

Emotional Choices

*How the Logic of Affect Shapes
Coercive Diplomacy*

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relation to significant others.⁶² From this perspective, target leaders' responses to coercive diplomacy are shaped by their social norms and self-conceptions. If these cultural scripts stipulate resistance in the face of coercive threats, they are unlikely to comply.⁶³

What rationalist, cognitivist, and constructivist accounts of coercive diplomacy either neglect or do not examine systematically is the role that emotions play in encounters between coercers and targets.⁶⁴ James Fearon, for example, acknowledges that "emotional commitments" may help to explain why states wage war, but he does not make any effort to further explore this possibility in his research.⁶⁵ Robert Art, Alexander George, and Peter Viggo Jakobsen all contend that targets will yield to a coercive threat that triggers "fear" of unacceptable military escalation.⁶⁶ Lawrence Freedman and Phil Haun observe that coercive diplomacy may be complicated by targets' experience of "humiliation."⁶⁷ Even though these scholars deem fear and humiliation important factors, however, they take their antecedent conditions and influences for granted. They examine neither how target leaders come to be afraid or humiliated nor how these emotions shape their choice behavior.

⁶² See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Homo Sociologicus* (New York: Routledge, 1973); Martin Hollis, *Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁶³ Some of these scholars do not necessarily identify as constructivists. Christopher Gelpi, for example, takes an "institutionalist" approach to exploring the influence of normative ideas on crisis bargaining. See Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," *American Political Science Review* 91:2 (1997), 339–60; Christopher Gelpi, *The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 184, 189. See also Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations*, 18, 125, 229; Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities*; Schoppa, "The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining," 312; Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence against 'Irrational' Adversaries? No Common Knowledge," in T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 76–7.

⁶⁴ A few scholars informed by research in psychology took into account affective forces in coercive diplomacy early on, but they generally conceived of them as a form of "motivated bias" distorting perception and detrimental to decision-making. See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). For other partial exceptions, see Todd H. Hall, "We Will Not Swallow this Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger," *Security Studies* 20:4 (2011), 521–55; Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides and Deterrence," *Security Studies* 16:2 (2007), 188; Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 552; Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 4, 6, 90–1, 132, 144.

⁶⁵ See James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49:3 (1995), 392.

⁶⁶ See Art, "Coercive Diplomacy," 372, 383; George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 79; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy: Refining Existing Theory to Post-Cold War Realities," in Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion*, 82.

⁶⁷ See Freedman, *Deterrence*, 110; Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 11, 173. See also Art, "Coercive Diplomacy," 362.

According to Janice Gross Stein, the interconnectedness of emotion and decision-making opens an important research agenda for students of international security. "Scholars will have to grapple systematically with the impact of fear, anger, and humiliation on threat perception at the individual level of leaders," she notes.⁶⁸ Under what conditions does fear lead to risky or to cautious behavior, and when does humiliation result in revenge or in retreat? Answers to these kinds of questions are "absolutely critical" to theories of threat-based strategies.⁶⁹ Even though empirical studies are "urgently needed," Stein notices a "lack of progress," in part due to the thorny methodological challenges of studying emotions outside the laboratory.⁷⁰ So far, scholars have not investigated in-depth the role of emotions in coercive diplomacy. This book seeks to fill this void.

THE LOGIC OF AFFECT

At present, there is no emotion-based logic of choice in International Relations. What I offer here is a first step to establish an affective paradigm in the field. The logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, proposes that individual-level decision-making is shaped by the interaction of norms, identities, and emotions. While norms and identities represent important long-term underlying conditions in the decision process, emotions function as essential short-term catalysts for change.⁷¹ Human decision-making is not only socially but also emotionally constructed.

Before we can explain how emotions influence choice behavior, we need to understand how they are themselves molded by the cultural milieu in which they are embedded. The book borrows insights from sociologists in general and symbolic interactionists in particular to delineate how actors' identities and social norms about the appropriate experience and expression of affect guide their emotions. It does not specify the precise substantive content of these cultural constructs *ex ante*. Given that norms and identities are bound to vary from case to case, they need to be investigated inductively. Rather, emotional choice theory describes the generic processes through which they shape emotions: Norms affect emotions through what sociologist Arlie

⁶⁸ Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," in Huddy, Sears, and Levy, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd edn, 386.

⁶⁹ See Janice Gross Stein, "Psychological Explanations of International Decision Making and Collective Behavior," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd edn (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 215.

⁷⁰ Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 387.

⁷¹ On the workings of catalysts, see Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 96.

Hochschild terms "feeling rules," which tell people how to experience emotions in a given situation, and "display rules," which instruct them how to express emotions. Identities influence emotions above all through recognition-seeking dynamics.⁷²

Emotions are not only social but also bodily experiences that are tied to an organism's autonomic nervous system. People feel emotions physically, often before they are aware of them.⁷³ These corporeal processes can exert a profound impact on human cognition and behavior. They generate or stifle energy, making choice selection a continuously dynamic phenomenon. Only if we capture this embodied dimension can we understand emotions and explain how they shape decision-making. To do so, the logic of affect draws on research in psychology in general and contemporary appraisal theories in particular. Pioneered by psychologist Magda Arnold in the 1960s, the appraisal paradigm posits that emotions arise once humans identify and appraise an event as relevant to a need, desire, value, or concern.⁷⁴ Her approach became one of the leading theoretical perspectives in emotion research from the 1980s onwards. While some early adherents viewed emotions primarily through a cognitive lens, contemporary appraisal scholars treat physiological reactions as integral and crucial components of emotion. They emphasize that appraisals are not necessarily deliberate processes; they mostly operate non-consciously and give rise to bodily changes in the organism. Cognitive and physiological processes are closely intertwined from early perception to choice selection.⁷⁵

In sum, the logic of affect takes inspiration from sociology and psychology to conceive of actors as *homo emotionalis*—emotional, social, and

⁷² See Arlie Russell Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology* 85:3 (1979), 563–4, 566; Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*, 3rd edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 18, 56–9.

⁷³ See Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruse, "Introduction," in Evans and Cruse, eds, *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality*, xiv; Jesse Prinz, "Which Emotions Are Basic?" in Evans and Cruse, eds, *Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality*, 74; Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 387.

⁷⁴ See Magda B. Arnold, *Emotion and Personality*, 2 vols (London: Cassell, 1960). Within the appraisal paradigm there are several appraisal theories with some important differences, but they all share the assumption that emotions come about as individuals evaluate events that relate to themselves. See Paul J. Silvia and Kari M. Eddington, "Self and Emotion," in Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney, eds, *Handbook of Self and Identity*, 2nd edn (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), 431; Rose McDermott, "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics* 2:4 (2004), 693–5.

⁷⁵ See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, "Appraisal Theory: Old and New Questions," *Emotion Review* 5:2 (2013), 125; Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Klaus R. Scherer, "Appraisal Processes in Emotion," in Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith, eds, *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, 572–3, 585; Agnes Moors and Klaus R. Scherer, "The Role of Appraisal in Emotion," in Michael D. Robinson, Edward R. Watkins, and Eddie Harmon-Jones, eds, *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion* (New York: Guilford Press, 2013), 137.

physiological beings whose emotions connect them to and separate them from significant others.⁷⁶

Main Propositions of the Logic of Affect

The conceptual core of the logic of affect sets out how the five key emotions fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation shape actors' preference formation and choice selection through their appraisal and action tendencies. This results in a series of propositions about how these emotions influence the decision-making of leaders whose countries are targets of coercive diplomacy. To begin with, if target leaders' emotions center primarily on fear of a military attack by a coercer, this can have complex effects. One option is the classic *flight* response: Target leaders are likely to back down if they believe that they can avoid this attack by acceding to the coercer's demands.⁷⁷ A second possibility is a *fight* reaction: Target leaders tend to resist if they appraise that they have a chance of overcoming the source of the threat, if they see conflict as inevitable, or if their cultural norms disapprove of escaping in the face of danger.⁷⁸ Finally, fearful target leaders may experience a shock and freeze if they view fighting as hopeless and do not see an escape route. The resulting inertia means that they are generally not in a position to comply with the coercer's demand to change their behavior.⁷⁹

Furthermore, target leaders are less likely to acquiesce if their emotions center primarily on anger at a coercer,⁸⁰ pride in the original behavior that

⁷⁶ See Helena Flam, "Emotional 'Man': I. The Emotional 'Man' and the Problem of Collective Action," *International Sociology* 5:1 (1990), 43; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 20; Thomas Schwinn, "Individual and Collective Agency," in William Outhwaite and Stephen P. Turner, eds, *The SAGE Handbook of Social Science Methodology* (London: Sage, 2007), 302–15.

⁷⁷ See Nico H. Frijda, *The Emotions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 18, 72, 100; John Tooby and Leeda Cosmides, "The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables," in Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, eds, *Handbook of Emotions*, 3rd edn (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 119. For a skeptical view on the idea of using the deliberate production of fear as a tool in coercive diplomacy, see Neta Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security* 24:4 (2000), 146–9.

⁷⁸ See Carmen P. McLean and Emily R. Anderson, "Brave Men and Timid Women? A Review of the Gender Differences in Fear and Anxiety," *Clinical Psychology Review* 29:6 (2009), 502; Christine Tappolet, "Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear," in Peter Goldie, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 333.

⁷⁹ See Michelle G. Craske, *Origins of Phobias and Anxiety Disorders: Why More Women than Men* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2003), 21; Tappolet, "Emotion, Motivation, and Action," 332–4.

⁸⁰ See Spanovic et al., "Fear and Anger as Predictors of Motivation for Intergroup Aggression," 726; Tagar, Federico, and Halperin, "The Positive Effect of Negative Emotions in Protracted Conflict," 157–8.

the coercer considers objectionable,⁸¹ or hope that they will get away with it.⁸² For these emotions tend to promote resistance and perseverance. Finally, if target leaders feel humiliated at the hands of a coercer, their response may go either way. They tend to withdraw if they assume that they are being justly humbled, and if they feel mentally or physically incapacitated.⁸³ If they view the perceived degrading behavior as unjustified, however, and if they have enough energy to resist, they are likely to defy the coercer's demand and seek revenge.⁸⁴ Figure 1.1 provides a summary of these expected influences.

Even when emotions produce powerful impulses, people will not necessarily act on them. Humans are neither slaves of the passions nor perfect manipulators of their emotions, but they exert limited and varying degrees of control over them. The logic of affect thus restricts itself to explaining and predicting the influence of emotions on decision-making in a probabilistic fashion. These probabilistic predictions represent a middle path between enduring covering laws and mere historical description.⁸⁵

The characteristics of the five key emotions shed some light on the puzzle of why leaders of target states often refuse to bow to the will of stronger coercers. For coercers face a dilemma: They must induce enough fear of a military attack in target leaders to get them to change their behavior without giving the impression that an attack is inevitable and without shocking the target leaders into paralysis. At the same time, they need to avoid eliciting anger and a sense of unjust humiliation on the part of the target leaders, because these emotions are likely to provoke the defiant response that coercive diplomacy is supposed to avoid.⁸⁶ This is no easy feat because targets typically get angry at demands to do or undo something against their will. They may also feel unjustly humiliated by threats. Coercers can take steps to

⁸¹ See Jessica L. Tracy, Azim F. Shariff, and Joey T. Cheng, "A Naturalist's View of Pride," *Emotion Review* 2:2 (2010), 169; Lisa A. Williams and David DeSteno, "Pride and Perseverance: The Motivational Role of Pride," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 94:6 (2008), 1007-8.

