapter 8.

Source: Vote share calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow, 2016. *Parliaments and governments database* (ParlGov) 'Elections' dataset. www.parl.gov.org/.

FRINGE (5)

Croatia	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia	HDSSB	2.0	3	0.9
Poland	Real Politics Union - Congress of the New Right	UPRI/KNP	1.3	2	0.4
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights of 1861	HSP-1861	1.1	1	
Croatia	Croatian Democratic Peasant Party	HDSS	1.0	1	
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights - Dr. Ante Star	HSP-AS	0.6	1	

Note: The list includes 26 Authoritarian-Populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe which contested elections for the lower house of the national parliament. The percentage vote is the mean share of the vote for each party (and the standard deviation) in parliamentary elections from 2000 to 2015. For the party classification, see Chapter 8.


Source: Vote share calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow, 2016. *Parliaments and governments database* (ParlGov) 'Elections' dataset. www.parl.gov.org/.

in Northern Europe are Albert Rösti's Swiss People's Party (SVP), Geert Wilder's Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands, Heinz-Christian Strache's Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Marine Le Pen's National Front (FN), Alexander Garland's Alternative for Germany (AfD), Tom Van Grieken's Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), and Nigel Farage's UK Independence Party (UKIP).⁵⁵ In Central and Eastern Europe, as well, several parties fall into the authoritarian-populist category, including Bulgaria's Ataka, the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS), the Czech Republic's Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) Party, the Polish Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy or KNP), and Slovakia's Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). In order to explain the electoral appeal, this is the core group of parties we focus on in subsequent chapters.

An extreme Authoritarian-Populist party is exemplified by Golden Dawn in Greece with one of the highest scores on the authoritarian index in Europe due to policies which are extremely anti-immigrant, ultra-nationalistic, and hardline Eurosceptic. This has led some to classify Golden Dawn and the Independent Greeks ANEL parties as extreme right, neo-Nazi, or fascist.⁵⁶ Yet these categorizations are potentially confusing, since the labels conflate social with economic conservatism, according to the expert assessments in the CHES data. In fact, Golden Dawn is also anti-capitalist in its economic policies, for example its 'National Plan' advocates nationalizing banks and natural resources and strengthening trade agreements with Russia, Iran, and China. The party first entered parliament in May 2012 and just a few years later, in the January 2015 general elections, Golden Dawn had become the third largest party in the national parliament, winning 17 seats.⁵⁷

In post-communist Europe, another example of extreme Authoritarian-Populist parties is Ataka (Attack) in Bulgaria, positioned close to Hungary's Jobbik. The party was created by Volen Siderov in April 2005 and in parliamentary elections since then, Ataka has been in fourth place in Bulgaria. Its program advocates ultra-nationalist and xenophobic policies, especially directed against Muslim, Turkish and Roma minorities. The party seeks to assert traditional Bulgarian values, including by recognizing the Orthodox Church as the official religion of the country. It also endorses classic left-wing economic and social policies, such as restoring state ownership of major industries and increasing spending on education, welfare, and healthcare.⁵⁸ The party blames capitalism, neo-liberal markets, globalization, the IMF, the World Bank, and United States-led pro-Western forces for the country's economic problems and seeks to withdraw Bulgaria from NATO.⁵⁹ In the March 2017 elections, the party

FIGURE 7.2. Classification of European political parties



formed a coalition, United Patriots, with other nationalist and populist parties, including the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO), and the Union of the Patriotic Forces. United Patriots won 9 percent of the parliamentary vote and came third with 27 seats. Based on this result, United Patriots entered a government coalition led by Boyko Borisov, and nominated one-third of the Council of Ministers.