⁸² See Kevin L. Rand and Jennifer S. Cheavens, "Hope Theory," in Shane J. Lopez and C. R. Snyder, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press Online, 2009), n.p.

⁸³ See Walter J. Torres and Raymond M. Bergner, "Humiliation: Its Nature and Consequences," *Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 38:2 (2010), 199; Julian Walker and Victoria Knauer, "Humiliation, Self-Esteem and Violence," *Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology* 22:5 (2011), 726.

⁸⁴ See David J. Y. Combs et al., "Exploring the Consequences of Humiliating a Moral Transgressor," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 32:2 (2010), 130.

⁸⁵ See Richard S. Lazarus, "Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion," *American Psychologist* 46:8 (1991), 819; Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 22, 208. For a similar approach, see Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*.

⁸⁶ See Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 382.




Figure 1.1 How the Five Key Emotions Shape Target Leaders' Decision-Making

alleviate these emotions by offering positive incentives, for example. Such measures, however, may prompt target leaders to feel pride or hope that the opponents are not as resolved as presumed and that it may not be necessary to comply with their demands. To overcome this dilemma, coercers not only need to develop a good understanding of target leaders' identities and emotion norms. They also require empathy, i.e., the capacity to infer how

emotion in opposition to rationality. This is certainly not the case. I do not see feeling and thinking as separate or antithetical processes. What I do want to do, however, is to challenge the monopoly that many rational choice theorists claim over the notion of rationality. I submit that their notion of rationality is problematic not for what it includes, but for what it omits. It leaves out important intellectual and affective capacities that put humans in a position to make reasoned decisions.⁹¹ In the following paragraphs, I will first propose a conceptualization of rationality that transcends the narrow rationalist view. Next, I will characterize the relationship between rationality and emotions, suggesting that emotions may both help and hinder decision-makers. Finally, I will explain why neither an objectivist nor a purely subjectivist orientation is helpful to gauge whether emotions may have been a source of rationality or irrationality in a given situation. I will instead advocate a pragmatic approach that focuses not only on an individual's self-perception but also on the observations of eyewitnesses in her social group.

If we wish to begin to fathom the complexity of rationality, we need to try and take its multifaceted nature into account. Rationality has not only an instrumental dimension but also an epistemic, reflective, and affective facet. The instrumental facet of rationality is a normative assumption about which means an agent should choose to realize her aims and preferences as efficiently as possible.⁹² This is how rational choice theorists conceive of rationality. When actors depart from the optimum prescribed by their means-ends model, their behavior is deemed instrumentally irrational.⁹³ Whereas the instrumental facet of rationality is concerned with rational action, its second, epistemic facet relates to rational thought.⁹⁴ Epistemic rationality represents a theoretical assumption about how an agent should think in order to form

⁹¹ See Jervis, *How Statesmen Think*, 3; Karen Jones, "Gender and Rationality," in Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 304.

⁹² See Jon Elster, "Emotional Choice and Rational Choice," in Goldie, ed., *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, 263; Keith E. Stanovich, *Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. Instrumental rationality is sometimes also referred to as "practical" or "strategic" rationality.

⁹³ See Ronald de Sousa, *Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7; Keith Stanovich, *Rationality and the Reflective Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. Pointing to the cognitive limits of human beings, Herbert Simon famously proposed the notion of "bounded rationality." He suggests that actors are less than fully rational; they merely "satisfice" rather than "maximize" their utility. His approach nevertheless adheres to the basic premise that rationality is a normative assumption about which means agents should choose to realize their aims and preferences. See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Bounded Rationality*, vol. 3, *Empirically Grounded Economic Reason* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 295.

⁹⁴ See de Sousa, *Why Think?*, 121; Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, "Introduction: Aspects of Rationality," in Mele and Rawling, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Rationality*, 3.

someone else is currently feeling and to imagine how someone will likely feel in response to certain signals.⁸⁷

Experiments have shown that humans are better at judging emotions of those with whom they are more culturally familiar. The more culturally distant targets are, the more difficult it will be for a coercer to empathize with them.⁸⁸ What is more, psychologists have found that high-power individuals tend to be less sensitive to the emotions of others than those with low power. They are less willing to take someone else's perspective and they are less able to accurately infer their emotions. The authors of the resulting studies theorize that this is because people who see themselves as powerful may believe that they are less dependent on others and hence do not require an accurate understanding of how they feel.⁸⁹ Moreover, since power typically entails increased demands on attention, power holders are thought to have limited cognitive and emotional resources to analyze the perspectives of subordinates.⁹⁰ If this finding about participants in experiments can be transferred to leaders of states, this sheds some further light on the puzzle of why heads of great powers often fail in their coercive diplomacy toward weaker states. A limited ability or willingness to empathize with supposedly inferior targets may prevent coercers from taking their opponents' emotions into consideration.

The rest of this section will clarify the relationship between emotion and rationality, and explicate how the logic of affect relates to the logics of consequences and appropriateness.

Emotion and Rationality

The term emotional choice theory and the way I contrast this action model with the rational choice paradigm may create the impression that I cast

⁸⁷ See Jean Decety, "Neuroscience of Empathic Responding," in Stephanie L. Brown, R. Michael Brown, and Louis A. Penner, eds., *Moving Beyond Self-Interest: Perspectives from Evolutionary Biology, Neuroscience, and the Social Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109; Gary D. Sherman et al., "Perceiving Others' Feelings: The Importance of Personality and Social Structure," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6:5 (2015), 560. For IR literature exploring the phenomenon of empathy, see Neta C. Crawford, "Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy," *International Theory* 6:3 (2014), 541; Naomi Head, "Costly Encounters of the Empathic Kind: A Typology," *International Theory* 8:1 (2016), 171-99; Holmes and Yurhi-Millo, "The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits," 107.

⁸⁸ See Mina Cikara, Emile G. Brunneau, and Rebecca R. Saxe, "Us and Them: Intergroup Failures of Empathy," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 20:3 (2011), 149; Hillary Anger Elfenbein and Nalini Ambady, "When Familiarity Breeds Accuracy: Cultural Exposure and Facial Emotion Recognition," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85:2 (2003), 286.

⁸⁹ See Adam D. Galinsky et al., "Power and Perspectives Not Taken," *Psychological Science* 17:12 (2006), 1068; Keltner and Lerner, "Emotion," 339; Michael W. Kraus, Stéphane Côté, and Dacher Keltner, "Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathic Accuracy," *Psychological Science* 21:11 (2010), 1717, 1721.

⁹⁰ See Galinsky et al., "Power and Perspectives Not Taken," 1068.

beliefs that are commensurate with the information available to her.⁹⁵ It requires accurate perception, sound information processing, and consistent reasoning.⁹⁶ When actors do not meet these requirements, their thinking is considered epistemically irrational.⁹⁷ The instrumental and epistemic facets of rationality tell actors how to reach their goals efficiently and on the basis of sound reasoning, but they fail to grasp why people adopt these goals in the first place.⁹⁸ This leads us to the third, reflective facet of rationality, which involves the ability of humans to reflect on their beliefs, preferences, and behavior in light of their values.⁹⁹ Constructivists generally conceive of rationality along these lines. The process of what Amartya Sen calls "reasoned self-scrutiny" on the basis of normative convictions may prompt actors to change their minds and to make new choices accordingly.¹⁰⁰ There are two kinds of reflective irrationality: First, people may behave contrary to what their reasoned reflection suggests. Second, "a person can fail to do what he would decide to do if he were to reason and reflect on what is to be done," Sen notes.¹⁰¹

The fourth facet of rationality involves agents' affective experience. Traditionally, scholars in Europe and North America drew a sharp distinction between rationality and emotions. They not only regarded them as two separate processes—one located in the mind, the other in the heart—they also viewed them as being in constant tension. While rationality was seen as a means to achieve progress and human betterment, the "passions" were deemed irrational impulses that undermine logical thinking and moral judgment.¹⁰² From the 1980s onward, however, this received wisdom began to be challenged by a number of scholars. Evolutionary psychologists theorized that emotions can, in fact, help humans to make rational choices. By functioning as heuristic short-cuts, for example, they may enable individuals to focus attention on the key aspect of a challenge and to navigate rapidly through a complex and often dangerous world.¹⁰³

⁹⁵ See Stanovich, *Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World*, 5–6, 90. Epistemic rationality is sometimes also referred to as "theoretical" or "evidential" rationality.

⁹⁶ See Richard Samuels and Stephen P. Stich, "Rationality and Psychology," in Mele and Rawling, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Rationality*, 285.

⁹⁷ See Stanovich, *Rationality and the Reflective Mind*, 7.

⁹⁸ See Amartya Sen, *Rationality and Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 40; Stanovich, *Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World*, 5.

⁹⁹ See Sen, *Rationality and Freedom*, 32, 36; Stanovich, *Decision Making and Rationality in the Modern World*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), 195.

¹⁰¹ Sen, *Rationality and Freedom*, 228.

¹⁰² See Peter N. Stearns, "History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact," in Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett, eds., *Handbook of Emotions*, 3rd edn, 17–31.

¹⁰³ See Tooby and Cosmides, "The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables," 133; Paul Slovic et al., "Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral Economics," *Journal of Socio-Economics* 31:4 (2002), 331–2; Hideki Ohira, "The Somatic Marker Revisited: Brain and

This line of research received support from neuroscientists in the 1990s. When Antonio Damasio and his colleagues examined people who had suffered damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain responsible for managing emotions, they noticed an unusual pattern of symptoms. These patients did not show any deficits in their reasoning abilities, but they could look at the most cheerful or gruesome photos without feeling anything.¹⁰⁴ Given that the brain damage had virtually erased their emotionality, the traditional perspective on affect would predict that they should now be able to make highly efficient decisions on the basis of pure logical thinking. The patients, however, performed disastrously in gambling tasks, betraying indecisiveness and poor judgment.¹⁰⁵ The inability to feel was associated with what seemed to be suboptimal and outright irrational decisions. This led Damasio and his team to conclude that rational behavior depends on the capacity to experience emotions. The emotions triggered in a given situation help people to narrow down the options for action by approving the beneficial ones and by abandoning those that are detrimental.¹⁰⁶ Rather than being separate faculties, let alone polar opposites, rationality and emotion are neurologically intertwined. According to this perspective, emotion is an intrinsic and necessary part of rational decision-making.¹⁰⁷

These revolutionary findings in psychology and neuroscience demolished the old orthodoxy that affect always undermines rationality. As they were being received and taken up by philosophers and social scientists, the pendulum of academic discourse began to swing in the opposite direction. Many scholars started to argue that emotions are inherently a source of good judgment and enhanced decision-making.¹⁰⁸ More recently, some researchers

Body in Emotional Decision Making," *Emotion Review* 2:3 (2010), 246; Kirsten G. Volz and Ralph Hertwig, "Emotions and Decisions: Beyond Conceptual Vagueness and the Rationality Muddle," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 11:1 (2016), 107. For valuable observations about the gendered dimension of rationality and emotion, see J. Ann Tickner, *A Feminist Voyage through International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 8, 103, 163, 171.

¹⁰⁴ See Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel, and Antonio R. Damasio, "Deciding Advantageously before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy," *Science* 275:5304 (1997), 1293–5; Antonio R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon, 1994), xii; Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 33.

¹⁰⁵ See Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review* 108:4 (2001), 824; Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 34.

¹⁰⁶ See Damasio, *Descartes' Error*, xii–xiii, 53; Baba Shiv, George Loewenstein, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio, "Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion," *Psychological Science* 16:6 (2005), 438.

¹⁰⁷ See Franks, "Emotions and Neurosociology," 268–9.

¹⁰⁸ Margaret Archer treats them as trustworthy "commentaries" in choice behavior, for example. Gerd Gigerenzer asserts that "gut feelings" are infused with the "intelligence of the unconscious." And Martha Nussbaum regards emotions as "forms of evaluative thought" that are "part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning." See Margaret S. Archer, *Structure,*

have sought to develop a more nuanced view. They agree that at the most basic level, the ability to feel seems to be necessary to rationality, and affect may be conducive to decision-making. At the same time, however, they point to further evidence indicating that emotion can also distort judgment¹⁰⁹ and that neurologically impaired emotional processing may also be associated with what could be considered advantageous decision-making.¹¹⁰ Emotion “can undermine rationality even while it is necessary to rationality,” as Jonathan Mercer points out.¹¹¹ Damasio and his associates recognized this when they complemented their earlier work with further studies on the “negative side” of emotions.¹¹² The present book subscribes to this post-revisionist perspective. It maintains that emotional choice theory can help to explain both deviations from rationality and optimal decision-making.¹¹³

This raises the question of how we are supposed to evaluate the degree of rationality or irrationality of actors’ behavior. Scholars taking an objectivist approach would first develop an objective rational baseline to determine what would be the rational thing to do in any given situation and then compare

Agency and the Internal Conversation. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26–7; Gigerenzer, *Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious* (New York: Viking, 2007), 19; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11, 1.

¹⁰⁹ See Ronald de Sousa, “Emotion,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2014), available at <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotion/>> (accessed December 12, 2015), n.p.; Evans and Cruse, “Introduction,” xvii; Loewenstein and Lerner, “The Role of Affect in Decision Making,” 635–6; Rebecca K. Ratner and Kenneth C. Herbst, “When Good Decisions Have Bad Outcomes: The Impact of Affect on Switching Behavior,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 96:1 (2005), 25; Gaurav Suri, Gal Sheppes, and James J. Gross, “Emotion Regulation and Cognition,” in Robinson, Watkins, and Harmon-Jones, eds, *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, 196.

¹¹⁰ See Ralph Herwig and Kirsten G. Volz, “Abnormality, Rationality, and Sanity,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 17:11 (2013), 547–9; Michael Koenigs and Daniel Tranel, “Prefrontal Cortex Damage Abolishes Brand-Cued Changes in Cola Preference,” *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience* 3:1 (2008), 1–6.

¹¹¹ See Jonathan Mercer, “Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9:3 (2006), 299. According to Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “emotions accompany so-called ‘rational’ actions as much as ‘irrational’ ones, positive experiences as much as negative.” See Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Grief and the Transformation of Emotions after War,” in Åhäll and Gregory, eds, *Emotions, Politics and War*, 215.

¹¹² See Shiv et al., “Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion,” 435–9.

¹¹³ For similar approaches in psychology, see Lerner et al., “Emotion and Decision Making,” 799, 816; Volz and Herwig, “Emotions and Decisions,” 101–16. For similar approaches in IR, see Holmes, “Believing This and Alleviating That,” 707; Richard Ned Lebow, “Greeks, Neuroscience, and International Relations,” in Daniel Jacobi and Annette Freyberg-Inan, eds, *Human Beings in International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 135; Mercer, “Human Nature and the First Image,” 296; Roger D. Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 27; Jonathan Renshon, Julia J. Lee, and Dustin Tingley, “Emotions and the Micro-Foundations of Commitment Problems,” *International Organization* 71, Supplement (2017), S200.

agents’ thinking, feeling, and actions against this ideal standard.¹¹⁴ The more people approximate (deviate from) this rational baseline, the more rational (irrational) they are assumed to be.¹¹⁵ I will discard this method because researchers’ ideas about which decision would be rational may differ substantially from those of actual decision-makers. Moreover, I reject the objectivist premise that agents exist in an objective reality independent of the subjective orientations of scholars.

A subjectivist approach, on the other hand, would suggest that a person’s level of rationality can be established only by the person herself.¹¹⁶ I will also refrain from such a purely subjectivist perspective, because individuals may not be able or willing to recognize irrational behavior as such. Instead, I will widen my focus and propose that an actor’s degree of rationality can be best appraised by herself and by eyewitnesses in her social group. Understanding evaluations of the degree of rationality from within a cultural community makes it possible to uncover the intersubjective meanings attached to them.¹¹⁷ If the actor or close observers view her behavior as (ir)rational, this would open up the possibility that it may, indeed, be so.

The Relationship among the Logics of Consequences, Appropriateness, and Affect

How does the logic of affect relate to the logics of consequences and appropriateness? In foregrounding the emotion-based paradigm, this book does not advocate a rejection or replacement of the traditional action models. Rather, it acknowledges that each logic of choice captures important elements of political life. *Homo emotionalis* is designed to offer a useful complement in the spirit of model pluralism. The logics of consequences, appropriateness, and affect should be seen as ideal types that do not come about in pure form in social reality. They are deeply interwoven in practice, and each decision

¹¹⁴ For advocates of the use of “objective” rational baselines, see Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics* (New York: Free Press, 1988), 145; Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 3; Andrew H. Kydd, “Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice,” in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 438. For a perceptive critique of the rational baseline approach, see Jonathan Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” *International Organization* 59:1 (2005), 89.

¹¹⁵ See Duncan Snidal, “Rational Choice and International Relations,” in Carlisnaes, Risse, and Simmons, eds, *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd edn., 88.

¹¹⁶ See Itzhak Gilboa, *Rational Choice* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 5; George Loewenstein, “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 65:3 (1996), 289.

¹¹⁷ See Vincent Pouliot, “Practice Tracing,” in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 243.

process is shaped to some extent by instrumental, normative, and emotional motivation.¹¹⁸

Emotions are omnipresent and permeate both *homo oeconomicus* and *homo sociologicus* to varying degrees of intensity. Damasio's neurological research indicates that affective experience is a critical precondition for instrumental rationality. People's pursuit of their preferences is generally toned by emotion. Conversely, how we experience and express affect is colored by more or less intuitive utility considerations. We often try to generate and display what we consider useful feelings, and we attempt to suppress and hide disadvantageous ones.¹¹⁹ Likewise, affect plays a role in normative action and reflective rationality. On the one hand, emotions endow cultural symbols with meaning and the authority to regulate decision-making. If we feel strongly about norms we are particularly likely to adhere to them. Rules that cease to resonate at an affective level often come to lose their prescriptive power.¹²⁰ On the other hand, culture molds what people feel. "Social structure regulate[s] emotional experience from within the feeling subject through the very framing and interpretation of emotions," as Eva Illouz and her colleagues explain.¹²¹

Given that instrumental and normative motivation is so deeply imbued with affect, some readers may wonder why one should establish *homo emotionalis* as an additional action model. I make the case that it is useful for heuristic purposes to distinguish among the logics of consequences, appropriateness, and affect, and to use them pragmatically as analytic lenses to examine choice behavior.¹²² A single action model is unlikely to be able to grasp the complexity of human decision-making. The empirical question to be asked is thus not whether agents follow one logic of choice or the other, but which of these logics plays the greatest role in a decision process and how the interplay between them unfolds over time.¹²³ This interplay may be characterized by five main patterns: First, since humans generally feel before they think, the logic of affect may lead them to prioritize one of the other two action

models. Affective experience may prompt decision-makers to engage primarily in strategic goal-seeking or to comply with their normative obligations in a given situation.¹²⁴ Second, *homo emotionalis* may infuse the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness and inform actors how to adjudicate between different strategic goals or between distinct norms, respectively.¹²⁵ Third, the logic of affect may constrain or reinforce decision-making that is motivated chiefly by one of the conventional logics of choice. Fourth, emotional choice may itself become the predominant action model shaping decision-making. When emotions become the principal forces influencing choice behavior, they may override or be supported by one or more of the other logics of choice.¹²⁶ At high levels of intensity, emotions may "invade or overwhelm" and "connect or separate individuals against their will," as Helena Flam observes.¹²⁷ In such instances, the logic of affect may be able to illuminate behavior that seems difficult to comprehend from the standpoint of existing rationalist and constructivist approaches. Finally, emotional choice theory will lose its explanatory power when actors manage to express unfeelt emotion or stifle felt emotion to achieve their goals or to comply with social norms.¹²⁸ Such strategic or normative behavior is best explained by *homo oeconomicus* or *homo sociologicus*, respectively. The logic of affect cannot shed any light on it, because it is limited to accounting for the influence of experienced emotion.¹²⁹

In practice, these five patterns in the interplay between the logic of affect and the logics of consequences and appropriateness continuously alternate and merge with each other. For instance, some psychological studies suggest that individuals who simulate an emotion for instrumental or social reasons may come to feel it over time.¹³⁰ This is likely to give rise to the emotion's

¹²⁴ See Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 181.

¹²⁵ See Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, 3; Roger D. Petersen and Sarah Zukerman, "Anger, Violence, and Political Science," in Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler, and Charles Spielberger, eds., *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes* (New York: Springer, 2010), 570.

¹²⁶ I thank Helena Flam for helping me to think through these issues.

¹²⁷ Flam, "Emotional 'Man,'" 43.

¹²⁸ See *ibid.*, 46–7; Schimank, *Handeln und Strukturen*, 117.

¹²⁹ This does not mean that this strategic or normative behavior is free of emotions, of course. If an actor manages to express unfeelt anger for instrumental reasons, for example, the logic of affect will not be able to account for this emotional display, but it may be able to explain some of the underlying felt emotions. The actor may feel proud of her good anger-performance or hope that her strategy will succeed, for instance.

¹³⁰ See Paul Ekman, *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life* (New York: Times Books, 2003), 36; Marwan Sinaceur and Larissa Z. Tiedens, "Get Mad and Get More than Even: When and Why Anger Expression is Effective in Negotiations," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 42:3 (2006), 320.