Libertarian-Populist Parties

Libertarian-Populist parties, combining socially liberal values and progressive policies with populist rhetoric, are located in the bottom-right quadrant in the figure. This includes Spain's Podemos (We Can), Greece's Syriza, Germany's The Left (Die Linke), and Italy's Five-star Movement.⁶⁰ These parties blend more socially liberal attitudes with anti-capitalist appeals calling for social justice and the end to austerity cuts, and some newer forms of participation within local communities.⁶¹

This position is exemplified by the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), a coalition of the radical left formed in 2004. In the January and September 2015 elections, in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, Syriza led coalition governments as the largest parliamentary party, in partnership the Independent Greeks (ANEL).⁶² The sovereign debt crisis in Greece, discussed in Chapter 5, formed the backdrop for the rise of Syriza, which fought the January 2015 elections on a platform pledged to end austerity, rewrite the bailout, and achieve substantial debt relief, and attacking the international financial institutions of the EU, IMF, and European Central Bank, as well as foreign governments such as Germany, which sought public-sector spending cuts as a condition of debt relief. The party is also socially liberal, implementing same-sex civil unions in 2015, despite opposition from its coalition partner, ANEL, and the Orthodox Church.

Authoritarian-Pluralist Parties

Authoritarian-Pluralist parties with socially conservative values, but which endorse less populist philosophies toward governance, are shown in the top-left quadrant. This quadrant contains parties such as Hungary's Fidesz, Norway's Freedom Party, and the Danish People's Party scoring more highly on the authoritarian index, which experts rate as reflecting socially conservative values but with weaker emphasis on populist appeals.

This category is exemplified by the Swiss People's Party (SVP), which is socially conservative in its values but relatively moderate in its degree of populist discourse. SVP was established in 1971 as a farmer's agrarian party, but its electoral support remained limited in the 1970s and 1980s, attracting around 11 percent of the vote mainly from cantons in the rural countryside. Party fortunes were transformed in the early 1990s, however, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, a wealthy industrialist, when the SVP became more Eurosceptic, advocating keeping Switzerland out of the European Economic Area and the EU, and opposed to mass immigration. The party became more hierarchically organized around the leader and a tight circle of party officials, and it adopted more aggressive anti-establishment discourse.⁶³ The party program promoted a philosophy of national conservatism and identity politics, advocating a limited role for government in the economy and the welfare state, and the preservation of traditional Swiss values against the supranational integration of Europe and the threat of foreigners.⁶⁴ Asylum seekers and refugees were blamed for the rise of crime and drugs and insufficient security.

The transformation of the party into the Swiss standard bearer for the socially conservative right led to its growing electoral success.⁶⁵ From 1959 to 2003, out of the four parties represented in the seven member Swiss Federal Council, the executive governing body, the SVP had one member. In 2004, after the party had gained in strength and representation in the federal parliament, they were allocated two seats – the Christian Democrats were reduced to one.⁶⁶ Currently chaired by Albert Rösti and led by Toni Brunner, the SVP's economic policies oppose deficit spending, government regulation, environmental protection, military engagement abroad, and closer ties with NATO.⁶⁷ On cultural issues, the party has emphasized Euroscepticism, strict asylum laws, and opposition to multiculturalism and immigration. For example, its party manifesto says: 'The SVP is fighting the failed asylum policy that leads to skyrocketing costs, more crime, and housing problems.'⁶⁸ The electoral success of the SVP at municipal, cantonal, and national levels polarized the Swiss party system, especially on cultural issues.⁶⁹ In 2009, in one of its most controversial moves, claiming to 'stop the creeping Islamization of Switzerland,' it pushed successfully to ban the construction of minarets – an initiative that subsequently became an amendment to the Swiss Constitution.⁷⁰ As we have seen in Chapter 6, Switzerland is a multiethnic and multilingual country with around one-third of its population foreign-born (see Figure 6.3), and one of the highest proportions in Europe. Following the October 2015 federal elections, and spurred by the European migration

crisis, the SVP became the largest party in the Federal Assembly, winning a record number of around one-third of the seats (65/200) with 29.4 percent of the votes. The SVP backs a referendum campaign to limit the free movement of EU citizens into the country, a bilateral accord agreed earlier to give Switzerland access to the EU single market. At the same time, the party managed to be in government without giving up its 'anti-system' image and rhetoric and without experiencing internal factionalism.⁷¹ Therefore, the SVP flourishes in a highly educated plural society – as well as a stable consociational democracy and federal state. Switzerland is also one of the affluent societies, which the World Bank estimates has the second highest per capita GDP in the world (\$78,813), with low unemployment.⁷²