¹¹⁸ See Flam, "Emotional 'Man,'" 99, 51; Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in International Relations," *International Organization* 54:1 (2000), 18.

¹¹⁹ See Uwe Schimank, *Handeln und Strukturen: Einführung in die akteurstheoretische Soziologie*, 3rd edn (Weinheim and Munich: Juventa, 2007), 114–15.

¹²⁰ See Jon Elster, "Emotion and Action," in Robert C. Solomon, ed., *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 155–8; Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*, xi; Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, *The Sociology of Emotions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 292.

¹²¹ See Eva Illouz, Daniel Gilon, and Mattan Shachak, "Emotions and Cultural Theory," in Stets and Turner, eds., *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, vol. 2, 223. See also Jon Elster, *Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 106–8, 113–14.

¹²² For a similar approach, see James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), 52–3.

¹²³ See Risse, "Let's Argue!," 18.

CASE SELECTION

The value of emotional choice theory ultimately depends on whether it enhances our understanding of human decision-making. To assess the model's analytic power, it is applied in two detailed historical case studies: Nikita Khrushchev's response to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and Saddam Hussein's decision-making during the Gulf conflict in 1990-1. Harry Eckstein has advised that a theory can be shown to be strong and generalizable if its propositions are confirmed with "hard" cases that, *ex ante*, look least likely to corroborate them.¹³² Given that both the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict are commonly associated with high emotional tension, some readers may regard them as "easy" tests for a theory about the role of affect in strategic interaction. This would, indeed, be so if the aim of this study were to explore *whether* emotions matter in coercive diplomacy. The primary goal, however, is to show *how* and to *what extent* they matter. The two crises can thus serve as productive cases because they are likely to bring into sharp relief the workings of emotions.¹³³

The missile crisis and the Gulf conflict have been selected as cases for three main reasons. First, both are viewed as classic instances of forceful persuasion in the IR literature. Scholars have used the missile crisis as a foundational case study to theorize strategic interaction between states. Thomas Schelling and Alexander George, for example, referred to the episode at length to illustrate their concepts of compellence and coercive diplomacy, respectively. Both authors viewed John F. Kennedy's approach as an example par excellence of a success in crisis bargaining.¹³⁴ Over the years, students as well as practitioners of security policy have regularly turned to this apparent role model to learn lessons about the formulation of threats and the provision of incentives.¹³⁵ In the Gulf conflict, on the other hand, the George H. W. Bush administration and its international allies did not manage to get Saddam Hussein to recall his troops from Kuwait without the use of force. The crisis has become a standard example of coercive diplomacy failure in the strategic studies literature.¹³⁶ Precisely because both cases have achieved such

¹³² See Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 158.
¹³³ For a similar approach, see Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 6.
¹³⁴ See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 40-1, 57-8, 60-5, 80-7, 94-8, 279-82; George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 31-8; Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution through Coercive Diplomacy," in George and Simons, eds, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 111-32.
¹³⁵ For overviews of the evaluation of the crisis over the years, see Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 17, 99; Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 291; Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 16.
¹³⁶ See Richard K. Herrmann, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait, 1990-1991," in George and Simons, eds, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 229-64; Stanley A. Renshon,

appraisal and action tendencies, which, in turn, shape the construction of preferences, judgment, and choice selection. In such instances, *homo oeconomicus* or *homo sociologicus* makes some room for *homo emotionalis*. If these actors later get desensitized, they will stop experiencing the emotion for the time being but may continue to express it on strategic or normative grounds. Much of the explanatory power then shifts back to the logic of consequences or appropriateness. Due to these continuous transformations and transitions, we are bound to find numerous cases where we need a combination of action models to account for an agent's decision-making trajectory. By employing all three logics of choice at different times and in conjunction with each other, it may be possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of how humans feel, think, and decide. Such a multidimensional perspective will enable us to explain a broader spectrum of decision-making.¹³¹ Table 1.1 outlines and compares the main features of the three action models under consideration in this study.

Table 1.1 Three Action Models

	Homo oeconomicus	Homo sociologicus	Homo emotionalis
Theoretical perspective	Rationalist	Social constructivist	Socioemotional constructivist
Logic of choice	Logic of consequences	Logic of appropriateness	Logic of affect
Main drivers	Pursuit of utility, cost-benefit calculations	Norms, identities, and other intersubjective ideas and practices	Affect and emotions in combination with culture
View of rationality	Instrumental, epistemic	Reflective	Instrumental, epistemic, reflective, and affective
View of agents	Autonomous being	Social being	Emotional, social, and physiological being
View of self-control	Assumed	Assumed	Limited
View of structures	Generally materialist	Generally ideational	Biological and physiological as well as cognitive and cultural
Form of explanation ¹	Causal analysis	Constitutive analysis	Process analysis

¹ For an elaboration on the different forms of explanation and a summary of process analysis, see Chapter 3.

¹³¹ See Flam, "Emotional 'Man,'" 39, 51; Annette Freyberg-Inan and Daniel Jacobi, "Conclusion: Toward an International Political (Post-)Anthropology," in Jacobi and Freyberg-Inan, eds, *Human Beings in International Relations*, 324.

a canonical status, it is useful to investigate whether the logic of affect can help to account for the variation in their outcomes and to see whether the findings invalidate or confirm the lessons drawn in existing studies.

Second, tracing the emotions of leaders requires a substantial source base that includes not only eyewitness accounts but also records of their confidential deliberations at the time of the crisis. Unfortunately, it is generally difficult to obtain this material for targets of forceful persuasion. The missile crisis and the Gulf conflict are rare exceptions in this respect because there is a rich body of sources available to explore Nikita Khrushchev's and Saddam Hussein's decision-making. The Russian material ranges from autobiographical reflections by Khrushchev and other Soviet policy-makers to archival records and oral history interviews. The Kremlin archives have released important government files, such as protocols of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Soviet Union's top decision-making body. In the case of the Gulf conflict, the study relies on media sources, oral history interviews, and internal Ba'ath regime files captured by US armed forces during the War in Iraq in 2003. Copies of about 1,200 records, including tapes of internal leadership discussions and meetings with foreign visitors, intelligence reports, and other government files are now held at the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. These documents of policy-making at the heart of power in Moscow and Baghdad provide a unique opportunity to explore the feeling and thinking of the top decision-makers in these two crises.¹³⁷

Finally, both the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict comprised different phases during which the target leaders took a number of distinct decisions. These periods display substantial within-case variation in their

"Introduction," in Stanley A. Renshon, ed., *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), xvii; Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?" *International Security* 17:2 (1992), 147-79. Officially, President George H. W. Bush defined success in coercive diplomacy toward Baghdad as his primary goal. Some authors, however, argue that he came to purposefully work toward failure of this strategy in order to be able to wage war against Iraq. By January 1991, he had allegedly reached the conclusion that Saddam Hussein's military needed to be substantially decimated in order to reduce its threat to the region. See, for example, Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War*, 70. This hypothesis deserves further exploration on the basis of archival research, but it does not cause any problems for the setup of the present study. What matters for our purpose is how the Iraqi leadership interpreted US statements and actions.

¹³⁷ This material was first examined by the Institute of Defense Analysis on behalf of the US Department of Defense. Electronic copies of about 1,200 records filling around 34,000 pages were then passed on to the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRRC) at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. This study benefits greatly from the CRRRC's transcripts and translations of the tapes. Whether the participants in these sessions knew that they were being recorded is often not clear. See Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xiv, 2, 3-5, 8.

rhetoric and behavior, which is useful for the assessment of the role of emotion and alternative explanations.¹³⁸ It would be difficult to treat these phases as separate mini-case studies, however, because the choices that the policy-makers made over time are unlikely to be independent from each other. The affective experience surrounding each decision is bound to be shaped to some degree by emotional memories of past decisions. As Martha Nussbaum points out, the "content of emotions arrives embedded in a complex narrative history, without mentioning which one frequently cannot give an account of the full specificity of the emotion itself."¹³⁹ To gain an understanding of a leader's emotions during an episode of coercive diplomacy, it is thus necessary to take into consideration their historical context.¹⁴⁰ The case studies will, therefore, start out with an in-depth analysis of the developments leading up to the beginning of crisis bargaining.

Emotional choice theory is, in principle, designed to be applicable to any instance of forceful persuasion in any era and region of the world. It may also be used to examine other cases of foreign policy decision-making. The primary goal of the book, however, is to establish whether the theory presents a fruitful analytical lens to examine the choice behavior of the Soviet and Iraqi leaders in the Cuban missile crisis and the Gulf conflict, respectively. If the resulting account were persuasive, it would be reasonable to assume that the logic of affect may also be able to illuminate target leaders' decision-making in other instances of coercive diplomacy.¹⁴¹ Given that this study is based on only two case studies, there is an inherent risk of extrapolating features to a class of events that are, in fact, unique to a specific case or subgroup. This is why I will follow Alexander George's advice to formulate only conditional generalizations that are bounded by scope conditions.¹⁴² Experts agree that both Nikita Khrushchev and Saddam Hussein wielded supreme power in their choice behavior.¹⁴³ The findings from the case studies should thus be transferred only to target leaders

¹³⁸ See Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2 (1985), 29-50; Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 41.

¹³⁹ Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 179.

¹⁴⁰ See Ja Ian Chong and Todd H. Hall, "One Thing Leads to Another: Making Sense of East Asia's Repeated Tensions," *Asian Security* 13:1 (2017), 20; Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit*, 41.

¹⁴¹ See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 110; Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 29, 268.

¹⁴² See George and Simons, "Findings and Conclusions," 267-8.

¹⁴³ See Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, *Why Leaders Fight*, 55; Joseph Sassoon, *Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 191.

who enjoy a similar level of domestic authority. Any wider extrapolations would require further empirical analysis.¹⁴⁴

THE FOCUS ON POLITICAL LEADERS

In concentrating on the emotions of top political leaders, the book follows Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen's argument that these individuals are "critically important" in shaping their governments' foreign policy at times of crisis.¹⁴⁵ The reasoning is that crises often erupt and develop quickly, and policy responses tend to be developed behind closed doors at the highest level of political power. As a result, even a top leader in a democratic system is frequently in a position to take momentous decisions without strong domestic checks and balances.¹⁴⁶ Rationalist accounts typically treat these decision-makers as interchangeable subjects. They claim that any leader would make similar choices in response to the same domestic and external constraints and incentives.¹⁴⁷ The logic of affect takes into consideration actors' heterogeneity, including their agency and personal disposition.¹⁴⁸ That it focuses on top decision-makers does not mean that it subscribes to an individualist ontology, however. Rather, it assumes that actors are formed in the course of the relationships they have with others. Consequently, emotions are not locked up in the hearts of autonomous individuals, but they are in a continuous

¹⁴⁴ For similar approaches to the issue of generalization, see Steven Bernstein et al., "Social Science as Case-Based Diagnostics," in Richard Ned Lebow and Mark Irving Lichbach, eds, *Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 237; Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 6; Richard Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9.