Libertarian-Pluralist Parties

The lower left-hand quadrant depicts the Libertarian-Pluralist parties, usually long-established and mainstream parties favoring socially liberal policies and traditional forms of liberal democratic governance, including the many social democratic and socialist parliamentary parties in Western Europe. Mainstream parties in this group, include many Christian Democrat, Social Democrat, Conservative, Liberal, and Green Parties, sharing a liberal consensus concerning the value of cooperation and engagement in international affairs, generally supporting multilateral institutions of global governance, cooperation, development assistance, and humanitarian engagement, and the benefits of open borders for the free movement of capital, trade, goods, and labor. On the cultural dimension, Libertarian-Pluralist parties endorse socially liberal policy positions, reflecting the expansion of personal freedoms and individual rights on moral issues, tolerance of pluralistic diversity, supported by liberal democratic institutions and norms of governance. Parties in this quadrant differ from each other primarily on the traditional left-right cleavage over the importance of free markets versus state management of the economy and thus policy positions toward issues of redistribution, taxation, regulation, and social justice, as well as the role and size of the public sector and welfare states.

V CLASSIFYING LEFT-RIGHT PARTIES

How do parties compete across the left-right dimension? To examine these patterns, we can look at Figure 7.3 which shows the authoritarian-libertarian and the left-right cleavages broken down by country.

FIGURE 7.3. Classification of European political parties Notes: For the scale components, see Table 7.1. Party scores on all dimensions are standardized scales. Source: 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.



and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, commonly seen as a reaction against the economic stagnation and financial crises that hit the region during the late 1990s. Similar arguments about economic inequality have been made to explain the case of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV).⁷⁸ The election of Hugo Chavez as Venezuela's president in 1998, less than seven years after his unsuccessful military coup attempt, marked one of the most dramatic political transformations in the nation's history. This was followed in 2013 by his successor, Nicolás Maduro.⁷⁹ Venezuela illustrates the dangers of authoritarian left populist leaders in hybrid regimes, and how democratic institutions like elections can be destroyed by them.

Libertarian Right and Libertarian Left

Finally, the majority of European parties can be observed to fall into the libertarian left (99) and libertarian right (130) categories in the bottom quadrants in Figure 7.2. This includes many mainstream center-right governing parties close to the middle of the political spectrum, such as the British Conservatives, the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the German CSU, and Ireland Fianna Fail.

VI CLASSIFYING AUTHORITARIAN-POPULIST LEADERS

Finally, several presidents can also be classified as authoritarian populists. The technique of discourse analysis of leadership speeches has been used to identify these but unfortunately systematic data are lacking across many countries so judgments have to be more impressionistic.⁸⁰

Does President Trump fit the authoritarian-populist classification? We think so.⁸¹ His speeches feature a mélange of xenophobic fear-mongering and Islamophobia, narcissism, misogyny and racism, conspiracy theories ('millions of fraudulent votes'), and isolationist 'America First' policies. It is in his legitimization of authoritarian values that Trump represents the gravest threat to American democracy with his equivocal treatment of neo-Nazi and white supremacist hate groups, his open approval of some of the world's most repressive regimes, attacking the press and using Twitter to slam 'fake news,' seeking border limits on migrants from Muslim-majority countries and promising to build a wall to keep out Mexicans, casting doubts on the integrity of American elections and the independence of the judiciary, prioritizing military security and American

Authoritarian Right

The top-right quadrant contains the authoritarian right parties. These parties typically favor pro-market policies with a small role for the state on issues such as public-sector spending and taxation, and are socially conservative on issues such as preserving traditional family values and religious traditions, and deeply Eurosceptic and nationalistic in international affairs. Overall 17 European parties fall into this category. Many of these parties are also populist – denigrating the legitimacy of established elites at home or abroad – but not all. We can observe far more parties located in the authoritarian right quadrant than in the authoritarian left quadrant. When the position of all political parties in the 2014 CHES dataset is compared, we can observe a moderately strong and significant correlation between the authoritarian-libertarian scale and the left-right scale ($R = -0.74^{**}$ $P < 0.000$, $N = 270$).