¹⁴⁵ Mintz and DeRouen, Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 19. For similar views, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25:4 (2001), 107–46; Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit*, 23, 103–4. For a recent skeptical examination, see Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?," *Security Studies* 22:2 (2013), 153–79.

¹⁴⁶ See also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David G. Victor, "The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making," *Perspectives on Politics* 11:2 (2013), 373.

¹⁴⁷ See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, *Leaders and International Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jessica L. Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 106:2 (2012), 326–47.

¹⁴⁸ For similar approaches, see Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, *Why Leaders Fight*; Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*; McDermott, *Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making*.

dialogue with social norms and identities. They become meaningful only in a cultural context.¹⁴⁹

Presidents, prime ministers, and other rulers rarely devise policies on their own, of course. Advisers often provide crucial support and guidance, and their emotions may influence those of their principal, and vice versa. Even in small circles, group dynamics can shape the process and outcome of decision-making in critical ways.¹⁵⁰ If the documentary record reveals signs of what Andrew Ross conceptualizes as circulations of affect—"conscious and unconscious exchanges of emotion occurring in and through the process of social interaction"—between leaders and their counselors or within the entire decision-making group, the empirical case studies will take them into account.¹⁵¹

The focus of the book is restricted to the perspective of targets, because information about the coercers' affective experience is not strictly necessary to find an answer to the question of what prompts target leaders to defy or accede to threats. Moreover, the concentration on target leaders makes it possible to carry out an in-depth analysis of the emotional trajectories of two key individuals in this study. This does not mean that I ignore the coercer's behavior, however. I recognize that any form of crisis bargaining is shaped by the dynamics of interaction. I will thus examine carefully how the target leaders' perception of the coercers' actions and reactions shaped their feeling and thinking.¹⁵² Since an analysis of the coercer leaders' emotions is beyond the scope of this book, some readers may get the impression that the Americans pursued an affect-free coercive diplomacy, while the target leaders—in this case Iraqis and Russians—were consumed by emotion. This is certainly not an impression I wish to create. It is not my intention to reproduce Euro-American stereotypes about overly emotional or irrational non-Westerners.¹⁵³ The US sources I have consulted for this project suggest that Presidents John F. Kennedy and George H. W. Bush felt just as strongly about these conflicts as their counterparts in Moscow and Baghdad, respectively.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ I thank the anonymous reviewers for this point. See also Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 54.

¹⁵⁰ See Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, 2nd edn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne, "The Polythink Syndrome and Elite Group Decision-Making," *Advances in Political Psychology* 37:1 (2016), 3–21; Elizabeth N. Saunders, "No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making," *International Organization* 71, Supplement (2017), S219–47.

¹⁵¹ Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 16. ¹⁵² See Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*, 6.

¹⁵³ For a classic account critical of such Western ethnocentrism, see Catherine A. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See also L. H. M. Ling, "Decolonizing the International: Towards Multiple Emotional Worlds," *International Theory* 6:3 (2014), 580; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 127.

¹⁵⁴ To avoid the impression of emotion-free US policy-makers, I will refer to evidence of coercer leaders' emotions at critical junctures of coercive diplomacy in the footnotes. I thank the anonymous reviewers for this idea.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The remainder of the book proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 develops the logic of affect, or emotional choice theory, as an alternative action model besides the traditional logics of consequences and appropriateness. Drawing on research in sociology and psychology, the model captures not only the social nature of emotions but also their bodily and dynamic character. It posits that the interplay between identities, norms, and five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—can shape decision-making in profound ways. The chapter derives a series of propositions how the five key emotions tend to influence the choice behavior of political leaders whose countries are targeted by coercive diplomacy. These propositions specify the affective conditions under which they are likely to accept or reject a coercer's demands.

The empirical study of phenomena as elusive as emotions raises thorny methodological challenges. Chapter 3 proposes a methodological strategy for detecting the external representations of emotions. Borrowing techniques from linguistics, psychology, and sociology, the chapter brings together qualitative sentiment analysis and an interpretive approach to infer actors' emotions and their intensity from textual sources. It delineates a number of methodological steps to recover the cultural, strategic, and individual context of emotions. Moreover, the chapter uses process philosophy to develop a process form of explanation as an alternative to conventional causal and constitutive analysis, neither of which is suitable for theorizing the relationship between emotions and decision-making. This process account is then combined with an interpretive variant of process tracing, which makes it possible to grasp the dynamic nature of emotions and to explore their influences on choice behavior.

Chapter 4 evaluates emotional choice theory's propositions in a case study about eight major decisions by Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis. It argues that the theory offers a more comprehensive explanation of his choice behavior than existing accounts. Specifically, it shows that the Soviet premier's defiance of Kennedy's demand to remove the missiles from Cuba during the first two days of the crisis was not only shaped by his hope that his technicians on the island would soon complete all rocket installations. It was also influenced by his sense of humiliation and anger at what he saw as the American president's refusal to recognize him as leader of a power co-equal to the United States. In the last four days of the crisis, however, the decline of Khrushchev's hope, anger, and humiliation, the absence or low level of pride, and a growing fear of nuclear war shaped his preference for giving in to US demands. His fear was not triggered by JFK's alleged resolve to attack Cuba, as most existing accounts imply. Rather, it was aroused by a growing belief that the president might lose control over his emotions and over bellicose hardliners in his administration, inadvertently bringing about a nuclear escalation.

The premier's identity dynamics help to explain why he did not seem to experience any anger or humiliation when he finally decided to withdraw the rockets from Cuba. A careful reading of the documentary record indicates that he interpreted a message from Washington at the height of the crisis to mean that Kennedy was at long last recognizing him as leader of a co-equal power. This perceived validation of his identity enabled him to preserve his self-esteem in retreat.

Chapter 5 applies the logic of affect to explain eight major decisions by Saddam Hussein in the course of the Gulf conflict in 1990–1. The theory enhances our understanding of the Iraqi president's choice behavior in a number of ways. It demonstrates that his refusal to recall his troops from Kuwait in the face of pressure from the United States and its allies was shaped by a complex set of emotions: He found it difficult to abandon Kuwait because its conquest served as a continuous source of pride for his narcissistic self. He also came to nourish hope that he would be able to defeat the American troops with the support of foreign volunteer fighters from across the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, he tried hard to down-regulate his fear of a US attack, partly because his identity as the Arab knight placed a taboo on the experience of this emotion. Toward the end of the crisis, any fear that he may have felt came to be overlaid by a deep sense of humiliation and anger at what he saw as the Bush administration's degrading behavior. The combination of these emotions and identity dynamics influenced his desire to resist in the face of all adversity.

Finally, the concluding chapter assesses the explanatory power of the logic of affect. It suggests that the model is able to illuminate some decisions that are difficult to comprehend from the standpoint of existing theoretical approaches. The logic of affect also improves on accounts where the logics of consequences and appropriateness already enjoy some success. This results in more complete explanations for why coercive diplomacy worked in the missile crisis but not in the Gulf conflict. After comparing the findings of the case studies, the chapter sketches their policy implications for the practice of forceful persuasion in the twenty-first century. Finally, it maps out some avenues for future research that build on this effort to introduce an affect-based paradigm into International Relations.

of this book. The second section sketches out the theory's ontological and epistemological assumptions, and synthesizes three major scholarly debates about the nature of emotion into a unified definition. The third section utilizes research in sociology to outline how culture guides affective experience through emotion norms and identities. Based on findings from psychologists, the fourth section specifies how five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—tend to shape actors' thinking and behavior. The fifth section derives a series of propositions from these insights and applies them to the decision-making of political leaders whose countries are targets of coercive diplomacy. The last section incorporates people's limited ability to regulate their emotions and the role of their individual dispositions into the logic of affect.

AN AFFECTIVE REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Scholars working in the three main IR paradigms—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—used to rely on reason and cognition to explain world politics, and many still do so today. Some researchers noticed the traditional disregard of the role of emotion in international affairs early on. Friedrich Kratochwil, for example, charged in the mid-1990s that it was “hardly excusable that the question of what role sentiments play in the constitution of the social and moral world has been so neglected.”⁴ This led him to call for a “much-needed corrective” to the tradition of examining political phenomena solely through cognitive lenses. For “leaving unanalyzed the feelings behind the thoughts, the issues of sympathy and approbation, of solidarity, and, unfortunately, also of hate, is not simply an omission,” he noted. “It is to fail in the very effort of providing a coherent account of social reality.”⁵ A couple of years later, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink criticized that “affect and empathy have been swept under the carpet in recent decades.” The result was “politics without passion or principles, which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live.”⁶ In a seminal article from 2000, Neta Crawford appealed to students of international relations to use findings in psychology, neuroscience, and other disciplines to investigate the influence of emotions

⁴ Friedrich Kratochwil, “Citizenship: On the Border of Order,” in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds, *Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 192.
⁵ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), 916. See also Jervis, “Signaling and Perception,” 294–5.

2

The Logic of Affect

International Relations (IR) scholars have generally employed the logics of consequences and appropriateness to explain decision-making.¹ In his classic *Economy and Society*, Max Weber, however, mentioned a further logic of choice. He suggested that human behavior can also be motivated by emotions and “feeling states.”² Weber did not elaborate much on this idea, but he inspired subsequent generations of sociologists and psychologists to theorize the emotional dimension of actorhood.³ Drawing on their insights, this chapter introduces the logic of affect, or a theory of emotional choice, into the field of International Relations.

The logic of affect is developed in six steps, which move from the general to the specific. The first section reviews the vibrant scholarship on the role of affect and emotions in world politics that serves as the intellectual foundation

¹ The present study focuses on the logics of consequences and appropriateness, because they are the dominant action models in the field. Besides these classic logics of choice, however, IR theorists have developed valuable additional theories of actorhood, including a logic of argumentation—see Risse, “Let’s Argue!,” 1–39; Harald Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 10:3 (2004), 395–435—a logic of national relations; *European Journal of International Relations*, “European Journal of International Relations” habit—see Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 16:4 (2010), 539–61; Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics—A Logic of Practicality*—see Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy,” *Millennium* 31:3 (2002), 627–51; Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” *International Organization* 62:2 (2008), 257–88; Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010)—and a logic of rational intuitionism—see Marcus Holmes and David Traven, “Acting Rationally without Really Thinking: The Logic of Rational Intuitionism for International Relations Theory,” *International Studies Review* 17:3 (2015), 414–40.

² See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 24–5.

³ See Elster, “Emotional Choice and Rational Choice,” 263–82; Flam, “Emotional ‘Man,’” 39–56; Jennifer M. George and Erik Dane, “Affect, Emotion, and Decision Making,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 136 (2016), 47–55; Hochschild, *The Managed Heart*; Lerner et al., “Emotion and Decision Making,” 799–823; Loewenstein and Lerner, “The Role of Affect in Decision Making,” 619–42.

on global phenomena.⁷ "How we think *and feel* about ourselves and others is as important as the brute facts of anarchy or military technology," she submitted.⁸

Over the past ten years, Crawford's call has been eagerly taken up by several dozens of IR scholars.⁹ As a consequence, the number of publications on the role of affect and emotion in world politics has skyrocketed. Authors have approached these issues from diverse theoretical perspectives. Some have observed that fear is central to the realist premise that the anarchical international system leads states to seek security or power, and started exploring this emotion in-depth.¹⁰ Others have found that liberal assumptions about how

⁷ See Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics," 116–56. For a recent reiteration, see Jean-Michel Roy, "From Intersubjectivity to International Relations: The Relevance of the 'Emotive Turn' of Cognitive Science," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 80–111.

⁸ Neta C. Crawford, "Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking 'Man,'" *International Relations* 23:2 (2009), 278, emphasis in original.

⁹ For practical purposes, this section is limited to studies on the role of emotions in international relations. Much valuable work, however, has been done in the fields of domestic politics, comparative government, and political theory as well. See, for example, Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian, *Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett, and Simon Thompson, eds., *Emotion, Politics and Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jon Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Sharon R. Krause, *Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); G. E. Marcus, "Emotions in Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000), 221–50; W. Russell Neuman et al., eds., *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Martha C. Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2013); David P. Redlawsk, ed., *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett, eds., *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies* (New York: Continuum, 2012).

¹⁰ See Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 62–80; Crawford, "Human Nature and World Politics," 271–88; Annette Freyberg-Inan, "Between Fear and Despair: Human Nature in Realism," in Jacobi and Freyberg-Inan, eds., *Human Beings in International Relations*, 32–53; Arash Heydariyan Pashakanlou, *Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morigenitaku, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Joshua D. Kertzer and Kathleen M. McGraw, "Folk Realism: Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens," *International Studies Quarterly* 56:2 (2012), 245–58; Brian C. Rathbun, "Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 51:3 (2007), 533–57; Andrew A. G. Ross, "Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics," *International Theory* 5:2 (2013), 273–99; Shing Tang, "Fear in International Politics: Two Positions," *International Studies Review* 10:3 (2008), 451–71; Eric Van Rynhoven, "The Perils of Realist Advocacy and the Promise of Securitization Theory: Revisiting the Tragedy of the Iraq War Debate," *European Journal of International Relations* 22:3 (2016), 487–511.

cooperative strategies and institutions can help states to further their economic wellbeing and avoid conflict are closely linked to affective concepts like trust and empathy.¹¹ Yet others have begun to investigate the emotional underpinnings of cultural constructs like norms,¹² taboos,¹³ identities,¹⁴ discourses,¹⁵

¹¹ See Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, 232–4; Robert O. Keohane, "Empathy and International Regimes," in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., *Beyond Self-Interest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 227–36; Richard Ned Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," *International Politics* 42:3 (2005), 304; Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64:1 (2010), 6–8; Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," 95–9; Brian C. Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds," *International Theory* 1:3 (2009), 345–80; Brian C. Rathbun, *Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 24–40; Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Investigating Diplomatic Transformations," *International Affairs* 89:2 (2013), 477–96.

¹² See Ingrid Creppell, "The Concept of Normative Threat," *International Theory* 3:3 (2011), 450–87; Paul A. Kowert, "Completing the Ideational Triangle: Identity, Choice, and Obligation in International Relations," in Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul A. Kowert, eds., *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 30–53; Steven C. Roach, "Affective Values in International Relations: Theorizing Emotional Actions and the Value of Resilience," *Politics* 36:4 (2016), 400–12; Wesley W. Widmaier and Susan Park, "Differences beyond Theory: Structural, Strategic, and Sentimental Approaches to Normative Change," *International Studies Perspectives* 13:2 (2012), 123–34.

¹³ See Thomas M. Dolan, "Unthinkable and Tragic: The Psychology of Weapons Taboos in War," *International Organization* 67:1 (2013), 37–63; Frank Sauer, *Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

¹⁴ See Nina Elena Eggers, "Mehr Leidenschaft für Europa? Zur Bedeutung von Identitäten und Emotionen im Kontext der Europawahl," in Korte, ed., *Emotionen und Politik*, 271–96; Ioannis D. Evrigenis, *Fear of Enemies and Collective Action* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Fierke, *Political Self-Sacrifice*; Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*; Caron E. Gentry, "Anxiety and the Creation of the Scapegoated Other," *Critical Studies on Security* 3:2 (2015), 133–46; Hutchison and Bleiker, "Emotional Reconciliation," 385–403; Matthew Coen Leep, "The Affective Production of Others: United States Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Cooperation and Conflict* 45:3 (2010), 331–52; Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 217–22; Andrew Linklater, "Anger and World Politics: How Collective Emotions Shift over Time," *International Theory* 6:3 (2014), 515–35; "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," *International Theory* 6:3 (2014), 515–35; Dominique Moisi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World* (London: Random House, 2009); Deepa Parakash, "More than a Feeling: Emotional Responses to International Criticism in Erdoğan's Turkey," *Review of International Studies* 43:1 (2016), 130–51; Ross, "Coming in from the Cold," 197–222; Jelena Subotic and Ayşe Zarakol, "Cultural Intimacy in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19:4 (2013), 915–38; Mira Sucharov, "Imagining Ourselves Then and Now: Nostalgia and Canadian Multiculturalism," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16:4 (2013), 539–65.

¹⁵ See Jack Holland and Ty Solomon, "Affect is What States Make of It: Articulating Everyday Experiences of 9/11," *Critical Studies on Security* 2:3 (2014), 262–77; Koschut, "The Power of (Emotion) Words"; Ty Solomon, *The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015).

and practices,¹⁶ which mainstream constructivists conceived of as purely cognitive phenomena.¹⁷ These forays into the realm of the "passions" have led researchers to re-examine a wide range of global issues. For example, they have studied the role of affect and emotion in foreign policy,¹⁸ diplomacy,¹⁹ interstate relations,²⁰ crisis bargaining,²¹ threat

¹⁶ See Janice Bially Mattern, "A Practice Theory of Emotions for International Relations," in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds., *International Practices* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 63–86; Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality," 276–8.

¹⁷ See, for example, Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium* 26:2 (1997), 263–4; John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the World Policy: Essays on International Institutionalization* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 37, 201, 230; Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 319.

¹⁸ See Assia Alexieva, "The Role of Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Embarrassment from the Bay of Pigs," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 221–53; Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, "The Role of Emotions in US Security Policy towards Iran," *Global Affairs* 2:2 (2016), 155–64; Christopher J. Fettweis, *The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Nehemia Geva and J. Mark Skoric, "The Emotional Calculus of Foreign Policy Decisions: Getting Emotions Out of the Closet," in Redlawsk, ed., *Feeling Politics*, 209–26; Mintz and DeRouen, Jr., *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 8–9, 16, 29, 99–100, 114, 154; Bianca Naudé, "States Have Emotions Too: An Affect-Centred Approach to South African Foreign Relations," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 23:4 (2016), 475–93; Sasley, "Affective Attachments and Foreign Policy," 687–709; Paul Saurette, "You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics," *Review of International Studies* 32:4 (2006), 495–522; Eric Van Rhythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear? Emotions, Imaginaries, and Limits in the Politics of Securitization," *Security Dialogue* 46:5 (2015), 458–75; Christopher L. Schilling, *Emotional State Theory: Friendship and Fear in Israeli Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015); Reinhard Wolf, "Emotionalisierung der Außenpolitik? Die zunehmende Bedeutung von Emotionen im Politikmanagement der internationalen Beziehungen?," *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 23:4 (2013), 595–603.

¹⁹ See Sarah Ellen Graham, "Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion," *International Studies Review* 16:4 (2014), 522–39; Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*; Hall, "We Will Not Swallow this Bitter Fruit," 521–55; Marcus Holmes, "The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions," *International Organization* 67:4 (2013), 829–61; Holmes and Yurhi-Milo, "The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits," 107–22; Wheeler, "Investigating Diplomatic Transformations," 477–96; Seanon S. Wong, "Emotions and the Communication of Intentions in Face-to-Face Diplomacy," *European Journal of International Relations* 22:1 (2016), 144–67.

²⁰ See Chong and Hall, "One Thing Leads to Another," 20–40; Lucile Eznaack and Simon Koschut, "The Sources of Affect in Interstate Friendship," in Simon Koschut and Andrea Oelsner, eds., *Friendship and International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 72–88; Hall, "Sympathetic States," 369–400; Ainius Lašas, "Shadow of Guilt: U.S.-Rwandese Relations after the 1994 Genocide," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 254–76; Taryn Sheppard, *Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action: Understanding Post-Cold War Crisis Interactions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Edward Slingerland, Eric M. Blanchard, and Lyn Boyd-Judson, "Collision with China: Conceptual Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Markings, and the EP-3 Incident," *International Studies Quarterly* 51:1 (2007), 53–77; Wolf, "Emotionen in den internationalen Beziehungen," 317–32.

²¹ See Hall, "We Will Not Swallow this Bitter Fruit," 521–55; Stephen Benedict Dyson and Paul 't Hart, "Crisis Management," in Huddy, Sears, and Levy, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd edn., 412–15.

perception,²² deterrence,²³ assurance,²⁴ interstate armed conflict,²⁵ causes of war,²⁶ warfare,²⁷ attitudes toward war,²⁸ the termination of wars,²⁹ alliances,³⁰

²² See Creppell, "The Concept of Normative Threat," 450–87; Marcus Holmes, "You Never Get a Second Chance to Make a First Impression? First Encounters and Face-Based Threat Perception," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1:4 (2016), 285–302; Omar Shahabuddin McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict," *International Security* 37:2 (2012), 119–55; Steih, "Threat Perception in International Relations," 377–88.

²³ See Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics," 145–9; Amir Lupovici, *The Power of Deterrence: Emotions, Identity, and American and Israeli Wars of Resolve* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," 13–19; Sauer, *Atomic Anxiety*; Stein, "Rational Deterrence against 'Irrational' Adversaries?," 68–79.

²⁴ See Janice Gross Stein, "The Psychology of Assurance: An Emotional Tale," in Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed., *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 39–52.

²⁵ See Jean-Marc Coicaud, "Emotions and Passions of Death, and the Making of World War II: The Cases of Germany and Japan," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 277–98; Jorg Kustermans and Erik Ringmar, "Modernity, Boredom, and War: A Suggestive Essay," *Review of International Studies* 37:4 (2011), 1775–92; Thomas Lindemann, "Interest, Passion, (Non-)recognition, and Wars: A Conceptual Essay," *Global Discourse* 4:4 (2014), 483–96; Mercer, "Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War," 221–52; Maja Zehfuss, "Hierarchies of Grief and the Possibility of War: Remembering UK Fatalities in Iraq," *Millennium* 38:2 (2009), 419–40.

²⁶ See Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010); Jennifer Mützen and Randall L. Schweller, "Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War," *Security Studies* 20:1 (2011), 2–35.