Authoritarian Left

The top-left quadrant in Figure 7.2 contains the authoritarian left parties – again many but not all populist in their discourse toward governance authority. Overall, 22 parties fall into this category but in Western Europe and Nordic Europe, although many voters blend socialist views toward redistribution and the welfare state with adherence to traditional cultural values around issues like nationalism, it is notable that relatively few parties offer policy positions endorsing this combination, generating a representation gap.⁷³ Elsewhere around the world, however, many parties are of this category.⁷⁴ In post-communist Europe, this includes the Lithuanian Way of Courage (DK), the governing Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Slovak National Party, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian National Movement, the Czech Party of Civic Rights, and Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary).⁷⁵ In Latin America, as well, the Peronist tradition reflects this combination of socialist state-managed economics with populist authoritarian leaders in many countries, notably Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela (becoming increasingly authoritarian over time), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, Eva Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.⁷⁶ Latin America has a long history of populist leaders on both the economic left and right that dates back to the 1940s, when Argentina's Juan Perón came to power.⁷⁷ The resurgence of populism in Latin America during the last decade is exemplified by the success of Cristina Fernández in Argentina




FIGURE 12.8. Importance of democracy by birth cohort across post-industrial democracies

Note: 'How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose?' Mean importance by birth cohort. 3 "Born 1930s" 4 "Born 1940s" 5 "Born 1950s" 6 "Born 1960s" 7 "Born 1970s" 8 "Born 1980s." N. 43,432. Correlation indicates a significant decline by birth cohort in 18 societies (Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, NZ, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, and Uruguay).
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2014, 5th and 6th waves.

The countries are all classified by Freedom House as democratic states, and they share similar characteristics as high-income societies.⁷² The correlation between birth cohort and responses are also tested. As Figure 12.8 illustrates, far from a uniform 'European' pattern, the countries under comparison show widely varying trends by birth cohort. Thus, the Anglo-American democracies (including Australia, the US, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand) do indeed display a statistically significant decline in support for democracy by birth cohort. More modest generation gaps can also be observed in several other countries, including Slovenia, Uruguay, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. But in half of the post-industrial democracies under comparison no significant difference by birth cohort can be observed, including Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Chile, Germany, Hungary, and France. Striking contrasts in the overall levels of democratic approval are also clearly evident among societies, particularly the low approval recorded in America, displaying a profile more like Slovenia than Sweden.⁷³ The contrasts observed across similar post-industrial democracies are usually greater than the contrasts by cohort within each society.

Public Trust in Representative Institutions and Elections

What about the impact of populism on trust on core democratic institutions? There has long been concern about an erosion of trust in political parties, parliaments and governments in Western societies.⁷⁴ This is also where populism might be expected to have the strongest impact. For example, repeated rhetorical claims of 'fake news' by President Trump and White House spokespersons have sought to construct an alternative reality portraying facts as fungible and journalists as the partisan tool of an arrogant elite.⁷⁵ This phrase has spread to many dictators when rejecting critical news reports, including Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Myanmar government officials dismissing news about genocide, and by Russia's Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party's *People's Daily*.⁷⁶ The fake news narrative from Trump, combined with social media users actually being targeted by Russian misinformation campaigns, is widely believed to have eroded public trust in the news media.⁷⁷ For example, Gallup polls report that most Americans say that it is harder to be well informed and to determine which information is accurate today, with social media 'bubbles' reinforcing partisan polarization among like-minded networks.⁷⁸

To examine the trends, we turn to the Eurobarometer surveys which have monitored institutional trust in political parties, national parliaments and national governments in EU member states from 2001 to 2017. These institutions are some of the core pillars of representative democracies which are commonly attacked by populist leaders. Figure 12.9 shows the trends and suggests that in fact, rather than a steady slide in institutional confidence, we observe patterns closely associated with the onset of the economic recession in 2007. The overall pattern across the EU displays largely flat lines for trust in political parties from 2001 to 2017, not a steady erosion. The trends for trust in national governments and national parliaments show a dip in 2007, followed by recovery as the economy improved, and then another slight erosion starting in 2013. The European survey does not support the more extreme 'crisis of legitimacy' theories.

Social Tolerance and Trust

Finally, what are the broader effects on society – including tolerance and trust. Authoritarian values, especially when promoted by extremist groups, are widely believed to pose serious dangers for the values of social tolerance and trust, by vilifying or attacking foreigners, immigrants, Muslims, women, and sexual minorities. Racial discrimination and ethnic intolerance remain