²⁷ See Ben Anderson, "Modulating the Excess of Affect: Morale in a State of 'Total War,'" in Gregg and Seigworth, eds., *The Affect Theory Reader*, 161–85; Victoria M. Basham, "Waiting for War: Soldiering, Temporality and the Gendered Politics of Boredom and Joy in Military Spaces," in Åhäll and Gregory, eds., *Emotions, Politics and War*, 128–40; Katherine E. Brown and Elina Penttinen, "A 'Sucking Chest Wound' Is Nature's Way of Telling You to Slow Down...: Humour and Laughter in War Time," *Critical Studies on Security* 1:1 (2013), 124–6; Thomas M. Dolan, "Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime Success," *International Studies Quarterly* 60:2 (2016), 230–42; Thomas M. Dolan, "Emotion and Strategic Learning in War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12:4 (2016), 571–90; Dolan, "Unthinkable and Tragic," 37–63; Thomas Gregory, "Photographing War: Don McCullin, Vietnam and the Politics of Emotion," in Åhäll and Gregory, eds., *Emotions, Politics and War*, 182–94; Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 21, 25–6; Helen Parr, "Representations of Grief and the Falklands War," in Åhäll and Gregory, eds., *Emotions, Politics and War*, 154–66; Kenneth Payne, *The Psychology of Strategy: Exploring Rationality in the Vietnam War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Roger D. Petersen and Evangelos Liaras, "Countering Fear in War: The Strategic Use of Emotion," *Journal of Military Ethics* 5:4 (2006), 317–33; Michael J. Shapiro, "Encounters: War's Becoming Subjects," *Critical Studies on Security* 1:1 (2013), 136–41; Julia Welland, "Compassionate Soldiering and Comfort," in Åhäll and Gregory, eds., *Emotions, Politics and War*, 115–27.

²⁸ See Scott Sigmund Gartner and Christopher F. Gelpi, "The Affect and Effect of Images of War on Individual Opinion and Emotions," *International Interactions* 42:1 (2016), 172–88.

²⁹ See Kenneth Payne, "Fighting On: Emotion and Conflict Termination," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 28:3 (2015), 480–97.

³⁰ See Lucile Eznaack, "Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships," *Security Studies* 20:2 (2011), 238–65; Lucile Eznaack, *Crises in the Atlantic Alliance: Affect and Relations among NATO Members* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

political and security communities,³¹ nuclear proliferation,³² honor considerations,³³ status-seeking,³⁴ stigmatization,³⁵ conflict resolution,³⁶ reconciliation,³⁷ international cooperation,³⁸ foreign interventions³⁹ and

³¹ See Emma Hutchison, "Affective Communities as Security Communities," *Critical Studies on Security* 1:1 (2013), 127–9; Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*; Koschut, "Emotional (Security) Communities," 533–58.

³² See Hyman, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*.

³³ See Thomas Dolan, "Demanding the Impossible: War, Bargaining, and Honor," *Security Studies* 24:3 (2015), 528–62; Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunziker, "Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War," *Security Studies* 24:4 (2015), 662–95.

³⁴ See Tuomas Forsberg, "Status Conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and Emotional Biases," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47:3–4 (2014), 323–31; Regina Heller, "Russia's Quest for Respect in the International Conflict Management in Kosovo," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47:3–4 (2014), 333–43; Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47:3–4 (2014), 269–79; Tudor A. Onea, "Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry," *Review of International Studies* 40:1 (2014), 125–52; Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*; Andrei P. Tsygankov, "The Frustrating Partnership: Honor, Status, and Emotions in Russia's Discourses of the West," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47:3–4 (2014), 345–54; Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition," *International Theory* 3:1 (2011), 105–42; Reinhard Wolf, "Treating Asian Nations with Respect: Promises and Pitfalls of Status Recognition," *Global Discourse* 4:4 (2014), 462–80.

³⁵ See Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society," *International Organization* 68:1 (2014), 143–76; Ayşe Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³⁶ See Eran Halperin, "Emotional Barriers to Peace: Emotions and Public Opinion of Jewish Israelis about the Peace Process in the Middle East," *Peace and Conflict* 17:1 (2011), 22–45; Eran Halperin, "Emotion, Emotion Regulation, and Conflict Resolution," *Emotion Review* 6:1 (2014), 68–76; Naomi Head, "Transforming Conflict: Trust, Empathy, and Dialogue," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds, *Emotions in International Politics*, 358–79; Bahar Rumelili, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Paul Saurette and Henrik Thune, "Dialogue in a World of Emotional Politics," in Pernille Rieker and Henrik Thune, eds, *Dialogue and Conflict Resolution: Potential and Limits* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 51–72.

³⁷ See Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations after World War II* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Stuart J. Kaufman, "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 43:2 (2006), 201–18; William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 123–50; Shiping Tang, "Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy," *World Politics* 63:4 (2011), 711–49.

³⁸ See Hall, "Sympathetic States," 369–400; Holmes and Yachi-Milo, "The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits," 107–22; Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," 283–313; Torsten Michel, "Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19:4 (2013), 869–90.

³⁹ See Dakhong Kim, "Affect and Public Support for Military Action," *Sage Open* (2014), 1–13; Cigdem V. Sirin, José D. Villabos, and Nehemia Geva, "Political Information and Emotions in Ethnic Conflict Interventions," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 22:1 (2011), 35–59.

the resulting local opposition,⁴⁰ colonialism and post-colonialism,⁴¹ social movements,⁴² rebellion and revolution,⁴³ intergroup conflict,⁴⁴ civil war,⁴⁵

⁴⁰ See Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans*.

⁴¹ See Ling, "Decolonizing the International," 579–83; Himadeep Muppidi, "Shame and Rage: International Relations and the World School of Colonialism," in Robin L. Riley and Naem Inayatullah, eds, *Interrogating Imperialism: Conversations on Gender, Race, and War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 51–61.

⁴² See Helena Flam, "The Transnational Movement for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation as an Emotional (Rule) Regime?," *Journal of Political Power* 6:3 (2013), 363–83; Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Himadeep Muppidi, *Politics in Emotion: The Song of Telangana* (New York: Routledge, 2014); Irena L. Sargsyan and Andrew Bennett, "Discursive Emotional Appeals in Sustaining Violent Social Movements in Iraq, 2003–11," *Security Studies* 25:4 (2016), 608–45.

⁴³ See Wendy Pearlman, "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings," *Perspectives in Politics* 11:2 (2013), 387–409; Wendy Pearlman, "Narratives of Fear in Syria," *Perspectives on Politics* 14:1 (2016), 21–37; Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴⁴ See Stephane J. Baele, Olivier C. Sterck, and Elisabeth Meur, "Theorizing and Measuring Emotions in Conflict: The Case of the 2011 Palestinian Statehood Bid," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60:4 (2016), 718–47; Daniel Bar-Tal, "Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?," *Political Psychology* 22:3 (2001), 601–27; Christopher Claassen, "Group Entitlement, Anger and Participation in Intergroup Violence," *British Journal of Political Science* 46:1 (2016), 127–48; Crawford, "Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics," 535–57; Dana Gold, "The Politics of Emotion: A Case Study of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Israel Studies Review* 30:2 (2015), 113–29; Eran Halperin, "Group-Based Hatred in Intractable Conflict in Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52:5 (2008), 713–36; Eran Halperin and James Gross, "Intergroup Anger in Intractable Conflict: Long-Term Sentiments Predict Anger Responses during the Gaza War," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 14:4 (2011), 477–88; Eran Halperin et al., "Anger, Hatred, and the Quest for Peace: Anger Can Be Constructive in the Absence of Hatred," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55:2 (2011), 274–91; Peter K. Hatemi et al., "Fear as a Disposition and an Emotional State: A Genetic and Environmental Approach to Out-Group Political Preferences," *American Journal of Political Science* 57:2 (2013), 279–93; Naomi Head, "A Politics of Empathy: Encounters with Empathy in Israel and Palestine," *Review of International Studies* 42:1 (2016), 95–113; Head, "Costly Encounters of the Empathic Kind," 171–99; Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Stuart J. Kaufman, "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," *Security Studies* 18:3 (2009), 400–34; Karina V. Korostelina, *Political Insults: How Offenses Escalate Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); McDoom, "The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict," 119–55; Ifat Maoz and Clark McCauley, "Threat Perceptions and Feelings as Predictors of Jewish-Israeli Support for Compromise with Palestinians," *Journal of Peace Research* 46:4 (2009), 525–39.

⁴⁵ See Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies, and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943–45," *International Security* 40:2 (2015), 119–57; Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Stuart J. Kaufman, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence," *International Security* 30:4 (2006), 45–86; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Symbols, Frames, and Violence: Studying Ethnic War in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 55:4 (2011), 937–58; Stuart J. Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*; Petersen and Zukerman, "Anger, Violence, and Political Science," 561–81; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 93–121; Pierre de Senarclens, "From Group Identity to Ethnic Violence," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds, *Emotions in International Politics*, 299–314.

political violence,⁴⁶ terrorism,⁴⁷ counter-terrorism and the US "war on terror,"⁴⁸ trauma and memories of violence,⁴⁹ humanitarianism,⁵⁰

⁴⁶ See Linda Åhäll, "Confusion, Fear, Disgust: Emotional Communication in Representations of Female Agency in Political Violence," in Linda Åhäll and Laura J. Shepherd, eds., *Gender, Agency and Political Violence* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 169–83; Khaled Fattah and K. M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," *European Journal of International Relations* 15:1 (2009), 67–93; Fierke, *Political Self-Sacrifice*, 193–227; Victoria Fontan, "Polarization between Occupier and Occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: Colonial Humiliation and the Formation of Political Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18:2 (2006), 217–38; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Ungendering the Links between Emotions and Violence: Towards a Political Appreciation of Empathy and Compassion," in Åhäll and Shepherd, eds., *Gender, Agency and Political Violence*, 151–68.

⁴⁷ See K. M. Fierke, "Agents of Death: The Structural Logic of Suicide Terrorism and Martyrdom," *International Theory* 1:1 (2009), 155–84; K. M. Fierke, "Terrorism and Trust in Northern Ireland," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2:3 (2009), 497–511; David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith, "Political Rage: Terrorism and the Politics of Emotion," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21:1 (2009), 85–98.

⁴⁸ See Ian Burkitt, "Powerful Emotions: Power, Government, and Opposition in the 'War on Terror,'" *Sociology* 39:4 (2005), 679–95; Lloyd Cox and Steve Wood, "'Got Him': Revenge, Emotions, and the Killing of Osama bin Laden," *Review of International Studies* 43:1 (2017), 112–29; Alex Danchev, "Like a Dog! Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 31:3 (2006), 259–83; Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics after 9/11," *International Organization* 69:4 (2015), 847–79; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Emotions in the War on Terror," in Alex J. Bellamy et al., eds., *Security and the War on Terror* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 57–70; John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, "The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11," *International Security* 37:1 (2012), 81–110; Sven Opietz, "Zeitnotstandsgesetze: Affekte und Recht im Antiterrorkrieg," *Mitteilungsblatt des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung* 24:1–2 (2015), 156–70; Andrew A. G. Ross, "Exceptionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Emotional Politics of Human Rights," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 315–40; Saurette, "You Dissin Me?," 495–522; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 67–92; Ty Solomon, "Affective Investment in the War on Terror," in Michelle Bendley and Jack Holland, eds., *Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 108–23; William Walters, "Parrhesia Today: Drone Strikes, Fearless Speech and the Contentious Politics of Security," *Global Society* 28:3 (2014), 277–99.

⁴⁹ See Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003); K. M. Fierke, "Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War," *Review of International Studies* 30:4 (2004), 471–91; Emma Hutchison, "Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing," *International Relations* 24:1 (2010), 65–86; Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics*; Hutchison and Bleiker, "Grief and the Transformation of Emotions after War," 210–21; Hutchison and Bleiker, "Emotional Reconciliation," 385–403; Ty Solomon, "I Wasn't Angry, Because I Couldn't Believe It Was Happening," *Affect and Discourse in Responses to 9/11*, *Review of International Studies* 38:4 (2012), 907–28; Catarina Kinnvall, "Feeling Ontologically (In)secure: States, Traumas and the Governing of Gendered Space," *Cooperation and Conflict* 52:1 (2017), 90–108; Kate Schick, "Acting Out and Working Through: Trauma and (In)security," *Review of International Studies* 37:4 (2011), 1837–55; Maja Zehfus, *Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁵⁰ See Emma Hutchison, "A Global Politics of Pity? Disaster Imagery and the Emotional Construction of Solidarity after the 2004 Asian Tsunami," *International Political Sociology* 8:1 (2014), 1–19; Juha Kåpylä and Denis Kennedy, "Cruel to Care? Investigating the Governance of Compassion in the Humanitarian Imaginary," *International Theory* 6:2 (2014), 255–92; Andrew Linklater, "Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations," *International Politics* 44:1 (2007), 19–36; Katharyne Mitchell, "Celebrity Humanitarianism, Transnational Emotion and the Rise of

international development,⁵¹ transnational migration,⁵² international political economy,⁵³ international law,⁵⁴ international ethics,⁵⁵ and transitional justice,⁵⁶ as well as power,⁵⁷ belief formation,⁵⁸ ideology,⁵⁹ nationalism,⁶⁰ and ontological security,⁶¹ among other issues.

⁵¹ See Tristen Naylor, "Deconstructing Development: The Use of Power and Pity in the International Development Discourse," *International Studies Quarterly* 55:1 (2011), 177–97.

⁵² See Anne-Marie D'Aoust, "Love as Project of (Im)mobility: Love, Sovereignty and Governmentality in Marriage Migration Management Practices," *Global Society* 28:3 (2014), 317–35.

⁵³ See Earl Gammon, "Affect and the Rise of the Self-Regulating Market," *Millennium* 37:2 (2008), 251–78; Jocelyn Pixley, "Emotions of Uncertainty, Competition and Cooperation in the International Financial Sector," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 112–36; Wesley W. Widmaier, "Economics Are Too Important to Leave to Economists: The Everyday—and Emotional—Dimensions of International Political Economy," *Review of International Political Economy* 16:5 (2009), 945–57; Wesley W. Widmaier, "Emotions before Paradigms: Elite Anxiety and Populist Resentment from the Asian to Subprime Crises," *Millennium* 39:1 (2010), 127–44.

⁵⁴ See Vesselin Popovski, "Emotions and International Law," in Ariffin, Coicaud, and Popovski, eds., *Emotions in International Politics*, 184–203.

⁵⁵ See Renée Jeffery, "Reason, Emotion, and the Problem of World Poverty: Moral Sentiment Theory and International Ethics," *International Theory* 3:1 (2011), 143–78; Renée Jeffery, *Reason and Emotion in International Ethics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Steven C. Roach, "Why Moral Commitments Matter: Mapping the Ethics and Politics of Responsible and Accountable Global Governance," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29:1 (2016), 309–26.

⁵⁶ See Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially 216–44; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 123–50.

⁵⁷ See Jack Barbalet and Xiaoying Qi, "The Paradox of Power: Conceptions of Power and the Relations of Reason and Emotion in European and Chinese Culture," *Journal of Political Power* 6:3 (2013), 405–18; Jonathan G. Heaney, "Emotions and Power: A Bifocal Prescription to Cure Theoretical Myopia," *Journal of Political Power* 6:3 (2013), 355–62; Koschut, "The Power of (Emotion) Words"; Ty Solomon, "Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power," *International Studies Review* 14:2 (2012), 201–24; Ty Solomon, "The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power," *European Journal of International Relations* 20:3 (2014), 720–41.

⁵⁸ See Jervis, "Understanding Beliefs," 642, 652–4; Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," 1–31.

⁵⁹ See Hanna Samir Kassab, *The Power of Emotion in Politics, Philosophy, and Ideology and Conflict* 48:1 (2013), 100–21.

⁶⁰ See William A. Callahan, "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29:1 (2004), 199–218; William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapters 2–4; Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 43–53; Simon Koschut, "The Structure of Feeling: Emotion Culture and National Self-Sacrifice in World Politics," *Millennium* 45:2 (2017), 174–92; Ning Liao, "Dualistic Identity, Memory-Encoded Norms, and State Emotion: A Social Constructivist Account of Chinese Foreign Relations," *East Asia* 30:2 (2013), 139–60; Thomas J. Scheff, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Sheppard, *Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action*, 158–61; Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

⁶¹ Several scholars have observed that ontological security can be associated with emotions like pride, for example, while ontological insecurity may be related to fear, anxiety, frustration, shame, or nostalgia, for instance. See Kinnvall, "Feeling Ontologically (In)secure," 90–108; Lupovici, *The Power of Deterrence*, 59–69; Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations*

These accounts have substantially enhanced our understanding of how affect and emotion permeate and shape world politics. They represent the first phase of a veritable affective revolution in International Relations that places emotion at the center of inquiry. This book builds on some of their findings, especially with regard to foreign policy decision-making and crisis bargaining. While much of this literature explores emotion at the level of large groups or states,⁶² however, the present study regards individual leaders as the most important level of analysis to investigate how targets respond to coercive diplomacy.⁶³ A growing number of scholars is incorporating the affective experience of decision-makers into the study of diplomacy and foreign policy. Given that their accounts serve as the intellectual bedrock of this book, the remainder of this section will review them in more detail.

Leaders' Emotions and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

A few experts started exploring the relationship between emotions and foreign policy decision-making as early as in the 1970s. Irving Janis and Leon Mann drew on motivational psychology to develop a model describing how the desire to avoid fear, guilt, and shame imposes limitations on the rationality of policy-makers' choice behavior.⁶⁴ Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice

12.3 (2006), 341–70; Rumelli, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security*; Brent J. Steele, "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War," *Review of International Studies* 31:3 (2005), 519–40; Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (New York: Routledge, 2008), especially 13, 52–5, 114–47; Aysé Zarakol, "Ontological (In)security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan," *International Relations* 24:1 (2010), 3–23.

⁶² Some scholars conceptualize states as large emotional groups. See, for example, Mercer, "Feeling Like a State," 515–35; Brent E. Sasley, "Theorizing States' Emotions," *International Studies Review* 13:3 (2011), 452–4. Other authors treat states as corporate actors that feel through the emotions of the individuals representing them. See, for instance, Lucile Eznack, "The Mood Was Grave: Affective Dispositions and States' Anger-Related Behaviour," *Contemporary Security Policy* 34:3 (2013), 552–80; Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," *Security Studies* 17:4 (2008), 689–90; Naudé, "States Have Emotions Too," 475–93; Sheppard, *Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action*, 17. Yet others conceive of states themselves as organic, human-like entities. See Alexander Wendt, "The State as Person in International Theory," *Review of International Studies* 30:2 (2004), 313–14.

⁶³ Some scholars are skeptical about the idea of conceptualizing emotions at the state level, in part because they view states as incapable of experiencing emotions. See, for example, P. E. Digeser, "Friendship between States," *British Journal of Political Science* 39:2 (2009), 324, 337; Hall, "Sympathetic States," 381, 399; Hall, "We Will Not Swallow this Bitter Fruit," 532; Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, 509; Iver B. Neumann, "Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State," *Review of International Studies* 30:2 (2004), 259–67; Graham M. Smith, "Friendship and the World of States," *International Politics* 48:1 (2011), 11; Stein, "Foreign Policy Decision Making," 143.

⁶⁴ See Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 3.

Gross Stein, and Ralph White were building on this approach and other research in psychology in the 1970s and 1980s to explain how affective processes contribute to misperception, biased information processing, and other forms of suboptimal decision-making in interstate relations, crisis politics, and war.⁶⁵ In the mid-1990s, Blema Steinberg posited that feelings of shame and humiliation help to explain why Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon escalated US military involvement in Vietnam and Dwight Eisenhower did not.⁶⁶ David Welch maintained that the combination of intense emotion and nationalistic cultural scripts impaired the judgment of the Argentinian leaders as they embarked on the invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982.⁶⁷

Up until that point, IR scholars generally assumed that emotions diminish the quality of decision-making.⁶⁸ In the early 2000s, however, Rose McDermott, Jonathan Mercer, and others began to use new findings in neuroscience to argue that affective experience can also have adaptive functions by facilitating quick, effective, and accurate choice behavior.⁶⁹ Further studies have built on this central insight. One group of authors has examined the role of leaders' affect in national security decision-making; Stephen Peter Rosen, for example, has developed the notion of emotion-based pattern recognition to explain how memories formed at times of emotional arousal can help to account for decisions to wage war, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt's intervention on the side of Great Britain during World War II.⁷⁰ Jonathan Mercer has shown that

⁶⁵ See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 356–81; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*; Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 19, 116–18, 138–46, 148, 151; Janice Gross Stein, "Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," *Political Psychology* 9:2 (1988), 245–71; Ralph K. White, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of US-Soviet Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1984), ix, 3, 26, 91–2.

⁶⁶ See Blema S. Steinberg, *Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 6. See also Blema S. Steinberg, "Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychoanalytic Perspective," *Political Psychology* 12:4 (1991), 653–90.

⁶⁷ See David A. Welch, "Culture and Emotion as Obstacles to Good Judgment: The Case of Argentina's Invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas," in Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 191–215. See also Welch, *Painful Choices*, 8, 36–41. Christopher Fettweis makes a similar argument with regard to what he considers the "irrational" and "pathological" fear of dangers abroad by US foreign policy-makers since World War II. See Fettweis, *The Pathologies of Power*, 19.

⁶⁸ An early exception is James Blight's account of how the fear of losing control of events helped John F. Kennedy and his key advisers to focus on a peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. See James Blight, *The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 7–8, 30, 81–2, 150–1.

⁶⁹ See McDermott, "The Feeling of Rationality," 702; Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," 77–106.

⁷⁰ See Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 27–70. For a study linking the role of emotion and prospect theory to explain Roosevelt's decision-making during and after the Munich agreement of September 1938, see Barbara